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Abstract

A purpose of the study was to analyze the construction of reality around the
Georgian media democratization movement in 2010-12. The qualitative analysis of
movement statements (n=17) and in-depth interviews with movement activists (n=12)
found that the movement relied on mobilizing master frames linked to the concept of
democracy: free speech, access to information, fair elections, transparency, plurality, and
devised an innovative frame, it concerns you. The movement pursued two goals with its
framing efforts: improvements in the media environment and mobilization of citizen
participation.
The quantitative analysis of news stories about the movement (n=552) by six proopposition, pro-government, and independent news organizations found that the news
organizations used movement-advanced frames, and, in general, used more mobilizing
than demobilizing frames. The marginalization of the movement, a dominant mode of
news coverage of social movements based on the literature, did not occur. However, the
study found differences in coverage based on news organizations’ ties with the
government and the opposition, or lack thereof. The pro-opposition and independent TV
stations covered the movement more frequently, aired reports at better viewing times,
gave greater voice to the activists and their key frame, it concerns you, and used more
mobilizing frames (the pro-opposition station), than the pro-government TV. The pro-
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opposition newspaper used a more positive tone and lengthier stories, and the
independent newspaper more frequent coverage, than the pro-government newspaper.
However, the pro-government newspaper featured the coverage more prominently and
used activists’ key frame more often. Both pro-government news organizations used
government sources more often, than other media, and focused on those movement issues
that were eventually endorsed by the government.
In-depth interviews with news journalists (n=5) in these news organizations found
that journalists in the pro-opposition and independent media supported movement issues,
engaged in supportive reporting, and approved of advocacy journalism when press
freedoms were in danger. Journalists in pro-government media supported most of the
movement’s demands, but were suspicious of political motives behind movement
activism (the movement mobilized ahead of the Parliamentary Elections 2012) and did
not engage in and disapproved of advocacy journalism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Social movements and activism are on the rise in Georgia. Grown out of protests
over violations of civic and human rights in past years, activist groups have moved from
disorganized expression of grievances to sustained and coordinated collective action.
While there are a few activist groups around the country, the groups pursuing a broad
agenda of democratic rights and values, with backing from major local human rights
organizations and democratically-minded citizens, are by far the best organized and
articulate. These groups are engaged in coordinated and sustained collective action and
are emerging as social movements. They cluster together, forming the force of
democratization in the country1. The proposed study intends to analyze one of these
movements, which we call the media democratization movement, and its activism to
democratize the media sector of Georgia carried out from 2010 through 20122.

1

The term is admittedly broad. Many groups see themselves as contributing to

democracy, but few interpret democracy holistically, as a system of rights and values.
2

MDM activists, interviewed by this study, referred to their struggle variously as “media

advocacy”, “media activism, and “a coalition.” The literature has referred to speech and
media rights movements as “free speech movements” (Postigo, 2012), but also as “media
democratization movements,” especially, in the developing world (Mauersberger, 2012).
1

The democratization of media became a pressing issue before the 2012
parliamentary elections in Georgia, in which the government’s control of the country’s
biggest TV stations created uneven and unfair competition among those running for
elected office (IREX, 2013). The media democratization movement’s activism to ensure
greater transparency of broadcast media ownership and equal access to diverse content
produced spectacular results. The government introduced legislative amendments in the
broadcast and election laws to require the disclosure of ownership structure in the
broadcast outlets, and mandatory distribution of all broadcast signals by cable operators
during the two months prior to Election Day. Georgian citizens gained immediate access
to both government and opposition campaigns and the plurality of factual information
and opinion. The Parliamentary Elections of 2012 were held in a free and fair
environment, and resulted in “the first peaceful, democratic transfer of power since the
country’s independence in 1991” (U.S. Department of State, 2012). The government
ceded power to a coalition of opposition parties.
While media democratization movement (MDM)3 employed a range of
institutional and extra-institutional tactics, it has greatly benefited from securing
extensive and mostly positive media coverage. The activists produced effective frames
that resonated with the public and, arguably, members of the media. The movement
presented proposed media reforms as serving citizens’ democratic right to free speech,
access to plural sources of information and transparency, a strategy that has proven
successful in other countries (Mauersberger, 2012). The frames fit well with Georgian
journalists’ professional values of free speech, access to information, and transparency.

3

The media democratization movement will be abbreviated as MDM in this study.
2

The media democratization movement partnered with the media by forming a coalition
with journalists’ associations and watchdog groups.
The purpose of this study is three-fold: 1) to identify the dominant tone and
frames of coverage of the Georgian media democratization movement across the
dominant news organizations in the country, 2) to analyze whether and perhaps how
political factors and frames constructed by the media democratization movement
influenced the news coverage, and 3) to interpret meanings attached to the media
democratization movement by movement actors and the news media. At a more abstract
level, the study intends to enhance our theoretical knowledge about how media covers
social movements, and how social movements can influence news coverage. Current
theory holds that movements opposed to the status quo have little leverage over news
coverage, and that they generally receive negative and marginalizing media coverage
because the media tend to protect the status quo (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin,
1980). This study will explore if some media outlets in transitional political and media
systems, such as Georgia, are likely to report on social movements in a fair and
substantive manner. The core argument is that dynamic changes in emergent
democracies, such as Georgia, lead to great disparities among political elites and the
media, and the emergence of a new type of independent media, open to change. These
media are new forces in civil society, and were outside the circle of social and political
power during the previous, totalitarian regimes. In general, these media develop and gain
strength as a result of the process of transition (Spark, 2008). These media occupy
disadvantageous positions in relation to other media and thus experience undue
government control and unfair business practices (Freedom Forum, 2011, 2012,
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Transparency International – Georgia, 2011). These media are expected to question the
status quo rather than support it, and sympathize with social movements advocating
change. Social movements in these environments have the independent media, but also
pro-opposition media, as their allies against the government and the system. Since
media’s support for the status quo is the key premise of negative coverage of social
movements (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980), media sectors that oppose the
status quo are not expected to be negatively biased towards social movements. Social
movements that manage to exploit tensions in the “media-state dynamics”
(Mauersberger, 2012, p. 588) and differences in the media (Weaver & Scacco, 2013)
have a chance to gain good access to audiences and fair coverage.
In more established and stable political and media systems, productive interaction
between social movements and media and fair coverage of social movements are rare.
Media propaganda (Herman and Chomsky, 1988), media hegemony (Gitlin, 1980), and
media and conflict theories (Olien et al, 1995), developed in the 1970s and onwards,
explain media’s negative framing of social movements by media’s entrenched ties with
the elites and their interest in maintaining the status quo. In the media and community
conflict perspective (Olien et al, 1989, 1995), media act as “guard dogs” for the elites,
helping them fend off challenges emanating from social movements. The media
propaganda model (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) considers the media to be an integral
part of the elite hegemony, opposed to any change in the existing social structure and
order advocated by social movements. Gitlin (1977, 1980) explained that structural
influences, emanating from elite ownership of the media, interact with aspects of
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journalists’ professional codes (fetishism of facts, objectivity, newsworthiness) and
invariably lead to negative and marginalizing framing of social movements.
The protest paradigm, advanced by Chan and Lee (1984), builds on Gitlin’s ideas.
It posits that journalists’ coverage of protests is determined by their ideologically-based
“reporting paradigms,” which inform “where to look (and where not to look), and …
what to discover” (p. 187), and whether to support or denounce protests. These reporting
paradigms tend to emphasize social controversy or violence surrounding protest
activities, rather than the issues being protested. Yet, contrary to strong hegemony
models, the protest paradigm seems to suggest that an ideologically-inspired “reporting
paradigm” might offer positive news coverage of protest that is ideologically aligned with
the movement at hand. More recently, scholars found greater diversity in the coverage of
protests. As Weaver and Scacco (2013) argue, the recent trend of media diversification,
fueled, in part, by the diffusion of the Internet and media’s greater ideological posturing,
leads to greater opportunities for social movements to secure neutral and even positive
media coverage. This idea is echoed in Harlow and Johnston (2011), who found that the
coverage of Egyptian protests in social media and blogosphere broke away from
formulaic, marginalizing coverage. This holds true in other non-Western contexts
(Mauersberger, 2012; McCarthy et al, 2008; Yuan, 2013). In these contexts, those outlets
in the media landscape oriented towards social change are more sympathetic towards
movement causes.
By quantitatively analyzing Georgian newspaper and TV news content, the study
will look for instances of negative and demobilizing news coverage of the media
democratization movement in 2010 through 2012, as predicted by the Western political
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science and political communication literature, across the dominant news media in the
country’s news ecosystem. It also intends to examine the extent to which the media have
employed “mobilizing” frames. The study hypothesizes that negative coverage of the
media democratization movement will appear in pro-government news media. However,
it hypothesizes that opposition-aligned news media will provide positive coverage of the
movement. The study will explore the nature of coverage of social movements in the
independent news media. The divergent news camps are expected to grant different levels
of prominence to the movement in terms of the length and substance of the coverage and
to use different sources and frames. The study expects to find frames pushed by
movement actors in the news coverage of independent and opposition-aligned news
media.
The qualitative part of the study will further clarify the construction of meanings
around the media democratization movement. What were its goals and mobilizing frames
it has used? What was the rationale behind framing choices? The study will answer these
questions by interviewing activists and activist journalists4 in the media democratization

4

The term “activist journalist” refers to professional journalists, working in the media,

who joined the media democratization movement and openly engaged in activism as
volunteers. “Activist journalist” is different from “news producers” and “news reporters,”
the terms reserved for professionals working in the media but not engaged with the
movement. The study has interviewed both “activist journalists” and “news producers”
and “news reporters.”
6

movement. Interviews with news producers and reporters will answer the question about
their possible support of the movement through advocacy reporting.
This study relies on the framing theory and social constructivist framework to
explain how social actors, such as social movements and media, engage in meaning
construction, that is, framing, to advance their interpretation of issues in the discourse
(Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). The critical perspective informs the
study’s conceptualization of social movements, political elites, and media as potential
parties in social conflict, engaged in mobilizing and demobilizing framing (Herman &
Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980; Olien et al, 1995).
The study hopes to make important contributions to the scholarly literature on the
news media’s interaction with social movements in non-Western contexts. In these
contexts, Western structural and ideological models may not apply, as ownership patterns
are different, political ideologies are not fully formed, social movements and independent
media maintain close ties, and some types of news media are more susceptible to
government control efforts than others. Independent media have emerged as strong
mobilizing forces in the color revolutions in Georgia and other formerly Soviet republics
(Manning, 2007). Their role in less radical collective action, such as lobbying for
democratic improvements in the media and electoral process, warrants attention. Greater
understanding of the successful media democratization movement in Georgia will help
media scholars understand more fully the news media’s interaction with social
movements in transitional democracies and, in general, the role of social movements and
media in democratic transformation.

7

The first chapter of this dissertation provides background on the media
democratization movement. The chapter will also outline the media and political
environment in the country. The second chapter deals with the concept of framing, its
psychological and sociological roots and its current uses in mass media and political
communication studies. Further, the second chapter summarizes the current thinking
about the framing of social movements in media, including critical perspectives on
media’s role in the functioning of social movements, and the framing strategies applied
by social movements to reach their audiences, including the media. The third chapter
outlines the hypotheses and research questions advanced by the study and the methods it
used. The fourth chapter presents findings and discusses the qualitative analysis of
movement statements and in-depth interviews. The fifth chapter presents quantitative
findings and discussion of the media coverage of MDM. The sixth chapter synthesizes
findings in chapters four and five, and presents conclusions.
Before proceeding to the discussion of the substance and scholarly knowledge in
the area of proposed analysis, the author wishes to acknowledge her personal
involvement in the media democratization movement in Georgia, understanding this may
have influenced the selection and treatment of the subject of this study.
Media Democratization Movement
In modern politics, social movements are increasingly seen as engines of social
innovation and change, counteracting forces of social control as embodied by the state
(Goodwin, 2013). Emergent movements in Georgia, united around the democratization
agenda, have scored some spectacular victories in their struggle to secure rights to free
press and information, free and fair elections, and freedom of political assembly. These
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freedoms make the country one of the most progressive transitional democracies of the
former Soviet Union. These movements cluster together, and form the force of
democratization in the country. Georgia’s democratization movements are political
rights-oriented programs. They advocate for new rights but also for the protection and
implementation of the constitutional rights promised to the citizens of Georgia. While
democracy, as a system, enjoys widespread popularity in Georgia5, with groups across
the political spectrum voicing support, only some of these groups, united by the
democratization agenda, interpret democracy holistically, as a system of rights and
values, and act consistently in its service.
The origins of these movements can be traced to the declaration of Georgian
independence from the Soviet Union and the installation of a democratic system of
governance in April, 1991, but their roots are deeper. These roots reach back into the
distant past to the courageous and daring activism of Soviet dissidents and Georgia’s
national liberation movement. By employing the master frames of human and citizen
rights, constructed across years of struggle, emergent movements tap into Georgians’
long standing desire to secure rights and freedoms, withheld during almost two centuries
of Imperial and Communist rule.

5

The recent public opinion poll by the National Democratic Institute in Georgia

established that 13% of Georgians considered freedom of speech and independence of
media as the most important issues facing the country, ahead of jobs and territorial
integrity (Navarro & Woodward, 2013)
9

The media democratization movement has emerged out of a long-standing goal of
democratically-minded groups to open and improve the Georgian media environment and
the media themselves. The country has a partially free media system (Freedom House,
2013), which means censorship and other repressive tools are not in place, but the
government still has the power to manipulate the media. The former governments have
maintained close ties with the owners of nationally-distributed TV stations; if a station
owner did not cooperate with the government, the government often helped find the
station new “loyal” owners. Government’s control of big media businesses has allegedly
stripped independent newspapers and broadcast stations of advertising funds
(Transparency International - Georgia, 2011), and its manipulation of the broadcast
regulatory body led to withholding licenses from unwanted stations in the past (Freedom
House, 2011).
Over the years, the media democratization movement has pressed the government
for reforms to improve the media environment. The democratization of media became a
pressing issue ahead of the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia, which was regarded
as a litmus test for the young Georgian statehood and its democratic credentials.
Democratically-oriented groups have been actively advocating for a peaceful and
constitutional transition of power through competitive, free and fair elections. However,
the government was suspect in his desire to use all available means, including the
bureaucratic apparatus and the control of country’s biggest TV stations, to create an
uneven ground for contenders. Government-dominated major broadcast stations provided
news to 95% of the population, while access to alternative news outside big cities was
poor (Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2009).
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The media democratization movement has focused on two goals, transparency of
ownership and equal access to diverse media content, as key to its action program. Not
only were these goals important for the freedom and health of the media system, they
were essential to holding free and fair elections. Letting the audience know who stood
behind media messages and bias, while simultaneously providing it with diverse sources
of facts and views, equalized the chances of both the government and opposition forces
for a successful campaign. The movement was fully aware that the access to diverse
content was a prerequisite for meaningful and deliberative process (Dahlgren, 1995).
The recent activism started around summer 2010, when activists formed informal
working groups and sketched the program of media democratization (S. S., personal
interview, March 12, 2014; Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). As the first step,
these groups started identifying problems and putting pressure on the government to
introduce changes. The government started discussing, and, in April, 2011, enacted
legislative amendments requiring the disclosure of the ownership structure in broadcast
media. Next, the activists initiated a coalition of major local human rights organizations,
professional journalists’ unions, media development organizations and pressure groups,
with the backing of the Open Society Georgia Foundation, also known as the Soros
Foundation. On April 13, 2011, the Coalition for Media Advocacy was officially
launched. “We publicly declare that we will take all appropriate measures to improve the
media regulatory legislation, establish control over the implementation of all laws and
protect the rights of journalists and the financial independence of the press,” stated the
founding document. The coalition was made up of key non-governmental organizations,
including the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Transparency International --
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Georgia, Civic Development Institute, Non-governmental organization for Civil Society,
Media Club, Open Society – Georgia Foundation, Eurasia Partnership Foundation, and
the independent journalists’ associations, including the Georgian Regional Media
Association, Georgian Regional Broadcasters Association, Regional Broadcasters
Network and the Georgian Charter of Journalism Ethics. These non-governmental
organizations and unions occupied a position similar to that held by advocacy, pressure
and interest groups in Western societies, which hold critical middle ground between
political elites and the public and represent the views of a particularly engaged segment
of the public (McCluskey & Kim, 2012). The coalition became the social movement
organization (SMO) in the media democratization movement.
That the Coalition for Media Advocacy brought watchdog organizations and
media unions together was one of its best strategies. This helped forge ties with the
independent media, but also with the pro-opposition media, which were the members in
the unions. The independent media, have always supported the democratization cause.
The first independent media organizations were started by democratically-minded young
journalists, who distanced themselves from the Soviet media and their propagation of the
Soviet system, and by activists from civil organizations (Topuria, 2000). Over the years,
independent media and civil sector groups have existed almost symbiotically, with human
rights groups lobbying for the freedom of the press and the press emphasizing a human
rights agenda. The independent media have relied on the support of the civil sector
organizations when faced with legal troubles and government pressure.
The coalition started a sustained, high-tension, high-profile campaign which used
a range of institutional and extra-institutional tactics, from the It Concerns You campaign

12

to legislatively enforce a mandatory distribution of all TV stations around Georgia to
active denouncement of government’s media policies and violations of journalists’ rights
in the news media and protest rallies outside government buildings. From April, 2011 to
October, 2012, the Coalition for Media Advocacy actively lobbied the government for
media reforms: it made regular statements on the progress of its media democratization
movement; it was visibly engaged in all cases of media rights violations; it engaged in
direct action, staging protests, and worked to secure supportive statements and actions
from international human rights watchdogs and friendly governments. The coalition
engaged in effective negotiations with the opposition and the government. This activism
produced spectacular results. The government agreed, in June, 2012, to adopt into law the
“must-carry” rule, requiring cable operators to carry all broadcast signals during the two
months prior to Election Day. These were major improvements, contributing to greater
freedom, diversity and viability in the Georgian media (IREX, 2013).
Georgia: The Overview of Political and Media Systems
To put the media democratization movement in context, this study will describe
Georgia’s political and media environment. Georgia is one of three nations in the South
Caucasus. Its transitional political system has been variously described as “centralized”
(Laverty, 2008), “hybrid” (Freedom House, 2011), and “flawed democracy” (Zielis,
2010). The country of 4.5 million inhabitants secured independence on April 9, 1991,
shortly before the Soviet Union declared itself defunct. The first years of independence
were marred by street violence, military coups and civil wars. The wars in Abkhazia and
Ossetia, territories of Georgia, resulted in their secession and de-facto independence. In
the late 1990s, Georgian politics stabilized, but economic chaos and widespread

13

corruption delayed development. In a defining historical moment, Georgians staged mass
protests against rigged parliamentary elections and deposed the “neo-patrimonial
government” of President Shevardnadze in November 2003 (Laverty, 2008). The event,
which became known as the Rose Revolution, brought to power the government of
Michael Saakashvili. Saakashvili, who served two terms as the President of Georgia, and
his team of young politicians launched an impressive program of reforms with the near
total backing of the population. These reforms helped radically reduce corruption,
streamline the government apparatus and produce sustained economic growth. On the
negative side, the government’s weakening of the Parliament and the civil sector,
imposition of control on independent television stations and harassment of political
opponents and business owners damaged the country’s human rights record. The 2008
war with Russia over disputed territories led to the questioning of government’s
leadership and a new burst of activism. In years following the war, political life became
extremely polarized (Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2012). The opposition
parties formed a coalition, initiated by billionaire philanthropist and political newcomer
Bidzina Ivanishvili, in April 2012, which defeated President Saakashvili’s National
Movement party in the 2012 Parliamentary Elections and the 2013 Presidential Elections.
Georgia’s social movements. In the tense and polarized political environment
ahead of the 2012 parliamentary elections, citizens and organizations in Georgia’s civil
sector stepped up activism, engaging the public in the discussion of social and political
problems. Coalition building became a good strategy to follow. The activists organized
around human rights and civil society agenda pushed for greater individual and political
rights, the civil sector’s role in public affairs, and institutionalization of liberal, secular
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values. Other groups have formed conservative agendas, and introduced hard-core
nationalist and chauvinist discourse. Church-based conservative groups follow an agenda
premised on strengthening the Georgian Orthodox Church and repealing liberal reforms,
such as gay and abortion rights. They have distanced themselves from the mainstream
civil society organizations, which they criticize as grant-driven, Western projects.
Georgian media environment. Georgian media outlets reflect the political and
social flux in the country. Pending research on Georgia’s media system, the country
clearly belongs to the type described as “television-centric.” The comparative media
research (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, Norris, 2002, Shehata & Stromback, 2011) defines
media systems by “the relative roles of print and electronic media” (Hallin & Mancini,
2004, p.24). In Georgia, newspaper readership is meager (with leading dailies selling up
to 10,000 copies and weeklies no more than 35,000 copies), while TV reaches 95% of the
population (Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2009, 2012, IREX, 2013). TVcentric systems are more common in “pluralist and polarized” political systems (Norris,
2002, p. 84).
Politically, the news media are one of the most influential institutions in Georgia
(Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2012). Big TV stations have mass viewership.
Print press, with its limited circulation, targets the elites. The media are deeply polarized.
In the recent years, they have “essentially split into two opposing camps, leaving little
room for neutrality and balance in the news” (IREX, 2009, Introduction section, para. 1).
The Georgian media are assessed as “partially free” (Freedom House, 2013).
There is greater independence in the print press than in the TV sector. Most newspapers,
magazines and radio stations are free and independent. The Internet is free. Unlike
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Western media, in which the nature of ownership (profit-oriented firms, community
media, public media) and ideology (conservative, liberal, and centrist) are key influences
on news reporting (Scheufele, 1999), the Georgian news coverage is best explained by
news organizations’ level of dependence or independence from the government or the
opposition.
In 2010 through 2012, three TV stations, Rustavi 2, Imedi and Georgian Public
Broadcaster, dominated the market, spreading their signal around the country via
terrestrial lines. Rustavi 2 and TV Imedi, and, to a lesser extent, the Georgian Public
Broadcaster, supported the government. The popularity of these TV stations stemmed
from their accessibility around the country at no material or technological cost to viewers.
Smaller independent TV stations were either stationed in Tbilisi or in regional centers
and were unavailable to large parts of the population. Two Tbilisi-based stations,
Kavkasia TV and Maestro, voiced opinions of the opposition. Ahead of the Parliamentary
elections 2012, the key opposition figure, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, started the 9th
Channel on April 30, 2012. Maestro, Kavkasia and 9th Channel distributed their signals
via cable and satellite, and reached primarily the population in Tbilisi and other big cities.
Private ownership of TV stations has been “non-transparent” (Freedom House, 2012).
The ownership of the biggest TV station, Rustavi 2, was not clearly stated, while another
big station, TV Imedi, was the object of a legal battle over ownership. The Georgian
Public Broadcaster, Georgia’s only publicly funded TV station, has been much criticized
in the past for having grown “more friendly with the authorities” (Eurasia Partnership
Fund, 2012; Freedom House, 2012).
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Newspapers enjoy the most freedom in Georgia, apart from Internet-based media.
They provide diverse views, but reach a tiny segment of the population. Tbilisi-based
dailies Resonance, 24 Saati and Kviris Palitra, lead the list of serious print newspapers.
They have loyal readership, diverse content and modern management. Other popular
newspapers -- Alia, Akhali Taoba, Versia and Asaval-Dasavali -- have less stringent
professional standards. Tbilisi dailies carry much political content, and engage in
ideological posturing. Regional newspapers come out once a week. Precise data on
newspaper circulation are not available, but in the regions sales rarely reach 4,000 copies.
Local newspapers outside of Tbilisi and Internet-based publications are less politicized
than Tbilisi-based dailies (Mikashavidze, 2010).
Economically, the Georgian media face many challenges. The media business is
hampered by limited advertising. Newspapers rely on newsstand sales. Most news
organizations are poor and cannot invest in development. News journalists, with the
exception of few TV personalities, have moderate incomes, are not unionized, and often
do not even have labor contracts. Politically, Georgian journalists, as a group, are
considered to be powerful and influential. While the public views journalists as mostly
biased and manipulated by the government and the opposition (Caucasus Resource and
Research Centers, 2012), journalists’ self-concepts stress independence, professional
esteem and civic responsibility (Mikashavidze, 2009).
Georgian media legislation is liberal and progressive. Article 19 of the
Constitution states: “Every individual has the right to freedom of speech, thought,
conscience, religion and belief.” Article 24 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of
media and information. The Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression, adopted after
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the Rose Revolution in 2004, is the key legislation guaranteeing freedom of the press. It
has replaced the earlier law on the Press and Other Means of Mass Media, introduced
shortly after independence in 1991 (Freedom House, 2005). The 1991 law abolished
censorship of the press and introduced some other guarantees for free speech (IREX,
2001). The 2004 law improved the legislative framework by decriminalizing libel, one of
the most widely used tools against free press in repressive regimes (Freedom House,
2005). The law on broadcasting, adopted in 2005, established rules for obtaining licenses
for air frequencies and the code of conduct for broadcast entities. The Georgian National
Communications Commission (GNCC) regulates the broadcast sector and is in charge of
implementing the Broadcast Law (IREX, 2005). Provisions that are pertinent to the
freedom of press and information are included in other legislation, such as the Election
Law, the Administrative Code, and the Criminal Code (Mikashavidze, 2009).
While Georgia has exemplary media laws, governments in the past have done
little to ensure they are implemented. Government-controlled courts have rarely ruled in
favor of greater media freedoms (IREX, 2005). One of the most controversial cases of
selective enforcement of media-related laws happened during the 2012 election
campaign, when the police seized, on court orders, 140,000 satellite dishes that had been
distributed to viewers by Maestro TV, an opposition-leaning TV station, and Global TV,
an opposition-owned programming distribution company. The antennas were needed to
transmit the signal of Maestro TV and Channel 9, another opposition-aligned station, to
the regional population to break the government’s effective stranglehold over nationwide
news. Prosecutors claimed that Ivanishvili, the opposition leader, paid for the distribution
of the satellite dishes, which the courts ruled amounted to vote buying. The prominent
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rights advocacy groups described the move as illegal. The satellite dishes were returned
to the television companies immediately after Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream Coalition
defeated the ruling party in the October 2012 elections (Freedom House, 2013; IREX,
2013).
Chapter Summary
The Georgian political and media environment is in transition from totalitarianism
and authoritarianism to democracy. Before the watershed Parliamentary Elections of
2012, the system was deeply polarized and divided. The chapter has outlined key
characteristics of Georgia’s political and media systems. Georgia’s media system is
television-centric and has uneven patterns of freedom, professionalism and independence
in the media. The 2012 elections consolidated Georgia’s democracy by facilitating the
democratic transfer of office through free and fair elections. Georgia’s activists moved
from spontaneous protests to sustained and coordinated action, built around the agenda of
democratic rights and values. The media democratization movement mobilized around
2010, and stepped up activism in 2011 and 2012 -- ahead of the 2012 Parliamentary
elections – to press for greater transparency of media ownership and mandatory
distribution of all broadcast stations, including opposition-aligned stations, around the
country.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

Concept of Framing
Definitions of framing and the framing Process. In exploring the research
questions and hypotheses introduced earlier, this study will rely on the framing theory,
rooted in the social constructivist perspective. Social constructivism posits that there is no
single, “objective” reality, but that there are multiple, socially constructed and perceived
realities. These realities are continually created, reproduced and recreated by human
beings (Berger & Luckman, 1967; McQuail, 2005). Frames are tools used in constructing
and perceiving the reality.
The concept of framing is widely used in the fields of psychology, sociology,
political science, linguistics and mass communication. As a downside to its breadth and
popularity, the concept of framing lacks theoretical and empirical clarity. The definition
provided by Entman (1993) captures the sociological approach to framing. According to
Entman, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for
the item described” (p.52). Frames, in his view, are products of framing, and exist in at
least four locations: a) communicator, who consciously or unconsciously uses them in its
text, b) text, c) receiver and d) culture, which is “a stock of commonly invoked frames”
20

(p. 53). Entman proposed to treat framing as a paradigmatic approach explaining just
how a communicated text exerts its power6.
Next, Entman (1993) defines framing effects. In his view, framing effects are
salience-based. By highlighting certain aspects and diminishing others, framing makes
some aspects more salient, i.e. “more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to
audiences,” than others, and increases the probability that a receiver perceives, processes
and stores information in memory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Making the element salient
would not necessarily lead to effects. Salience is achieved if frames connect with
receivers’ schemata, which may or may not happen. Therefore, the presence of frames in
text does not guarantee their influence. When effective, framing “determines whether
most people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how
they evaluate and chose to act upon it” (Entman, 1993, p.54).
Framing in mass communication studies. Mass communication studies are
primarily interested in framing done by the media. Scheufele (1999) offered the model of
media framing process. He divides the process into frame building, frame setting,
individual-level framing processes and a feedback loop between individual and media
frames. Frame building refers to processes whereby media frames are influenced by
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D’Angelo (2002) argued against a single paradigm of framing. In his view, there existed

at least three framing paradigms: a) the cognitive model, in which frames are embodied
in the thoughts and words of those affected by a text, b) the constructionist variant, which
emphasizes creation of frames as interpretive packages, c) the critical paradigm, which
sees frames as the reflection of values of the elites and tools of hegemonic influence.
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various influences, such as journalist-centered, organizational routines (Gans, 1979;
Schoemaker & Reese, 1996) and external influences. Frame setting is concerned with the
transmission of framing effect. The literature is looking into two explanations: that
framing transmits salience, making certain frames more accessible for individuals to
retrieve from their memory, and that what gets transmitted is frames’ importance,
resulting in higher perceived importance of frames for an individual. Individual-level
effects of framing include media’s influence on individual frames, that is, schemata, and
the links between individual frames and various behavioral, attitudinal and cognitive
variables. Finally, a feedback loop refers to the interaction between individually-held
frames and the way individual journalists frame media content.
Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) connected the framing process with three stages
in the news process: news production, news consumption, and news effects. The news
production stage is described in frame building. Broadly speaking, news production is
contingent upon sociological, economic, critical and psychological factors, and so are
news frames. Building frames refers to journalists and other elites advancing their
“modes of presentations” (p. 12) in an effort to relay information in ways that best fit the
audience schema. According to Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), journalists are not
trying to spin or deceive receivers of information. They rely on the use of frames to
reduce complexity of information and meet time and space constraints. Unlike an agendasetting effect, which refers to “whether we think about an issue”, framing describes “how
we think about an issue” (p.14). Framing effect comes from the description of an issue or
a label attached to it. Contrary to Entman’s (1993) view, Scheufele and Tewksbury
(2007) argue framing relies on applicability effect rather than salience effect.
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Applicability effect refers to the fit between news frames and concepts attached to an
issue in a receiver’s own mental schema of the issue.
Sociological perspective on framing. The definitions of framing originating in
sociology stress human agency and purpose behind framing, and are primarily interested
in framing of contentious issues by social actors, such as social movements,
governments, specialists, and media. Media are seen as both producers of frames and
sites of framing contests. A framing contest is a contentious process to construct a
definition of an issue. Framing is defined as “signifying work or meaning construction”
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614; See also, Gamson et al, 1982; Snow et al, 1986; Snow &
Benford, 1988). While frames operate at different levels, sociology is primarily interested
in the meso and macro levels of framing. In a seminar study (1989), Gamson and
Modigliani explained how issues are framed and how “issues cultures” are created (p. 2).
In their view, public discourse produces various frames of an issue, and frames’ relative
“careers,” i.e. progress relative to each other, determines issue culture. Individuals’
interpretation of that issue and any related events depends on their pre-existing
knowledge, held in cognitive schemata, which are heavily influenced by issue culture.
Frames originate in various discourses, such as media, specialist, challenger (social
movements and interest groups), and policy-maker discourses. While media discourse is
not the only contributor of frames, it is the only platform for the various discourses to
interact and contest for the issue definition. It is also the key link to public opinion, both
in terms of its formation and reflection. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) also discuss
media framing technique. In their view, media tend to organize information in
interpretive packages to give meaning to the reported events. Each interpretive package
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contains a frame, or an interpretive angle, a range of positions within that angle, and
supportive devices, such as catchphrases, metaphors, causal links and other symbolic and
reasoning devices.
Scheufele and Iyengar (2012) have raised concern about the sociological
perspective on framing and similar approaches in the mass communication literature.
They described the dominant sociological approach as “emphasis framing,” which, in
scholars’ views, is different from the original concept of framing in experimental
psychology (Kanneman and Twersky, 1977). The original concept, “equivalence
framing,” is defined as differential presentation or labeling of identical information. By
contrast, “emphasis framing” refers to selective presentation of different content
elements. Scheufele and Iyengar (2012) think these two approaches to framing cause
confusion and inconsistency in the literature. The scholars themselves adhere to
“equivalence framing.”
Psychological perspective on framing. Lakoff clarifies frames are “mental
structures that shape the way we see the world” (2004, xv). This definition obviously
refers to the cognitive-level frames, which, for clarity’s sake, are termed as “schema” in
this study. The definition by Tannen (1993) also refers to the cognitive processes,
whereby frames act as structures of expectation. “On the basis of one’s experience of the
world in a given culture (or combination of cultures), one organizes knowledge about the
world and uses this knowledge to predict interpretations and relationships regarding new
information, events, and experiences (Tannen, 1993, p. 16). Tannen (1993) traces the
lineage of the term “frame” to Bateson (1972), who used it to describe a meta
communicative message about what was going on in a situation, and to Goffman (1974),
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who defined frames as “schemata of interpretation,” helping people to “locate, perceive,
identify and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences” (p.21).
Political and critical perspectives on framing. Nelson and colleagues (1997)
define political framing as "the process by which a source defines the essential problem
underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations
purportedly relevant to that issue" (p. 222). Because frames create certain definitions of
reality and cause audiences to have different reactions, they play a role in how power is
exerted. Frames are therefore highly contested in the political discourse (Entman, 1993).
The text, in Entman’s view, is “the imprint of power,” identifying actors and
interests that contested for its domination (p. 55). The contestants aim to sponsor the
dominant frame, which refers to the meaning most heavily supported by frames in text
and congruent with most common audience schemata (Entman, 1993). According to
critical perspective scholars, dominant frames reflect the elite views and are used as tools
of the hegemonic power (D’Angelo, 2002; Gitlin, 1977; Herman & Chomsky, 1988).
Social Movements
Social movements as forces of change. Social movements are agents of social
change and innovation in a society. Historically, social movements have been responsible
for the majority of progressive legislative and cultural changes. Goodwin (2013) defined
social movements as “conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to
change (or preserve) some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means” (p.
391). Other definitions (Lofland, 1985; Snow & Benford, 1992) interpret social
movements more broadly, as an extra-institutional but also institutional collective action,
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underscoring that movements often utilize institutional channels of decision-making and
pressure.
Ideas about movements have evolved across time, from earlier theorizing about
movements as fearsome deviations from normality, dangerous mobs (LeBon, 1897;
Mackey, 1841[1980]) and irrational, contagious behavior (Blumer, 1969; Park, 1924) to
understanding the rationality behind their formation and action (Olson, 1966). Current
literature on social movements relies primarily on three theoretical perspectives: the
social psychological or constructivist perspective, the conflict perspective and the
functionalist perspective. The social constructivist approach is focused on meanings and
perceptions. The conflict perspective emphasizes destabilizing factors, such as social
inequalities and social change (Markovsky, 2011), and is particularly useful in studying
the issues of power, domination and social conflict. The functionalist perspective treats
social movements as sub-structures of an interconnected system, and focuses on their
function, such as social movements’ role in the setting of political agendas or in the
formation of new political parties. This study draws its ideas from social constructivist
and conflict perspectives, as relevant to complex, multilayered interaction between social
movements and media.
Social constructivist perspective. The Social constructivist perspective on social
movements posits that social movements affect social change by influencing the
construction of individual and shared social reality. This approach pays close attention to
individual-level, micro processes, meaning-making, beliefs, identity and other cultural
orientations. The approach has gained greater currency in the social movement literature
as the importance of meanings, symbols and knowledge grew in post-industrial
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“knowledge societies.” In this environment, movements attain their goals by asserting
and maintaining the control over societies’ symbols and self-understandings (Goodwin,
2013). The adoption of the constructivist approach has also been a reaction to hyperrationalism of earlier theories, such as the resource mobilization theory, and their neglect
of social psychological and ideational factors (Cohen, 1985; Gamson, 1988;
Klandermans, 1984).
Benford (1993) argued in favor of the constructivist approach to social movement,
stressing the importance of meaning-making associated with interpreting and perceiving
grievances, collective identities, structural opportunities and resource availability for
action. Movements “frame” and articulate the grievances and ways to attend to them for
potential recruits, supporters, by-standers and targets. Framing, which is synonymous
with “meaning construction,” is the essential process in social movements’ operations
(Gamson, 1982; Snow & Benford, 1992, p.614).
Arguing against cost-benefit calculations as the sole basis for involvement in
collective action, as posited in the rational choice and resource mobilization theories,
Gamson (1992b) emphasized the importance of collective identity, collective
consciousness and solidarity, which helped “to blur the distinction between individual
and group interest, undermining the premises on which such utilitarian models operate”
(p. 57). He urged to consider cultural and ideational elements in the micro-mobilization
and other social movement processes to explain movement dynamics.
Klandermans (1997) further articulated the role of social construction of
collective meaning for the transformation of individual and collective discontent into
collective action. He introduced the concepts of “consensus mobilization” and “action
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mobilization”. The former refers to the generation of ideological or consensus support for
a collective action, and “implies a ‘struggle’ for the mind of the people”, while the latter
refers to the generation of behavioral support for the collective action, and is “a ‘struggle’
for their resources – their [people’s] money, time, skills” (1997, p. 7). To achieve both
types of mobilization, a social movement must tap into the attitudes and ideologies of its
target audiences (Klandermans & Tarrow, 1988, p. 10).
Conflict perspective. Championed by Marx, conflict perspective on social
movements emphasizes the conflict between social groups. Resource mobilization theory,
theories of social revolutions, and breakdown theories of social movements all have roots
in conflict perspective (Markovsky, 2011).
Media and Their Framing of Social Movements: Demobilizing Frames
Media as agents of social control. If social movements are forces of social
change, the media’s role in a society has long been recognized as a force of social
scrutiny and social control (Duster & Manza, 2013, p.455). This understanding dates
back to 18th and 19th century ideas about the press as the Fourth Estate of power,
exercising oversight over other branches on behalf of the public (McQuail, 2005). This
view is still widely held, but is contested. Critical scholars suggest that the mass media
today support corporate power, militarism, and the interests of the wealthiest elites
(Klinenberg & Wachsmuth, 2013). The essence of right-wing criticism is mass media’s
“leftist agenda,” geared towards promulgation of liberal, post-modern values of
feminism, environmentalism, global culture, and acceptance of homosexuality and
atheism (Klinenberg & Wachsmuth, 2013). What connects these criticisms is the belief
that the media do much more than just pass along facts to the public. The key question,
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pertinent to this study, is about media’s motives and “purposes which underlie the
strategies of creating one reality instead of another” (Molotch & Lester, 1974, p.111;
Tuchman, 1978).
Media’s “watchdog” function. The beliefs about media’s watchdog function, the
oldest and most widely-held way of thinking about the press (Boyce, 1978; McQuail,
2005), treat the media as an independent, powerful institution, exercising control over
branches of power on behalf of the public. The media monitor and scrutinize society, and
circulate facts and information for the formulation of public opinion that holds the
government accountable and exercises democratic self-rule. This thinking still dominates
the public policy and public opinion about the press, justifying many legislative and
practical freedoms and privileges available to the press corps.
Organizational and structural perspective – gatekeeper studies. Gatekeeper
studies appeared as media scholars started paying attention to internal and external
factors influencing news reporting (Gans, 1976; Schoemaker & Reese, 1996). These
factors are journalist-centered influences (journalists’ ideologies, norms, and values),
organizational influences (journalistic routines, ownership patterns) and external
pressures (political actors, authorities, interest groups and other elites). The gatekeeper
studies emphasize media’s role in defining what makes news. In his seminal book,
Deciding What’s News, Gans (1979) applied the concept of perspectives (Mannheim,
1936) to the work of the news media and concluded that journalists and the news media
saw “the country from their position in society,” that is, their class perspective (p.3).
Media’s lack of interest in grassroots politics and social movements and hyper-emphasis
on the government and politics stemmed from the perspective of journalists and editors,
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who typically held educated, white, middle class views (Gans, 2011). The framework of
organizational routines and professional standards of journalism shaped how that
perspective was expressed in the news. The journalists were also guided by a set of
structural preconditions, such as working for profit-making firms and having to capture
the interest of large, not very informed and not very interested audiences in a limited
amount of time and space. These conditions led journalists to compress and simplify
news, emphasize the conflict and drama, and attempt to remain neutral on controversial
items. Deficiencies in coverage, such as an excessive attention to government’s doings
and wrongdoings, stereotypes, atypical happenings and extreme behavior, and the lack of
analysis and reflexivity, stemmed from these conditions. The gatekeeper studies are
criticized (Gamson, 1991) for treating media as “isolated worlds” and failing to embed
them in the broader political and economic context.
Media as “guard dogs” of elites. The influence of structural orientations on
media’s coverage of social conflicts (Tichenor et al, 1970; Olien et al, 1989, 1994, 1995)
is elaborated in the media and social conflict theory and its perspective on the media as
“guard dogs.” The theory posits that the media protect power structures, acting as sentries
for powerful elites. Unlike the media hegemony perspective, “guard dog” perspective
puts media outside the power structure, but subservient to this structure. In homogenous
and consensual structures, such as small local communities, (Olien et al, 1995) media’s
alliance with the local elite prevents reporting on social conflict. In more pluralistic
structures, such as big cities, the presence of several power groups, each protected by its
own “guard dog” media, leads to greater likelihood of social conflict reporting (Olien et
al, 1995). Grassroots movements rarely get covered unless their actions threaten those in
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power, as the media are focused on the elites. The “guard dog” perspective rejects the
belief about media’s watchdog actions on behalf of the larger public, as well as the more
submissive role as a “lapdog” of power or media’s membership in the powerful elite
(Olien et al, 1994, 1995).
Media propaganda model. Media propaganda model, rooted in the political
economy perspective, views media as an integral part of the power elite (Herman &
Chomsky, 1988), entrenched in political and economic relations. Herman and Chomsky’s
propaganda model posits that the role of media is to inform, entertain and ingrain citizens
with national values and to suppress dangerous oppositional perspectives. While
propaganda is ubiquitous in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, in developed
democracies the propaganda is less manifest but nonetheless pervasive. The
concentration of media ownership in the hands of small but powerful elites, media’s
excessive reliance on advertising income and on government officials and corporate
leaders for information, coupled with the power of governments and corporations to
subdue and discipline critical media, all contribute to media’s instrumental participation
in the elite rule (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Media’s opposition to social movements
stem from their interest in preserving the existing institutions and social order. The media
propaganda model is criticized for overestimating the deterministic role of power in
media production, and rejecting the opportunity for social movements to advance their
messages through the media (Ryan, 1991).
Media hegemony perspective. Relying on Gramschian ideas of hegemony, the
media hegemony perspective views media as part of the hegemonic cultural power.
According to Gamson’s (1991, xiii) description of the hegemony, “the dominant culture
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works its magic in ways so subtle that the operation of power is thoroughly veiled.”
Gitlin (1977) analyzed media practice in great detail, and the patterns of media’s
reporting about social movements, and concluded that the way media shaped and
“certified” (p. 797) the reality for social movements left no chance for their success. The
media diminished importance of social movements and crippled their development. Gitlin
offered a two-part explanation: one deals with journalists’ unspoken “journalistic codes,”
rooted, at the level of practitioners, in their assumptions about “objectivity,”
“newsworthiness,” “timeliness,” and their “fetishism of facts” (p. 793); the second
explanation is structural as the codes journalists use reflect media’s integration with the
power elite and their interest in maintaining social stability and the status quo. A typical
coverage of a social movement starts with the media raising the awareness of a
movement and popularizing it, but the media focus on movement’s style and manner
rather than its issues; Next, the media polarize a movement by contrasting it with more
moderate groups while also trivializing, stereotyping, and marginalizing it; Finally, when
a movement gains the power and its “facts will be speaking very loudly for themselves,”
the media “seals off” a movement by censoring most of its news or barring it from
airwaves (p. 797). Among demobilizing frames used by the media against movements are
overemphasizing movements’ reliance on violence, flashy symbols, imagery, and radical
rhetoric, and stressing protesters’ emotional deviance (Gitlin, 1977, 1980). Gitlin
concludes that social movements are “caught in a fundamental, an inescapable dilemma:”
if they use radical tactics, they are marginalized and trivialized by the media, their issues
‘sealed off’ and the movement obscured. If they adopt moderate tactics, they are
assimilated in hegemonic politics, and their effectiveness, their ‘oppositional edge is
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blunted’ ” (1980, p. 291). Gitlin thinks more moderate movements, which appear to be
working within the system, get more favorable coverage but stand a lesser chance to
defeat hegemonic powers. While recognizing the role of power in the production of news,
media hegemony perspective recognizes active contestation of meaning in the media,
thereby allowing greater agency for social movements to counter-hegemonic forces
(Ryan, 1991).
Protest paradigm. The protest paradigm is an idea, based on Gitlin’s views
(1977, 1980), that the media marginalize movements by relying on generic “reporting
paradigms” or frames of coverage, which draw attention away from movements’ core
concerns and demobilize their supporters. This formulaic coverage is structurally and
ideologically-based. The more structurally and ideologically aligned the media with the
ruling class, the stronger their tendency to cover social movements negatively to weaken
their challenge.
In their seminal study credited with the emergence of “the protest paradigm,”
Chan and Lee (1984) found that journalists covered civil protests through ideological
prisms, which informed journalists “where to look (and where not to look)… what to
discover,” (p. 189) “what type of cause-effect relationship” to anticipate (p.199), and how
to treat protesters. The more ambiguous the conflict and the more radical the protest, the
more journalists relied on generic frames of coverage. Chan and Lee (1984) analyzed the
coverage of teachers and student protests over the closure of the Golden Jubilee School in
Hong Kong, and found that the leftist, centrist, and rightist newspapers covered the
protests in radically different ways. The rightist newspapers, supported by neighboring
Taiwan, gave the protests sharply critical coverage. They marginalized the protests by
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claiming they uprooted social order and traditional morality, politicized them by asserting
the protesters were manipulated by external political powers, and supported
government’s repressive measures. The leftist newspapers, linked to the Chinese
authorities, were more supportive of the protests, putting the blame on the government.
The centrists, Hong Kong’s rising independent, profit-oriented media, were most likely to
frame the protests in terms of their substance, focusing on the issue at hand.
Over years, the “protest paradigm” came to denote not just ideologically-based
coverage, but negative, marginalizing coverage of social movements. This interpretation
of Chan and Lee’s (1984) original idea developed in the political and media environment
of the 20th century United States, in which the media were ideologically and structurally
homogeneous and closely aligned with the ruling elites, while social movements were
perceived as the leftist threat to the status quo. The emergence of right-wing,
conservative movements, and greater structural and ideological pluralism in the media
(Weaver & Scacco, 2012) prompted 21st century scholars to re-visit and re-interpret the
protest paradigm.
Of special interest to the proposed study is the scholarship on factors that trigger
or mitigate media’s negative coverage of movements. The literature describes a range of
factors, from the level of deviance of a protest to its size, location, tactics and strategies.
In Western contexts, protests against the status quo get negative, demobilizing coverage
more often than the protests that support the status quo.
The level of deviance best predicted the activation of demobilizing framing in the
study of U.S. –based protests by Boyle and colleagues (2009). More radical protests were
more likely to be framed episodically and less likely to feature protesters as sources. In a
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comparative study of domestic and international protests, Boyle and colleagues (2012)
supported the earlier finding that protest tactics influenced the coverage. More radical
tactics were covered more negatively. Among other findings, political protests were
treated more critically than protests over social issue.
Entman and Rojecki (1993) found the media used eight “framing judgments” in
their coverage of the American nuclear freeze movement. The media produced mostly
negative coverage, describing the protesters as emotionally charged, diffuse, nonpolitical,
and marginal groups, which lacked expertise, public support, and partisan and strategic
thinking, as well as any leverage over the power in Washington. Characteristically, the
negative coverage intensified as soon as the movement gained strength, triggering its
downfall. Entman and Rojecki (1993) linked the activation of the marginalizing coverage
to certain stages in movement’s diffusion, echoing Gitlin’s (1977) observation that the
media are more favorable towards movements in their early diffusion stage and become
negative as movements gain strength.
Movements’ strategic decisions have a major bearing on their coverage in the
media. Noakes and Witkings (2002) tested both the strong hegemony model, suggesting
that the injustice claims advanced by challenging groups are systematically prevented
from gaining media access and reported within the negative, protest paradigm, and the
indeterminacy model, which posits that social movements are in greater control of their
own media access and coverage. The framing study of the Palestinian liberation
movement in the New York Times and the Associated Press found that none of the models
held a superior explanatory power, and that the two models appeared to have worked
together. Overall, the coverage was negative, as predicted by the hegemony model.
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However, some of the strategies and tactics, such as grassroots uprising Intifada, and
entering into negotiations with Israel, generated wider and more positive coverage, as
predicted by the indeterminacy model.
Demobilizing frames. Western scholarship has accumulated rich descriptions of
various marginalizing techniques used by the media to denigrate social movements.
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) found politicizing protest was one of the ways to
marginalize a movement and reduce its protest to a “dyadic conflict” with a government
(p. 17). TV imagery of protesters as deviant individuals wearing bandanas and playing
Frisbee and guitar was another technique of marginalization. McLeod and Hertog (1992,
1999) developed a typology of marginalization techniques. The most frequently used
techniques were emphasizing protesters’ deviant behavior and appearances, violence at
protest events, disapproval of protests by the public and the official version of events.
Protesters were rarely featured in this type of coverage. Dardis (2006) improved the
typology, and tested a hypothesis that marginalization devices were used in both negative
and positive contexts for social movements. Rejecting media’s pre-determination to cover
protests negatively, the scholar nonetheless found that demobilizing frames were
predominantly linked to the negativism towards the protest. Dardis concluded his
findings did not suggest the media tended to treat protests “unfairly in general,” but
media’s use of certain reporting devices in the negative context led to “perceived
negative coverage” (p. 130). In the author’s view, this type of coverage led to potentially
negative consequences for social movements, such as public’s perception of protests as
violent and “treasonous gathering of idiots” (Dardis, 2006, p. 131).
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In the realm of electoral politics, Lupien (2013) described the marginalization of
supporters of presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia in the
qualitative analysis of Bolivian and Venezuelan newspapers. Unable to contest public
support for these leftist governments, rich media owners used marginalizing frames
against their supporters to discredit the governments “from below.” These supporters,
who were predominantly working class poor, were described as “lumpen,”
“unreasonable,” “uneducated,” “emotionally bound to leaders” (pp. 230-231) and
generally incapable of making good and rationale choices for their countries. The author
theorized that the high concentration of ownership in the South American media and
entrenched elite interests were the factors behind the negative coverage, lending support
to the hegemony model.
Di Cicco (2010) introduced a concept of “public nuisance paradigm” (p. 135) to
describe a qualitatively new type of protest coverage, stressing bothersome, impotent and
unpatriotic nature of protests as a form of political participation. The coverage
emphasizes traffic jams, upset commerce, and various other costs to non-participating
publics. This type of demobilizing framing stresses ineffectiveness of collective action
and indifference to protests among the governments and publics. Protests are also framed
as “unpatriotic” and potentially harmful for the country.
Most studies stress the consequences of marginalizing coverage of social
movements for the public sphere and for grassroots’ participation in politics. By
analyzing the confrontation between pro-life and pro-choice movements, Husting (1999)
demonstrated that the media radicalized and polarized both movements, used war
rhetoric, and placed both groups outside the realm of normality. The protesters were cast
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as different from “viewers like us” (p. 159) and “normal Americans” (p. 171). On the
issue of abortion rights, the media spoke from a nonexistent centrist position, which
opposed both stands and the protest in general. Mindful of media’s role in shaping the
shared sense of reality among the public, the author expressed his concern that
demobilizing framing placed dissent outside normal American political expression and
the public sphere.
Recent scholarship on media’s coverage of social movements. The
proliferation of the Internet and other major changes in the 21st century prompted
scholars to revisit framing theories of media and social movements. Weaver and Scacco
(2013) analyzed the framing of the Tea Party in popular evening programs on CNN, Fox,
and MSNBC, and on the AP newswire. Based on Chan and Lee’s (1984) original idea
about ideological influences on protest coverage, Weaver and Scacco hypothesized that
the Tea Party’s coverage would vary across ideological lines. Indeed, the coverage of the
Tea Party depended on the ideological hues of the channel. MSNBC, a channel
ideologically least aligned with the Tea Party movement, used delegitimizing frames
significantly more often than others, while Fox, as ideologically most aligned with Tea
Party movement, and was least likely to marginalize the movement. MSNBC’s selection
of marginalizing frames was consistent with the protest paradigm, and involved deemphasizing the movement’s causes and issues, ridiculing its members, and asserting the
Tea Party movement was at odds with the public and was controlled by the political
elites. While CNN also used delegitimizing frames, it was the most neutral of the three
cable channels in the study. The authors proposed to re-visit the claim (Gitlin, 1980) that
conservative movements, supporting the status quo, would be covered positively. The
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authors call for the update of the protest paradigm to apply in a new, politically polarized,
ideologically-colored, fractured media environment.
Edgerly and colleagues (2011) described ideologically-based coverage of the
major protest demonstrations over immigration rights. The discourse analysis of
newspapers and niche TV stations found demobilizing frames dominated the coverage.
While the protesters, mindful of the “protest paradigm,” managed to mitigate some of the
marginalizing techniques -- the protests were not ignored but widely covered, and
described as peaceful — they failed to advance their messages along the two chosen
themes, economy and legislative rights. Newspapers, which reduced the event to episodic
and tactical coverage, provided so-called “negotiated reading” (p.12) of the protest such
that the reporting at times complied and at other times diverged from protesters’ intended
meanings. Critical TV pundits gave protesters’ messages a “resistive reading” (p. 19),
altering intended meanings of protesters. Friendly pundits gave protesters’ messages an
“aligned reading” (p.19). They offered the context, explained the movement’s goals and
issues, and generally focused on the intended meanings of the movement. The study
supports the earlier claim that ideologically-aligned cable TV channels in the U.S. vary in
their coverage of social movements.
Outside Western contexts, Yuan (2012) applied qualitative framing and discourse
analysis to the coverage of a major Shanghai fire in a Chinese party newspaper and in
three privately-owned Chinese metro dailies. The scholar found that the party organ and
independent dailies used different frames of the event. The dominant frame in the party
organ emphasized government’s rescue effort and support drawn to the victims,
downplaying the failure of the quality assurance systems and possible system-level
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corruption leading to the accident. The dailies, by contrast, drew a picture of human
suffering and criticized the system. On the rationale that media’s selection of frames is
contextualized and determined by the structural characteristics of their respective
audiences, the author linked the divergent frames to the structural characteristics of
newspapers’ divergent online communities: the officialdom and the older generation
raised in communist ideals as readers of the party organ, and liberal, white collar, young
urban professionals as readers of the dailies.
McCarthy and colleagues (2008) analyzed the likelihood of covering protests in
the first years of Belarus’ post-Soviet independence. Four ideologically diverse
newspapers, formerly partisan Soviet Belarus, elective organ’s the People’s Daily,
formerly Komsomol7-owned the Banner of Youth, and Soviet intellectuals’ favorite the
Star, differed in the likelihood of covering protests. Other factors influencing
newspapers’ coverage of protests were the size of the protest and the political standing of
protest sponsors.
Framing by Social Movements: Mobilizing Frames
Social movements’ interaction with media. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) spell
out organizing principles of social movements’ interaction with the news media and the
outcomes for both parties. Structurally, the relations between social movements and the
media are asymmetrical, and follow power-dependence pattern. Culturally, the parties are
more equal in the contest for meanings. Social movements’ dependence on the news
media stem from their need for media to mobilize supporters, validate a protest, and
expand the conflict in which they are contextualized. On the flip side of the relationship,

7

Komsomol was the youth wing of the Communist party in the Soviet Union.
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news media need social movements for stories, but the need is not very high. Social
movements are rarely treated as a beat, and have to compete hard with stories originating
in the government and other institutions.
According to Lipsky (1968), movements maximize their exposure through
communications media, which filter information that is available to followers, targets of
protest, and reference groups of protest targets. When media coverage is extensive,
reference groups’ perception of the protest is positively influenced, and the targets of
protest are more likely to dispense rewards, symbolic or material. Social movements are
typically interacting with four constituencies: followers, the media, third parties, and
targets of protest. Those movements that represent powerless classes and lack bargaining
power try to use protest as a tool to strengthen their bargaining positions. They typically
try to activate third parties. Their protest often is aimed at eliciting sympathy and support
among the groups that are referent groups of targets of protest. This is one of the few
ways in which the powerless groups can create bargaining resources to bargain with their
targets. Movements also woo interest groups. These groups, by virtue of their being part
of the political process, possess sufficient bargaining power and influence and can greatly
help powerless groups. In general, the protest is highly indirect process in which
communications media play critical roles (Lipsky, 1968).
Social movements and news media, along with other actors, are involved in
negotiations over frames and meaning. These framing contests offer greater opportunities
to movements. One of the success strategies is moving issues from the uncontested realm
of factual coverage, which journalists considered objective and fully devoid of frames, to
the contested realm of opinion and interpretative content (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993).
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To win the contest for dominant cultural meanings, social movements engage in
framing. Benford and Snow (2000) define framing by social movements as meaning
construction through contentious process, involving human agency and purpose. The
product of social movement’s framing are collective action frames, which simplify and
condense “the aspects of ‘the world out there’” (p. 614) in such a way as to recruit and
mobilize supporters and demobilize opponents. Framing, then, is an enabling instrument,
used by social movements for mobilization and other goals (Snow et al, 1986).
Mobilizing frames. Social movements design and promote mobilizing frames,
such as collective action frames and master frames. According to Benford and Snow
(2000), collective action frames are movement-specific frames, and are shaped according
to the tasks they serve. There are three types of tasks: a diagnostic task refers to
identifying and articulating the responsibility for a social problem; a prognostic task is
the articulation of a solution or a plan to deal with a problem; a motivational task stresses
problem’s severity, urgency, and infuses efficacy and sense of duty among supporters and
potential recruits. Framing is associated with three types of processes: discursive
processes articulate and amplify frames; strategic processes help align frames with the
audiences and the political and cultural context; and contested processes are framing
contests between mobilization and demobilization frames and internal social movement
disputes over frames.
There are several variable features to collective action frames. The frames vary in
terms of their attribution of blame or causality; the emphasis on internal or external
causes of problems; rigidity versus flexibility, that is, whether they articulate a problem
more narrowly or in a more elaborated way; and mobilizing potential. While elaborated
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frames possess greater mobilizing power, so do frames that have resonance, that is, a
power to strike a responsive chord with people (Snow & Benford, 1992). Resonance
depends on empirical credibility and experiential commensurability, that is, frames’
believability and relevance from the vantage point of individual experience, and narrative
fidelity, also called cultural resonance, that is, centrality of frames’ ideas and meanings to
the belief systems of audiences, and their fit with cultural narratives and myths. The
greater a frame’s flexibility, inclusivity, scope and resonance, the greater is its influence
and mobilizing potential.
Master frames. More inclusive and flexible frames, which also possess greater
interpretive scope, resonance and power, evolve into master frames (Benford & Snow,
2000). Master frames are generic frames, which serve a purpose of punctuating,
attributing and articulating social problems, but they do so at a higher level than
movement-specific, collective action frames. Punctuating involves identifying and
highlighting problems and injustices; attributing involves identifying sources of a
problem and assigning responsibility for future action towards ameliorating the problem;
articulating involves pulling together events and experiences in a meaningful thread such
that “what was previously inconceivable, or at least not clearly articulated, is now
meaningfully interconnected” (Snow and Benford, 1992, p. 138). Master frames, when
effectively coordinated with movement-specific frames, strengthen a momentum for
mobilization (Johnston, 1991; Noonan, 1995; Snow, 2004). Snow and Benford (1992)
argue that master frames, as “ideational webs” (p. 142), can support the emergence and
course of a movement and of the larger cycle of protest (Tarrow, 1983). An innovative
master frame can provide a good reason for collective action and spur tactical
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innovations. Sometimes, movements become progenitors of master frames for later
movements, providing ideational anchoring. Master frames advanced by the American
civil rights movement have inspired and served movements in later years (Snow &
Benford, 1992).
Sociopolitical and cultural influences on social movement framing. Benford
and Snow (2000) stress the influence of contextual factors on social movement framing.
Among factors that amplify or constrain mobilizing frames are political and cultural
opportunities and the audiences of social movements. Political shifts, such as conflicts in
the elites or lessening of repressions, strongly influence social movement framing
(McAdam et all, 1996), affecting the meaning and relevance of frames. These influences
are mutual, with frames shaping how individuals perceive political events and
opportunities, identity, injustices and needs in the society. Shifts in cultural “stock of
meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, narratives and the like” (Benford
& Snow 2000, p. 629) also affect social movement frames and their resonance. Again, the
influences are mutual, with the cultural stock replenished and altered by social movement
frames.
Mobilizing frames are strongly influenced by target audiences of social
movements. There is a consensus in much of the communication literature that the targets
affect the form and content of a message. Since social movements have multiple targets,
such as the government, potential supporters, media, or other movements, they attempt to
craft frames that are meaningful to them and are influenced by these multiple targets. The
audiences influence how movements devise and, from time to time, modify their
mobilizing frames (Benford & Snow, 2000).
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Zuo and Benford’s (1995) study of the Chinese democracy movement illustrates
how social movements design mobilizing frames to respond to political and sociocultural context and the needs and actions of the audiences. By analyzing frames that
accompanied the emergence and growth of the 1989 Chinese democracy movement, the
first major independent political movement in the People’ Republic of China, the scholars
concluded that the movement profited from successfully shaped and aligned frames.
These frames resonated with the millions of bystanders and turned them into active
protesters. The movement’s framing stressed culturally salient values among Chinese
citizens and their everyday experiences, while also targeting the state by stressing the
protest was patriotic, nonviolent and Confucian in spirit. The protesting students, whose
initial demands were for more democracy and freedom of expression, re-aligned their
frames to denounce corruption and state profiteering to enhance the scope of protest and
draw in the general population. After the state deployed counter-frames of “turmoil,”
“plotted conspiracy,” and “violations of the constitution” (p. 143), the students re-aligned
their frames again to neutralize the state. The new frames alluded to three major cultural
value sources: service to society in the Confucian tradition, communism and national
patriotism. The authors concluded that in repressive, totalitarian regimes, effective
framing is more important and influential than in other contexts. Once successfully
connected with belief and knowledge systems of the target population, frames trigger
mobilization, which occurs at a faster pace due to similarity and typicality of grievances
among millions of repressed individuals.
Noonan (1995) provided insightful analysis of the master frames used by the
Chilean women’s movement to fight for their rights and for the return to democracy
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during Augusto Pinochet’s authoritarian regime. This historical study provides empirical
support of the importance of well-chosen, resonant frames, modified to respond to shifts
in the environment. While the feminism frame served Chilean women well in the
beginning of the 20th century, it lost its cultural resonance after the leftists came to power
and advanced a more general “class oppression” frame. In response to the void, women
developed the “maternal” master frame, which emphasized the importance of women as
mothers in their families and in the larger family - the nation. With the arrival of
Pinochet’s repressions and “disappearances” of tens of thousands of Chileans, the
maternal frame opened up new opportunities for protest. In fact, it was the only possible
framing strategy in this authoritarian context. Women framed their activism and
opposition to the government as maternal search for “disappeared” sons, husbands and
loved ones, and as a traditional, maternal duty to care for a family. The “maternal” frame
resonated with Pinochet’s own conservative values and the emphasis on traditional
feminine roles. Thus, women used the “maternal” frame to successfully subvert the
regime. When the struggle reached a high point, several oppositional movements,
including women’s groups, came together under a new “return to democracy” master
frame. This new master frame was elaborate and flexible to incorporate many different
movements, including the groups that were not rights-oriented (the urban poor) but
started including human rights in the broader definition of life necessities.
Fuchs (2013) studied the women’s movement in Poland and its effective use of
the “law” master frame. The law and rights discourses have been used by the political
opposition in the Eastern Europe since the 1970s, and were highly resonant among the
Polish public. The women’s movement has successfully deployed the “law” master frame
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to advance its abortion rights agenda. A media discourse over the reforms proposed by
the movement was broad and predominantly supportive.
Markowitz (2009) described a case in which social movements’ mobilizing
frames failed to fit the socio-cultural context. In the late 1980s, Tajik and Uzbek national
liberation movements, called Popular Fronts, adopted the imported master frame of
“secessionist nationalism”, successfully deployed by the Baltic and Georgian liberation
movements. However, the frame failed to serve the goals of these movements because
ethnic, regional disputes and violence in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan made the idea of
nationalist unity irrelevant and marginal. Both movements failed to see the changes in the
political context and adapt their mobilizing frames. As a result, the Uzbek and Tajik
governments charged the movements with instigating ethnic violence and marginalized
and repressed them with tacit support from the public.
Mauersberger (2012) analyzed the adoption of a new and progressive media
legislation in Argentina, advocated by the Coalition for Democratic Broadcasting. The
new law on audiovisual broadcasting, adopted in October, 2009, tightened media crossownership limits, diversified regulatory structure and guaranteed equal access to airwaves
for public, private and private non-profit media. In the scholar’s view, the movement’s
success in promoting the law was due to an unusually broad participatory process, which
included coalition building with the members of media, “potent framing of media
regulation as a matter of democracy and the changing media-state dynamics that
disrupted the long-standing mutually supporting ties between the dominant media group
and the government” (p.222).
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The problem the movement set out to address was the high concentration of
media ownership, which prevented access to diverse sources of information, a
prerequisite for meaningful deliberative processes (Dahlgren, 1995). In August 2004, the
Argentinean Forum of Community Radios organized the Coalition of Democratic
Broadcasting, bringing together more than 300 national and international social actors,
movements, unions, academics, and activists. The coalition framed its agenda, called “21
basic points for the right to communicate,” under “discursive umbrella” of democracy
and human rights (p. 593). These points defined communication as a right and an
essential service for the social, cultural, and education development of the Argentine
people. The coalition dismissed the view that broadcasting was merely a commercial
business, and stressed that the plurality and diversity of ownership was vital to
democracy. The frames of human rights and democratization proved to be highly
resonant among the audiences, and more capable than, for instance, socio-economic
frames, of uniting diverse groups around a common media and communications agenda.
A high profile of human rights organizations in Argentina amplified the frames and made
it easier for the coalition to communicate its claims to the government. Borrowing the
discourse of the coalition, President Fernándes said the proposed law was “an old debt of
democracy” and called on the government to endorse it.
The coalition successfully dealt with the challenge emanating from the powerful
Argentine media organizations. The Argentine media have been known to have a “strong
tendency … to be controlled by private interests with political alliances and ambitions,
which seek to use their media properties for political ends” (p. 177). By presenting media
monopolies as a danger to democracy, the movement sought to neutralize its biggest
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opponent, the powerful Clarín media group. The Clarin group was capable of blocking
and marginalizing the coalition efforts. The coalition emphasized that the broadcasting
spectrum was a public resource, and that market mechanisms and interests of big
businesses had to be pushed back. The coalition managed to successfully exploit the
disruption of “long-standing cooperative relationship” and “logic of understanding
between government and dominant media” (Becera & Mastrini, 2010, p. 625) during
President Fernándes’ term in the office.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I have reviewed the literature on framing theory as the proposed
theoretical framework for the study and outlined major theories of social movements and
media. I have also summarized the current thinking on media’s framing of social
movements and social movements’ use of media for mobilizing.
The section on framing theory provides several conflicting definitions of the
concepts “frame” and “framing.” This study relies on Entman’s definition of framing as
an act of selecting and highlighting the aspects of a perceived reality. This definition is
consistent with the sociological stream of the framing literature (Benford & Snow, 2000;
Gamson, 1982, 1989; Snow et al, 1986), and its reliance on “emphasis framing.” The
emphasis framing refers to the selection and presentation of different elements of
information rather than the presentation of the identical information under different
labels, as in “equivalence framing” (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012). It is this author’s view
that equivalence framing, as a method, is more appropriate in experimental studies.
Drawing on emphasis framing, the study will attempt to clarify how the Georgian media
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selected and highlighted certain aspects of the news related to the media democratization
movement in order to produce mobilizing or demobilizing effects on the audiences.
The proposed study is interested in the framing that occurs at the issue level
(Johnston et al, 2996), and, primarily, in frames that exist with a communicator and in a
communicated text (Entmnan, 1993). The issue at hand is media democratization in
Georgia. Based on the insights reviewed in this chapter, different media organizations are
expected to frame in different ways. Some media, hypothetically, will present the
proposed reforms as serving the people’s right to know, while others may describe them
as an interference with the free market or as a pointless protest by marginal groups.
The study will analyze the media democratization movement’s framing decisions,
that is, frames that exist with a communicator (Entman, 1993), and media’s framing of
the movement, found in a communicated text. The text is Georgian newspaper and TV
stories.
The section on social movements outlined the key perspectives in the sociological
and political communication literature on social movements. The study will rely on social
constructivist and conflict approaches. The social constructivist idea that meanings and
reality are socially constructed helps explain how framing shaped the reality around the
media democratization movement in Georgia. The outcome of this effort is understood
and hypothesized as a success of media activists in constructing the issue of media
reforms as a necessary step towards greater, rights-based democracy. The second
approach that informed the proposed study emphasizes social conflict. This perspective,
reviewed in the section on social movements, and media propaganda, media hegemony
and “guard dog” media theories (Gitlin, 1980; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Olien et al,
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1995), reviewed in the section on media, are all rooted in conflict. The section on media’s
coverage of social movements is organized around the idea that “journalists do not
simply report on news, they actually help create and change it”, thereby setting the
context for making events in the world intelligible (Schudson, 2003, p.11). Media’s social
function is to scrutinize and control. But is the media acting on behalf of the public or on
behalf of elite, powerful groups? The studies in the gatekeeper tradition stress journalists’
role in producing news, and note the influence of organizational values and routines,
while “guard dog media,” media propaganda and media hegemony models emphasize
structural and ideological influences and the issues of power. This section provides an
overview of these views as necessary to understand media’s framing of social
movements. The conflict perspective helps conceptualize the deployment of mobilizing
and demobilizing frames in the coverage of the media democratization movement as the
reflection of a conflict between divergent interests in the issue. Reforms to democratize
media had powerful opponents in Georgia, such as the government and governmentaligned broadcast media. The movement had supporters, such as the political opposition
and opposition-sponsored media, geared towards political change. Hypothetically, the
independent media, held in disadvantageous position by the government and therefore
interested in greater fairness in the media sector, were also aligned with the media
democratization movement. The study anticipates that the conflict played out in the
media, resulting in different frames of the media democratization movement in different
news organizations. The conflict is expected to have also influenced the media
democratization movement’s framing decisions.
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The author takes a close look at the dominant view in the literature that the media
tend to demobilize movements by de-emphasizing their causes and marginalizing their
supporters. The literature explains this tendency with media’s alliances with the elites
against challengers, such as social movements, and journalists’ reliance on certain
narrative structures, emphasizing drama and conflict. However, the literature also seems
to suggest that the media that are ideologically aligned with social movements tend to
cover them with greater fairness and substance. Acknowledging the influence of power
on the media, and journalists’ tendency to rely on formulaic reporting and demobilizing
framing of social movements, this study rejects the deterministic role of power in media’s
coverage of social movements. The study anticipates fair and substantive coverage of the
media democratization movement in the media outside government-controlled segment.
Following Ryan (1991), the author theorizes that active contestation of meaning in
pluralistic and partially pluralistic political and media environments allow social
movements some opportunity to attain fair coverage.
The section on mobilizing framing by social movements discusses framing
strategies, which help secure media interest, subvert opponents, and mobilize supporters.
The section focuses on the elaboration and diffusion of mobilizing movement-specific
and generic master frames. The importance of framing for social movements’ goals is
stressed. The social movement framing studies reviewed in this section demonstrate the
importance of effective, culturally-aligned master frames, and the need to adapt and align
frames with the context (Markowitz, 2009; Noonan, 1995; Zuo & Benford, 1995). Based
on these findings, the study theorizes that the Georgian media democratization
movement’ frames were intended to resonate with culturally powerful themes of free
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speech and democracy. The movement frames were hypothetically resonant with multiple
audiences, including members of the media, to whom free expression and transparency
were deeply-held professional values.
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Chapter 3
Method

Research Questions and Hypotheses
Qualitative analysis of movement statements and in-depth interviews. The
first part of the study qualitatively analyzed materials produced by the Georgian media
democratization movement to identify mobilizing and demobilizing frames. These
materials were movement statements, produced between April, 2011 and October, 2012
(see Appendix C for the list of statements). The study also conducted in-depth interviews
with the activists of the media democratization movement, most of whom were the
members of the Coalition for Media Advocacy (SMO), to clarify the rationale behind the
framing decisions. Activist journalists8 participating in the Coalition for Media Advocacy
were asked about their understanding of the movement frames, and the movement’s
coverage in the media. A thematic analysis was used to identify common themes in
interview responses. The study posed the following research questions:
RQ1: What mobilizing frames were advanced by the movement?
RQ2: What were the goals of the media democratization movement?

8

The term “activist journalist” refers to professional journalists, who joined the media

democratization movement, and is different from “news producers” and “news reporters,”
the terms reserved for professionals not engaged with the movement.
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RQ3: What was the rationale behind framing choices?
RQ4: What were the experiences of activist journalists and news journalists while
covering the movement?
Quantitative Media Content Analysis. The study theoretically argued that
political factors, such as news organizations’ ties with the government and the opposition
(or lack thereof) would influence their application of mobilizing and demobilizing frames
in the coverage of MDM. Pro-opposition media would be interested in change and
willing to cover social movements positively. Pro-government media would be interested
in the maintenance of status quo and either ignore or negatively cover social movements.
The study posed a research question if the independent media, if and when they
experienced government pressures and unfair competition from government-controlled
media, would also be sympathetic towards the challengers of the system, such as social
movements, and cover them positively.
Based on these theoretical conjunctions, this study hypothesized that:
H1: Pro-government media are more likely to use a negative tone (H1a),
demobilizing frames (H1b), not use movement-advanced frames (H1c) and use
government officials as sources (H1d) in the coverage of the media democratization
movement. These media will cover the movement less frequently (H1e), more briefly
(H1f), less prominently in terms of assigned page space or airtime (H1g) than proopposition media.
H2: Pro-opposition media are more likely to use a positive tone (H2a), mobilizing
frames (H2b), activists as sources (H2d), in the coverage of the media democratization
movement. These media will cover the movement in greater length (H2f), and more
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prominently in terms of assigned page space or segment of airtime (H2g) than progovernment media.
The study posed the following research question:
RQ5: How do independent newspapers cover media democratization movement
in terms of the tone (RQ5a), demobilizing versus mobilizing frames (RQ5b), using
movement-advanced frames (RQ5c), sources (RQ5d), frequency (RQ5e), length (RQ5f)
and prominence of page space and airtime assigned to the coverage (RQ5g)?
Methodology
To analyze the nature of media coverage of the media democratization movement,
the study a) carried out the qualitative content analysis of mobilizing statements produced
by the media democratization movement; b) conducted in-depth qualitative interviews
with activists and activist journalists about their understanding of the goal, framing
decisions and media coverage, and with news producers and reporters about their
understanding of the movement and their experiences on the beat; c) conducted
quantitative content analysis of news media framing of the media democratization
movement.
Qualitative analysis of mobilizing and activist interviews
Analysis of movement statements. The study qualitatively analyzed statements
produced by the Coalition for Media Advocacy, SMO9 of the media democratization
movement. The purpose of this analysis was to identify mobilizing frames used by the
movement, and assess their effectiveness in terms of their replication in the media
coverage. The materials were all statements by the Coalition for Media Advocacy made

9

Social movement organization is abbreviated as SMO throughout the text.
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from April 13, 2011 (the day of launch of the Coalition) to October 1, 2012 (Election Day
2012), and carried by www.media.ge, an industry publication, in full. The study analyzed
17 statements. The statements were downloaded from the website, www.media.ge.
The coding proceeded as follows: a coding frame was developed to comprise
several mobilizing master frames described in the social movement literature, heeding on
de Vreese’s (2012) advice to use frames described in the literature in the interests of
building generalizable knowledge. In the pilot phase (Schreier, 2012), part of the material
was coded to test the coding frame. The text that did not correspond to any of the frames
was coded as “other,” and re-coded to identify other frames described in the literature or
any new frames. The coding frame was then revised before the coding proceeded. The
coding produced a list of frames used by the Georgian democratization movement in its
statements (see Appendix D). QD Miner, a qualitative analysis software package, was
used in the analysis.
In-depth interviews. The study conducted 17 in-depth, semi-structured qualitative
interviews with coalition activists, including activist journalists, about their
understanding of the goals of the media democratization movement (RQ2), its framing
strategies (RQ3), and activist journalists’ coverage of the movement (RQ4). The purpose
of this exercise was to understand the rationale behind the framing decisions, perceived
goals of the movement, and personal meanings attached to the media democratization
movement and activism in general. The study also interviewed five producers and
reporters in news organizations sampled for the content analysis of the Georgian media’s
coverage of MDM about their views about MDM and the activism, in general, and their
experiences on the beat (RQ4).

57

Personal interviews were conducted in Tbilisi, Georgia, by an interviewer hired
and trained by the study. The interviews were transcribed and analyzed thematically. The
thematic analysis involved reducing data by assigning codes to paragraphs and grouping
thematically related sections together to arrive at common themes. This process is
described in Schierer (2012) as “reductive coding.” Filing data under various thematic
codes is also described in Weiss (1994), and labeled as “local integration.” The analysis
produced a rich description of activists’ meanings and interpretations. Further in the
process of analysis, the researcher grouped themes into sections on the basis of mini
explanatory theories -- the process labeled a “vertical integration” (Weiss, 1994). These
mini-theories were derived based on logical theorizing and supported by evidence in
interviews. Next, the material was categorized into bigger sections, based on minitheories, supporting evidence and any dissenting evidence that was found in the
interviews.
Quantitative content analysis of news media content. The study used
quantitative content analysis as the method to look into the coverage of social movements
in the content of news media.
Media Democratization Movement. The study operationalized the coverage of
media democratization movement as the coverage of the Coalition for Media Advocacy
(SMO), the It Concerns You (the movement’s campaign), the “must carry” regulation to
ensure unlimited distribution of TV broadcasts by cable operators and the regulation to
disclose media ownership structure and financial data (movement’s key proposals), and a
special case upheld by the movement to lift the government’s ban on the distribution of
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TV Maestro’s antennas ahead of the Parliamentary Elections 2012. The coverage of these
organizations, actions and issues was treated as a proxy of movement’s coverage.
Selection of media organizations. The study analyzed the content of three
newspapers, daily 24 Hours, daily Resonansi and daily Alia, and their weekend edditions,
Weekend, Mteli Kvira and Kronika, respectively. These newspapers have had varying
degrees of financial and ideological independence from the government or the
opposition: 24 Hours has received public funds for the publication of government decrees
and other public information, and perceived to editorially support the government (TIGeorgia, 2011). 24 Saati has publicly denounced the allegation of its links with the
government (Tsiklauri, 2011, December 16). Alia has been radically critical of
Saakashvili’s government, and was less critical of the opposition during the Elections
2012 (Caucasus Resource and Research Centers, 2012). The Georgian Public Broadcaster
and other government-controlled national television stations have accused Alia of
accepting funds from the opposition -- the allegations Alia had vehemently denied
(Tsiklauri, 2012, October 1). Newspaper Resonansi held a middle ground: it has been
vocal about government’s transgressions without leaning heavily towards the opposition.
The study categorized these newspapers as pro-government (24 Saati), pro-opposition
(Alia) and independent (Resonansi)10.

10

This categorization is based on newspapers’ and TV stations’ perceived editorial bias,

documented by industry watchdogs (Freedom House, 2009-11) and on the monitoring of
these newspapers’ coverage of the 2012 elections (www.mediamonitoring.ge). None of
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Alia appears on weekdays other than Monday, with weekly Kviris Kronika
distributed on Mondays. Alia has 16 pages, and Kronika 40 pages (www.alia.ge). The
circulation of newspapers was 10,300 issue for each newspaper (www.alia.ge). The two
newspapers produced 258 issues per year. Resonansi prints five days a week, Tuesdays
through Saturdays, with weekly edition Mteli Kvira published on Mondays
(www.resonansdaily.ge), to the total of 310 issues per year (Matsne.ge). The circulation
of newspapers was 6,000 copies each. 24 Saati prints five days a week, with weekly
edition Weekend published on Fridays and no print on Sundays. 24 Saati and Weekend
produce 310 issues per year (www.matsne.ge).
The study also analyzed TV coverage of the media democratization movement in
three TV stations, pro-government Rustavi 2, pro-opposition 9th Channel, and
independent Kavkasia. The ownership in Rustavi 2 has always been in the hands of
government-linked businesses. The current general director of the company is the former
minister of education. At different times, business partners of former ministers of defense
and economy were at the helm of the company. The 9th Channel was launched in April
2012 by the key opposition figure, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and closed shortly after
the elections. TV Kavkasia was included in the sample as an independent TV station.
The content of these news sources was downloaded from the Terramedia
database. The institutional search engine of the database was searched for all materials
under “the Coalition for Media Advocacy,” “It Concerns You,” “media,” “television,”

the newspapers or TV stations have explicitly endorsed either the government or the
opposition in the 2012 campaign or at any other times.
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“radio” and “press” to identify news stories in the broad area of media issues. (A more
precise keyword search would leave some materials unaccounted due to the limitations of
Terramedia’s search engine.) The study identified these preliminary populations: 312
stories in daily 24 Saati and weekly Weekend; 300 stories in daily Alia and weekly Kviris
Kronika; 410 in daily Resonansi and weekly Mteli Kvira; 543 stories in Rustavi 2 (pulled
from news program “Courier’ at 08:00, 09:00, 10:00, 11:00, 12:00, 14:00, 15:00, 16:00,
17:00, 18:00, 20:00, 21:00, Business Courier at 13:00, and weekly Courier P.S.); 2031
stories in 9th Channel (news program “News” at 08.00, 09;00, 10:00, 11:00, 12:00, 14:00,
15:00, 17:00, 18:00, 19:00, 20:00, 21:00); and 558 stories in Kavkasia TV (news program
“Today” at 17:00, 19:99 and 20:30). Next, the study searched these preliminary
populations by more focused keywords “Maestro TV,” “antenna ban,” “media
ownership”, “ownership transparency,” “financial transparency,” “must carry” “must
offer” “cable signal distribution” in the word software. The search resulted in 23 stories
in Alia, 42 stories in 24 Saati, 87 stories in Resonansi, 105 stories in Rustavi 2, 186
stories in 9th Channel, and 139 stories in Kavkasia. Due to the limited amount of
newspaper stories, the study did not put any stories aside for the training, and used stories
about the media democratization movement in another newspaper, Akhali Taoba, instead.
The study set aside a training sample of ten stories from Rustavi 2, 9th Channel and
Kavkasia. After the training sample was set aside, the final sample was identified as 23
stories in Alia, 42 stories in 24 Saati, 87 stories in Resonansi, 95 stories in Rustavi 2, 176
stories in 9th Channel, and 129 stories in Kavkasia. The randomly selected sub-sample of
91 stories was set aside for the intercoder reliability test.
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Timeline. The study analyzed materials produced between July 1, 2010, the
approximate time first informal groups of the media democratization movement
organized and started exerting pressure on the government (S. S., personal interview,
March 12, 2014; Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014) and October 1, 2012,
Election Day.
Analysis of content. The study analyzed media texts for the presence of master
frames identified in social movement studies. The study looked for both mobilizing and
demobilizing frames, and for the use of frames devised by the movement. The study also
recorded the tone of articles and TV stories, their use of sources, genre, and frequency
and prominence of coverage.
Mobilizing and demobilizing master frames. The study analyzed the text in order
to identify mobilizing and demobilizing master frames. Mobilizing master frames were
conceptualized as frames launched by the media democratization movement or its
supporters to punctuate, attribute and articulate the problems in the media sector and
mobilize supporters. The study drew from the typology of social movement master
frames by Benford (1997). The rights master frame (Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow,
2000; Snow & Benford, 1992; Williams & Williams, 1995) referred to human rights and
freedoms; The injustice master frame (Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson et
al, 1982) accentuated injustices that a movement intended to address; The injustice frame
interpreted happenings as supportive of the conclusion that an authority system was
“violating the shared moral principles of the participants” and provided “a reason for
noncompliance” (Gamson et al, 1982, p.123); The democratization master frame has
been generally applied in the context of democratic transformation (Mauersberger, 2012;
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Nounah, 1995) to accentuate the right of a society to live in the system of rights, values
and practices known as democracy; The rule of law frame shaped issues in legislative
terms, and was often invoked in transitional contexts to press changes in the legal system
as a proven tool against the authoritarian regimes (Fuchs, 2013); The free speech frame
denoted commonly understood and universally held values of free speech, expression,
and access to information (Postigo, 2012, p.1183); The transparency frame underlined
the need for greater transparency and sincerity as opposed to conspiracy and
manipulation in the conduct of public affairs. In this study, transparency was expected to
frame the need to access information on private media ownership and other aspects of
their business. The frame has been deployed in an earlier study about the protests in
Georgia (Manning, 2007).
After the analysis of movement statements, the study replaced the transparency
frame by access to information – transparency frame to account for the meaning attached
to the frame by the activists, and added fair elections and access to information –
plurality frames, frequently used by the activists in their statements. The study added
these frames to the code book. The category other was for any other master frames (see
the codebook in Appendix A).
The study looked for the presence of demobilizing frames. These frames were
conceptualized as counter frames and marginalization frames deployed by movement
opponents and the media to denigrate and demobilize movements. In general terms,
demobilizing framing de-emphasize movement’s cause, including the issues that
legitimized a protest, and shifted the focus to the protesters, described as deviant,
antisocial and marginal (Weaver & Scacco, 2013). The study used demobilizing frames
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identified in the literature on social movements and media (Chan & Lee, 1984; Dardis,
2008; Di Cicco, 2010; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). The Support for status quo frame
(Chan & Lee, 1988) referred to the expression of support for the status quo government’s
measures against social movements; The hinders free business frame was an adaptation
of the free market master frame (Mooney, 1991), which referred to the free market
forces; The hinders country, unpatriotic frame involved the argument that developmental
goals of countries overrode other concerns, such as the respect for human rights, and that
activism was unpatriotic (Di Cicco, 2010); The immoral, goes against tradition frame
was an articulation of the morality and tradition frame (Chan & Lee, 1988). In this frame,
protesters’ actions and demands contradicted traditional moral, religious, cultural values;
Politicizing, also called dyadic conflict and strategic frame (Gamson & Modigliani,
1989) defined a protest in political or partisan terms, as an action motivated by the pursuit
of power. The frame also ascribed a protest to external manipulations rather than
spontaneous reaction to sociopolitical deficiencies; The violence frame described protests
as lawless situations, anarchy (Dardis, 2008), vandalism, police confrontations and
arrests; The freak show (McLeod & Hertog, 1999) was an appearance-based frame,
which emphasizes physical oddities among the protesters; The romper room/ idiots at
large frame focused on demonstrators’ immaturity and childlike behavior, and their
inability to tackle the complex issues they were advocating (McFarlane & Hay, 2003,
p.223); The carnival referred to the coverage of movement’s direct actions as carnivals,
theatrical performances, shows, and celebrity events; The unfavorable polls, statistics,
generalizations, eye-witness accounts referred to the use of public opinion polls,
statistics, eyewitness accounts to show public opposition to a protest and to claim that
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protesters did not speak for the majority of people; The counter-demonstrations showed
counter-demonstrations against social movement, typically, street protests parallel to
activists’ protest; The bothersome/disruptive frame accentuated disruptions of traffic,
upset commerce, and various other public costs of street protests (Di Cicco, 2010); The
impotent, ineffective, counterproductive frame referred to the ineffectiveness of a protest
(Dardis, 2008) (see codebook in Appendix A.)
Sourcing. The study analyzed the media’s use of sources. The idea was to make a
distinction between the coverage in which social movement activists and their supporters
were given a voice from the reporting that relied on official sources and accounts. The
coders were instructed to register the use of sources from among coalition activists and
journalists participating in the coalition, other non-profit sector representatives, other
journalists, government officials, opposition MPs, non-parliamentary opposition,
international community representatives, ordinary citizens and other sources.
Tone. The study analyzed the tone of media content. The coders were asked to
determine whether each paragraph in a newspaper or a TV story was negative, positive or
neutral toward the media democratization movement. The story at hand was coded as
positive or negative if two-thirds of paragraphs pointed in either direction. If not, the
story was coded as balanced.
Coding. Two trained coders hired for the analysis coded the stories after three
weeks of training and subsequent adjustment of the coding instrument. They doublecoded 91 articles for the intercoder reliability test. The intercoder reliability was
satisfactory. All variables except three had a Knipendorff’s alpha above .80. Three
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variables, “tone – positive,” “sources – activist journalist” and “mobilizing frame - free
speech” had Knipendorff’s alpha above .70 (see Appendix E).
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Chapter 4
Movement Statements and Interviews with Activists: Qualitative Analysis

The purpose of the qualitative study was to identify frames constructed by the
media democratization movement and clarify the rationale behind framing choices and
movement goals in interviews with the activists and activist journalists. The study carried
out the qualitative content analysis of movement statements and the thematic analysis of
in-depth qualitative interviews with activists and activist journalists. In addition, the
study interviewed news producers and reporters who had covered MDM about their
attitudes and experiences on the beat.
The chapter starts with the analysis of statements issued by the media
democratization movement. This section is titled Part One: Movement Statements. Part
One will identify dominant mobilizing frames and seek rationale behind framing choices.
In Part Two: In-depth Interviews, we analyze in-depth interviews with activists, including
activist journalists, to refine the analysis of activists’ framing choices, which starts in Part
One. In Part Two, we will also explore how activist journalists’ involvement in the media
democratization movement may have affected their coverage of the movement and
whether and how news producers’ and reporters’ professional values of press freedom
and access to information influenced their coverage of the movement. The study will link
meanings attached to the media democratization movement by news professionals to the
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tone and frames found in the quantitative content analysis of the coverage of media
democratization movement, which is provided in the following Chapter Five.
Part One: Movement Statements
The study qualitatively analyzed the materials produced by the Coalition for
Media Advocacy and other activist groups with which the Coalition joined forces. The
purpose of the analysis was to identify mobilizing frames advanced by the activists, as
per RQ1. The study analyzed statements released between April 13, 2011, the day the
Coalition was launched, and October 1, 2012, Election Day. The statements documented
activists’ positions on issues and demands and were typically distributed among civil
sector organizations, international watchdogs, diplomatic missions, government offices,
and the press. These materials were downloaded from www.media.ge, an industry web
publication. The study analyzed only the statements that were posted in full, ignoring the
statements that were simply summarized. The study analyzed 17 statements: the
memorandum of partnership and 11 statements by the Coalition for Media Advocacy;
two statements by the It Concerns You, the Coalition’s joint campaign with election
activists; two statements by the Georgian Platform of European Union’s Eastern
Partnership Forum, with which the Coalition and other civil society organizations
collaborated; and one petition by the group of media and civil sector organizations, which
included the Coalition, to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to
ensure that the “must carry” rule of mandatory distribution of broadcast signals by cable
companies remained in force after the 2012 Parliamentary Elections.
The statements were published approximately once a month (see Appendix C)
and covered priority items on the activist agenda. The purpose of the Coalition for Media
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Advocacy was addressed in one statement; the “must carry/must offer” legislation was
addressed in three statements and in the petition to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe; the ban on distribution of Maestro TV’s antennas was addressed
in two statements; the fairness of coverage and media access during the elections was
addressed in three statements; the restrictions of video recording at the Parliament of
Georgia, the beating and intimidation of journalists during the May 26 demonstrations,
the arrest of four photographers on espionage charges, the blackmailing of journalist
Tedo Jorbenadze, the removal of newspaper distribution kiosks, the financial audit of the
Palitra Media House, and the proposed auction of the main TV broadcast tower in Tbilisi
were covered in the remaining seven statements (see Appendix C, Table C.1).
Mobilizing frames found in MDM statements. The study analyzed these
materials for the presence of mobilizing master frames described in the literature
(Benford, 1997) and for any movement-specific frames. A mobilizing master frame has
been defined as a broad, generic frame that punctuates, attributes, and articulates
problems and has relevance across countries and contexts (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow
& Benford, 1992). The study drew from the typology of social movement master frames
by Benford (1997) to create an initial coding scheme. This coding scheme contained
rights, injustice, justice, democratization, rule of law, free speech, and transparency
frames. As coding progressed iteratively, the coding scheme was further revised. The
study dropped the justice frame, which refers to the restoring justice and dignity of the
oppressed as irrelevant to the Georgian media context, re-conceptualized the
transparency frame as access to information –transparency and access to ownership
information, and incorporated six new frames: fair elections, access to information –
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plurality, public interest, responsible government, it concerns you, and public
engagement. At the final stage, the coding scheme was streamlined by merging the
public engagement frame with the public interest frame and the access to ownership
information frame with the access to information –transparency frame. A qualitative
analysis software program, QDA Miner, was used for the analysis of data.
The analysis demonstrated that the most frequently used mobilizing frame—
which was used in the largest share, or roughly one fifth, of the movement statements—
was the free speech frame (RQ1) (see Appendix D for the list of frames and keywords).
Combined usage of access to information – plurality and access to information –
transparency frames also accounted for one fifth of the analyzed statements. Fair
elections and responsible government frames were used less frequently, or in roughly one
sixth of the material, and injustice and rule of law frames each appeared in approximately
one tenth of the material. Rights, it concerns you, public interest, and democratization
frames were used in less than one tenth of the material each. While quantitative
characteristics of the sample lack statistical precision, which, of course, is unattainable in
qualitative analysis, these quantitative data suggest that the key mobilizing frames
launched by activists of the media democratization movement were free speech, access to
information – transparency, access to information – plurality, responsible government
and fair elections (RQ1).
Other analyses showed that some of the frames were used across the range of
topics and issues explicitly addressed in the statements, while others were topically more
restricted. The free speech frame, for instance, was present in most of the statements,
regardless of topic. The rule of law frame was also applied to a range of topics. The
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access to information - plurality and fair elections frames were used in the context of
elections. The injustice frame was used mostly in statements about physical violence and
intimidation of journalists.
The distribution of frames in time also revealed a pattern. The free speech and
rule of law frames were evenly spread over the two-year period of this study. The access
to information – plurality and fair elections frames were only used in 2012, the election
year.
Rationale behind framing choices. Overall, the movement’s use of mobilizing
frames in its published statements is in line with the social movement literature.
According to Benford and Snow (2000), movements intend to achieve one or all of these
key framing tasks: identifying the problem and articulating blame (a diagnostic task);
articulating solutions (a prognostic task); and motivating supporters and recruits (a
motivational task). Frames used by the Georgian activists pursue diagnostic and
motivational tasks. Some of the frames, such as the injustice frame, identify problems in
the Georgian media environment and pinpoint the responsible party—in the case of the
injustice frame, the government of Georgia. Some other frames, such as it concerns you,
pursue motivational tasks. It concerns you signals that issues in the Georgian media
environment are relevant to journalists and non-journalists alike, motivating supporters
and potential recruits. The responsible government frame serves a dual purpose: 1) as a
diagnostic frame, it articulates the responsibility of the government for restricting the
freedom of media; and 2) as a motivational frame, it attempts to make the government act
towards the elimination of problems it has created. In the discourse framed as responsible
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government, the government of Georgia is called upon, asked, pressed, and otherwise
motivated to take action.
The Georgian activists interviewed in this study were clearly influenced by the
strength and reach of master frames, which carry meanings across countries and contexts
(Benford & Snow, 2000). Master frames link together events that appear not to be
meaningfully connected, providing rationales for collective action (Snow & Benford,
1992). Free speech, access to information - transparency, and access to information plurality frames linked issues in Georgia’s media environment, such as the problematic
distribution of broadcast signals around Georgia or the lack of information about media
owners, with other sociopolitical issues, such as people’s right to participate in politics
and make informed choices in elections, forming a coherent argument about
democratization in all spheres of public life. These frames linked the country’s priorities - building a successful and democratic statehood, holding fair elections, forming
responsible citizenry -- to the concept of freedom in the press. Georgian activists’ use of
frames is comparable with the framing practices of free speech movements in transitional
contexts (Mauersberg, 2012; Postigo, 2012). These movements accentuate frames related
to various aspects of freedom of speech: free press, access to information – transparency,
access to information – plurality. The free speech frame in this study referred to the right
of individuals and media to express, produce, and distribute information, while the access
to information – transparency and access to information – plurality frames dealt with
access to information, a more recently articulated component of the freedom of speech
framework (Postigo, 2012). Typically, the Coalition statements featured all three
elements of the free speech framework. Sometimes, two or all three of these frames were
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used in a single paragraph, as in the August 2012 statement by the Georgian Platform of
the Eastern Partnership below:
We are concerned with the decision to ban distribution of TV company
Maestro’s satellite antennas. This action is unacceptable as it limits
constitutional rights and freedoms, including the freedom of speech and
expression, the freedom to access and distribute information, and
ownership rights, and is in conflict with the existing legal framework.
(Mchedlidze, 2012, August 30)
The top five frames found in the studied statements– free speech, access to
information – transparency, access to information – plurality, fair elections, responsible
government – are interconnected and related to the concept of democracy. As mentioned
above, three frames reflect different aspects of the freedom of speech concept, an
essential element of democracy. The fair elections frame is conceptually linked to access
to information – transparency and access to information – plurality as aspects of a fair
electoral process, which is essential to democracy.
A careful reading of the statements in the context of Georgian politics helps us
understand the use of frames in a more nuanced way. In response to criticism over its
media policies, the government of Georgia crafted two arguments: a) freedom of
expression in Georgia is legislatively guaranteed and exercised by all citizens
(Mchedlidze, April 30) and b) plural and diverse sources of information exist in the
country (Mchedlidze, 2010, February 18). Through the use of the access to information –
transparency frame, the activists argued that the freedom of expression for news media
made little sense without the media’s free access to facts and public information. The
activists also questioned the information plurality argument by stressing citizens’ access
to plural sources was uneven and unavailable in different regions of the country--hence,
the use of the access to information – plurality frame. The presence of two justifications
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for the unimpeded access to information – transparency and pluralism -- underscores the
importance of the issue to activists. As is characteristic of master frames (Snow &
Benford, 1992), the access to information – transparency and access to information –
plurality frames easily aligned with the election context. The access to information –
transparency frame shaped discourse about the need for the Georgian government to
handle the elections in a transparent way, while access to information – plurality spoke of
the need to facilitate voters’ choices by providing plural sources of information.
The emergence of the fair elections frame in the activists’ discourse is related to
the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia. Fair elections was a powerful and
culturally resonant frame in Georgia and the rest of the former Soviet Union. One of the
oldest election monitoring organizations in Georgia is named International Society for
Fair Elections and Democracy. The Coalition for Media Advocacy and the It Concerns
You campaign relied on the fair elections frame to suggest that the media environment, if
not improved, would create problems for the elections. For example, the Coalition
stressed in the statement dated September 24, 2012, that “ensuring transparency of the
elections is important, because only a transparent process can lead to public trust in the
election results” (Tsiklauri, 2012, September 24). Similarly, the It Concerns You
campaign also insisted in the statement dated September 30, 2012, that the “must
carry/must offer” rule continue beyond Election Day on the grounds that “the disregard
of these principles would negatively affect media and election environments”
(Mchedlidze 2012, September 30).
The activists recognized the power of the fair elections frame and wanted to
leverage the interest in fair elections into support of media reform. The government of

74

Georgia as the protest target, the Georgian people, international organizations, and the
media – all were sensitive to the fair elections frame. The government of Georgia had
declared on multiple occasions that it had a strong interest and intention in holding free
and fair elections in 2012. President Saakashvili had vowed to hold “the best elections
ever” (24 Saati, 2012, September 7). The fairness of the elections was closely monitored
by foreign governments and international human rights watchdogs, to whom the elections
were a proxy indicator of Georgia’s democratic progress. “Georgia is an important
nation, which holds an important place in the Caucasus as a beacon of democracy and we
are here to protect this beacon,” said the President of the Parliamentary Assembly for the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Riccardo Migliori, ahead
of the 2012 elections (Resonansi, 24 August).
The responsible government frame also shows the activists addressing key
constituents in the framing process. The Coalition adopted the strategy of active
engagement with the government. By using the responsible government frame, the
Coalition suggested the government was responsible for the problems in the media and
pushed it to take action. For example, the It Concerns You activists addressed the
government to deal with the Maestro case in the statement dated July 12, 2012: “Once
again, we call on the government of Georgia to take all available measures to ensure that
the citizens have access to plurality of information, to produce without delay the evidence
it holds to justify the ban on the distribution of satellite antennas imported by TV
Maestro” (Mchedlidze, 2012, July 12).
One feature of the activists’ framing strategy was the use of multiple frames in a
single document, sometimes in a single paragraph. At times, frames were simply
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deployed one after the other. More often, multiple frames formed a coherent and
multifaceted argument. Here’s how the Coalition for Media Advocacy used
democratization, free speech, access to information – transparency, access to
information – plurality, and rights frames to argue against the government’s decision to
restrict video recording in the Parliament in the statement dated February 9, 2012:
The coalition believes that the decision will be a step backwards in
protecting democracy, transparency and freedom of expression and will
limit citizens’ right to access objective information about elected members
of the Parliament. (Tsiklauri, 2012, February 10)
There are several possible explanations for the Coalition’s use of multiple frames
in a single statement. One explanation is that the activists were aiming to reach all
constituents through a single message. Another explanation is framing uncertainty. The
Coalition for Media Advocacy was a young organization -– all statements analyzed here
are produced in Coalition’s first year and a half in operation – and it may have failed to
rally member organizations behind one or two key frames. One activist told the
interviewer to go find “old statements” to see “what words we used there,” failing to
recall framing decisions in the early period of activism (S. S., personal interview, March
12, 2014). Activist organizations typically spend time developing a common
understanding of goals and key frames among members (Powel, 2011). A single,
unifying frame – it concerns you – emerged towards the end of the timeframe of this
study, supporting our view that the activists’ framing was a work-in-progress.
Characteristically, the activists’ key frame (Z. K., personal interview, March 13,
2014), it concerns you, has not been sufficiently elaborated in the Coalition for Media
Advocacy and the It Concerns You materials. This frame underlined the agency and
purpose of citizen involvement in the media democratization movement, but the need for
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citizens to get involved in public affairs was not stressed in statements. The frame was
present just in the name of the campaign, but not all of its materials.
Part Two: In-Depth Interviews
The study thematically analyzed in-depth interviews with movement activists and
participating journalists to clarify meanings, motivations and thought processes attached
to the mobilizing frames and the media democratization movement. Activist journalists
participating in the coalition were also asked whether they had covered the movement
and, if yes, the nature of their experience. The study interviewed news producers and
reporters outside the Coalition, who had covered the activism for the broadcast and print
press. The interviews were semi-structured and built around three research questions:
RQ2 about activists’ vision of the goals and importance of the media democratization
movement; RQ3 about activists’ rationale for framing choices; and RQ4 about activist
journalists’ and news producers’ and reporters’ experiences covering the media
democratization movement. The latter question was to be further explored in the context
of the findings of the quantitative analysis of the news media coverage of the media
democratization movement (these findings are discussed in the following chapter).
The study conducted seventeen interviews with activists and news journalists.
One request for an interview was declined by a television producer. An interviewer, hired
by the study, conducted all interviews in person, using an agreed-upon interview
protocol. Twelve interviews were with activists and five with news producers and
reporters on the beat. Of the 12 activists, 11 were the leaders and representatives of
member organizations in the Coalition and one represented the Coalition’s partner
organization in the It Concerns You campaign. By professional background, eight
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activists had experience as journalists, with five then working as journalists. Four
activists were civil sector professionals: two headed media development programs at
major foundations (one of the two also worked in academia), one coordinated democracy
programs at a major foundation, and one was a media lawyer. For the sake of privacy,
these individuals will be referred to as “magazine publisher,” “regional publisher,”
“editor in chief,” “independent journalist,” “investigative journalist,” “head of
association,” “media rights activist,” “election activist,” “media developer,” “media
academic,” “democracy specialist,” and “media lawyer.”
News journalists were reporters and producers employed by the five news
organizations sampled for the quantitative content analysis of the Georgian media. They
were reporters in pro-government, pro-opposition, and ideologically independent
newspapers11 and producers at government-controlled stations.12 The decision to
interview TV producers instead of TV reporters was related to producers’ greater role in
selecting topics and determining the angle of coverage.

11

This categorization is based on newspapers’ editorial slant in the coverage of 2012

elections (www. mediamonitoring.ge), published watchdog reports, newspapers’
acceptance of various forms of funding from the government or the opposition. The
Georgian newspapers do not declare editorial support for political candidates or parties.
12

This categorization of Georgian TV stations’ editorial slant in the coverage of the 2012

elections (www. mediamonitoring.ge), watchdog reports, and the political positions and
ties of owners: business partners of government officials in one station and a key
opposition figure in another.
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The activists, including activist journalists, and news producers and reporters
seemed open and motivated to discuss the movement and its importance. They willingly
provided details about goals, strategies, and tactical moves and gave a rich description of
attitudes, experiences, emotions, and norms in response to the research questions posed
by the study. These questions are addressed in some detail in the following four sections:
“goals and importance of the media democratization movement,” “rationale behind
framing choices,” “views of activist journalism and news reporters about MDM.” These
sections correspond to RQ2-4, and draw heavily on the spoken words of activists,
including activist journalists, and news reporters themselves (see Table 4.1)

Table 4.1: Research questions, themes and sub-themes in in-depth interviews
Goals and importance of the media democratization movement (RQ2)
Theme 1. Strengthening press freedom
Sub-theme 1.1 Seeing media in distress
Sub-theme 1.2 Having professional and personal stake in MDM
Sub-theme 1.3: Engaging voluntarily, sincerely, and spontaneously in MDM
Theme 2. Building stronger, more involved society
Sub-theme 2.1. Perceiving problems in the governance and the society
Sub-theme 2.2. Movement to join forces with other activists and energize the
public
Sub-theme 2.3. Facilitating fair elections
Rationale behind framing choices (RQ3)
Theme 1. Frames to target the government
Theme 2. Frames to target the international community
Theme 3. Frames to target the people
Theme 4. Frames to target members of the media
Theme 5. Counter-frames and marginalization
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Views and experiences of activist journalists and news reporters (RQ4)
Theme 1. Debate about the expression of activism in journalism
Theme 2. News producers and reporters about MDM and its media coverage
Theme 3. Special relationship between the independent media and the civil sector
Goals and importance of the media democratization movement (RQ2). The
analysis of interviews showed differences and similarities in activists’ understanding of
the goals and importance of the media democratization movement. Two themes emerged
from the analysis. The first theme, the improvement of the media environment, was a
logical and understandable goal for the members in the media democratization
movement. The second theme -- energizing publics and increasing their involvement and
influence in public affairs – was a natural extension of improvements in media’s capacity
to inform citizens. Together, these two goals – improving media’s capacity to inform
citizens and strengthening citizens’ involvement in public affairs – were intended to
advance the democratization of Georgian society. They closely tracked the movement’s
overall goal of the democratization of Georgia. In this discourse, the activists articulated
the links between free media, free and participatory publics, and a stronger democratic
society. The interviewees articulated the achievements of the activism – the adoption of
“must carry/must offer” rules of mandatory distribution of TV signal by cable operators,
progressive changes in media ownership legislation, better distribution of media content
in the regions – as improvements in Georgia’s media environment and society at large.
Theme 1: Strengthening press freedom. The freedom of the press was the highest
order issue for the activists, the majority of whom were professional journalists. Activist
journalists, who had experienced government oppression first hand, used their own and
colleagues’ experiences in the interviews as evidence. Most journalists said they had
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never before been involved in activism and that problems the Georgian media faced made
them mobilize. They said the restoration of a “healthier, less censored environment”
(S.S., personal interview, March 12, 2014) in the media was their goal (RQ2), and that,
first and foremost, they wanted to improve their own professional environment (N. Z.,
personal interview, March 15, 2014; S.S., personal interview, March 12, 2014; Z. K.,
personal interview, March 13, 2014). Non-journalists in the sample saw problems of the
media as indicative of the lack of Georgian society’s overall health. All activists said
their efforts were voluntary, unpaid, sincere, individualized, and unscripted.
Sub-theme 1.1: Seeing media in distress. The majority of activists said they
became convinced -- sometime around 2007 and 2008 -- that the problems in the
Georgian media were not diminishing but growing. “We realized that we were in very
bad shape,” said an influential magazine publisher in Tbilisi.
We were losing freedom. Journalists were in trouble. We discovered the
invisible mechanisms of censorship were at work. Nobody was slamming
into newsrooms anymore, but we were still in trouble. Financially, the
independent media were near collapse. In national televisions, journalists
had no freedom and were not producing quality journalism, let alone
investigative journalism. (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014).
A veteran independent journalist, who had been involved in the emergence of
independent journalism in post-Soviet Georgia and actively involved in the
democratization effort since then, said the level of monopolization and government
control was so high that “the media were not a problem for the government anymore”
(Z.K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). Among many specific issues, the
interviewees identified four key areas of concern: transparency and access to public
information, non-transparent ownership in the broadcast media, the lack of plural sources
of information in various regions of the country, and the lack of independence of public
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broadcasting. They believed these problems stifled the development of media and
journalism in Georgia. The metaphors activists used -- roadblock, cordon, closed doors—
reflected their perceived gravity of the situation.
An experienced investigative journalist, who had been in the profession for almost
a decade, used the roadblock metaphor to describe her feelings in May 2007, when she
realized she might no longer be able to practice investigative journalism. Her story of
dealing with the ownership takeover at her employer’s organization, the lack of access to
public information, and distributional hurdles is a good illustration of problems in the
Georgian media and journalism in that period.
The problems in this journalist’s professional life started in 2004, when the
ownership at her employer, a national broadcast TV station, changed abruptly. The new
owners, who were business partners of the then-minister of defense, ordered all
investigative documentaries produced by her unit to be taken off the air. The team
continued receiving salaries and to be listed as official staff, but all production was
stalled.
One day, …[a new owner] came to the office, carrying a black suitcase …
[A colleague] introduced me. [The owner] said he knew me well. A few
days later, we learned that [TV station] was no longer interested in
investigative journalism, as this genre was not in demand with the
audiences. (That is what they always say.) We were instead offered to
produce a game show…Our sources were calling, demanding that we act
upon stories they had told us. ‘Help,’ they were saying. ‘We are robbed.
We are sent to prison.’ We were trying to hide from these pervasive phone
calls. (N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014)
Realizing she had no professional future at the station, the journalist left and
started an independent documentary studio. But her problems did not end. She had a hard
time accessing public information and getting government officials to talk. At one point,
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her request for the government to release the names of TV station owners was refused on
the grounds that the government restricted the release of ownership information to the
public. Her subsequent attempts to investigate suspicious takeovers of businesses by
individuals close to the government met with failure. Distributing independentlyproduced documentaries was another problem. At first, none of the TV stations would
show the documentaries, so the journalist screened investigations to small groups of
friends and supporters in rented cinema halls. Later, small, Tbilisi-based independent TV
stations picked up the documentaries, but their signal could not reach beyond certain
parts of Tbilisi. Cable operators did not include these outspoken media stations in their
distribution packages. For the investigative journalist, it meant her work would not reach
broad audiences.
The ownership takeovers such as the one described by the investigative journalist
were changing the face of the industry. The professional cleansing of TV stations -- an
effective, non-violent way of silencing journalists -- was happening across the country.
The practice triggered polarization. Some TV stations were becoming more and more
supportive of the government, and others increasingly critical. New owners in TV
stations preferred to stay in the shade and had companies registered in off shore zones
(Freedom House, 2009, IREX, 2009). While names of these owner companies were listed
publicly, information on the ownership structure and beneficiary owners was unavailable.
The lack of complete disclosure of ownership meant there was no way of knowing
whether these beneficiary owners held more than one broadcast license, a practice banned
on anti-monopoly grounds (T.K., personal interview, March 26, 2014; Z. K., personal
interview, March 13, 2014). The lack of financial transparency meant the owners could
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easily subsidize TV stations instead of operating them for profit, which, if disclosed,
would raise alarms about their non-commercial, political interests (Z. K., personal
interview, March 13, 2014). The editor-in-chief of a Tbilisi-based daily and the veteran
media activist said non-transparent TV ownership negatively influenced the industry. The
anonymous owners were “setting the rules and information policies from behind the
curtain” (L. T., personal interview. April 4, 2014). These owners, a group associated with
the government, were gradually taking over the broadcast media to influence the media
content, “destroying the trace” of transactions in off shore zones, according to the
independent journalist (Z. K., personal interview, April 4, 2014).
The lack of transparency in the government and access to public information was
another major problem in the Georgian media (Freedom House, 2005, 2011). The lack of
access to documents and sources meant journalists had to produce one-sided, factually
incomplete reports and face criticism and distrust of the public (R. M., personal
interview, April 20, 2014). Newspaper reporters in pro-government, pro-opposition and
ideologically independent media, interviewed by the study, thought the lack of access to
public information and officials was their biggest problem. They suffered from the
capriciousness of politicians. “We asked, pleaded, stood at their doors, trying to get them
to comment. This was a catastrophe,” said the reporter at independent Resonansi (R. M.,
personal interview, April 20, 2014). The reporter working for 24 Saati, pro-government
newspaper, said the officials privileged major television stations (D. G., personal
interview, April 21, 2014). He said all public events were scripted. Officials would make
statements in front of TV cameras and then withdraw without taking questions. The
media, he said, were essentially given ready-made reports to air, and many went along
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with this practice. (The interviewee put the most blame on editors and producers, who he
thought were siding with the government. Reporters, he said, joked about the practice but
were afraid to voice criticism.) The interviewee thought this practice went against the
public interest and limited substantive coverage of public affairs (D. G., personal
interview, April 21, 2014).
Problems in production were aggravated by distribution issues. The independent
journalist used the cordon metaphor to describe problems small independent and
oppositional TV stations faced in trying to reach audiences outside Tbilisi. Cable
operations, especially in the region, were willing or pressured to exclude these outspoken
TV stations from their distribution packages. The government had called these stations
“hostile to the government” (Mchedlidze, 2010, February 18). Many Georgians who
relied on cable to receive broadcast signals had no access to these critical stations. The
experienced producer of pro-opposition 9th Channel said the lack of distribution outside
the capital Tbilisi made her task of producing news extremely difficult. People in the
regions were unwilling to talk to journalists whose work they could not see on their
screens (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014). In the regions, small TV stations were
experiencing similar distributional hurdles. The head of a media association interviewed
by the study said a local station, if it dared to air serious criticism or exposure of the
government, would be switched off by a local cable operator at the government’s request
(N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014).
The print media, too, faced distributional problems. The mayor’s office in Tbilisi
put limitations on street sales, and successful newspapers had to deal with unexpected tax
audits. “We were witnessing absolutely irrational orders, aimed against the media,” said
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the reporter at pro-opposition newspaper Alia (T. O., personal interview, May 3, 2014).
Independent newspapers and magazines experienced severe financial problems because
businesses were unwillingness to advertise with critical media (S. S., personal interview,
March 12, 2014).
The magazine publisher summed up the mood in the media by saying it was
independent media’s “common vital interest to have a healthy media environment,” in
which “all of us would survive” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014) (RQ2). The
key assumption of the study – that certain media in transitional systems occupied
disadvantageous positions in relation to others and were therefore likely to question the
status quo and strive for the change – appears to hold in these interviews.
Sub-theme 1.2: Having professional and personal stake in MDM. In their
interviews, activists, including activist journalists, relied heavily on their professional and
personal experiences and stressed familiarity with the problems they had set out to
eliminate. Activist journalists said they turned to activism to be able to carry on with
professional duties and careers in the future. Activists from other professional venues
stressed activism was a natural extension of their support and involvement in the media.
The strength of professional and personal investment in the movement’s goals is one of
its distinct features (RQ2). The regional publisher said the Coalition for Media Advocacy,
the movement’s organization, was a platform to deal with participants’ real problems.
Usually, coalitions get together and start pondering over what issues to
engage. In our case, it was different. We did not have to ask questions.
The identification of issues came first, and the creation of the Coalition
followed. (I. M, personal interview, April 18, 2014)
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The following statement from the investigative journalist reflects dominant
feelings among professional journalists involved in activism:
The media were losing their function. I could no longer be an
investigative journalist. I was not providing people with information, how
could I? I could not steal information, nor invent it. I needed information
to analyze and inform the society. To solve the problem, I started
investing much energy into activism. (N. Z., personal interview, March
15, 2014)
The investigative journalist said she saw activism as “a way out” of her troubles,
“the job” she had to do. Citing Lenin, who famously pledged to “follow a different path”
to freedom, the investigative journalist said the activism was her path to unrestricted
access to public information and freedom to pursue investigative journalism. After
attending an advocacy seminar organized by the US Government for Georgian media
professionals, the journalist used a leftover travel allowance to legally register a new
advocacy organization13.
The strength of journalists’ personal motives did not mean they were on a
personal crusade against the system. Most activist journalists said that the problems that
affected them and the industry negatively influenced the Georgian society (Z. K.,
personal interview, March 13, 2014). Citizens needed free and independent media to get
information about the government and public affairs. The independent journalist, who
said he personally had as much stake in the media reforms as any other journalist,
claimed that the problems in the media environment that the activist journalists were
trying to resolve were important to the society at large.

13

Non-profit organizations in Georgia require legal registration with the Public Registry.
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I am producing a talk show…which airs on TV Maestro…I of course want
as many people as possible to watch my program. So, if Maestro gets
distributed via cable under the “must carry” rule, it is very good for me,
right? But is it only good for me? Isn’t it good for the pluralism in
general? (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014)
The independent journalist said he and his colleagues started getting together
regularly sometime in 2010 to discuss the state of media. Their group designed a proposal
for a comprehensive program of reforms. Another group of journalists gathered at the
offices of the magazine publisher. “We were meeting regularly,” She said, “… some 1020 people, different types, to discuss the events in the media and politics.” (S. S.,
personal interview, March 12, 2014). This group, which included the investigative
journalist, formed an advocacy organization and began lobbying for changes in the
Georgian Public Broadcaster. These professional interests and streams of activism
matched with the interests of media developers in revitalizing stalled media reforms
(RQ2). A media lawyer, who was responsible for organizational matters at the Coalition
for Media Advocacy and later led one of its member organizations, said the civil sector
organizations decided to join forces after seeing that huge resources they had been
investing in the media environment were not leading to substantial improvements in the
media sector. These organizations hoped the coalition work would improve the efficiency
of media assistance programs (T. K., personal interview, March 26, 2014). The Open
Society Georgia Foundation, also known as the Soros Foundation, chose media advocacy
as its key area of engagement (H. J., personal interview, March 25). It proposed the idea
of a coalition, which media professionals enthusiastically embraced. The activists saw the
coalition as a “common platform for action” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014).
The Coalition for Media Advocacy, launched on April 13, 2011, declared it would
support media freedom and access to information, protect media organizations, and
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initiate media legislation, setting in motion sustained activism in these areas. It brought
together a “hybrid expertise” (H.J., personal interview, Mach 25, 2014) of law,
management, and journalism professionals, which helped widen its focus and the concept
of reforms.
Sub-theme 1.3: Engaging voluntarily, sincerely, and spontaneously in MDM.
Most activists in the study repeatedly said they joined activism spontaneously, without a
plan, and that their effort was unfunded and sincere. If, initially, decision making and
planning in the movement were rather informal, in later months, closer to the elections,
the activism became highly organized (T. K., personal interview, March 26, 2014). The
picture that emerged from interviews was of the dynamic growth and professionalization
of activism from its inception in 2010 to the formation of the Coalition for Media
Advocacy in 2011 and the launch of the It Concerns You campaign in 2012. The
Coalition’s key campaign, It Concerns You, was highly coordinated (T. B., personal
interview, April 12, 2014). The organizational and decision-making procedures became
formalized, and the framing work more elaborated towards the end of 2012.
The media academic said “the members of the coalition have invested their time,
and this human investment, not funding, resulted in the crystallization of true interest…
[Members were] genuinely concerned, emotional and personally affected by these
problems” (T. Z., personal interview, April 2, 2014). The media lawyer said members
were attracted by the organization’s lack of hierarchy and collegial, consensual decisionmaking process (T. K., personal interview, March 26, 2014). “The greatest attraction for
me was the spontaneity, sincerity and intensity of the process,” said the magazine
publisher, who was one of the first to join the Coalition for Media Advocacy (S. S.,
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personal interview, March 12, 2014). She used the words idealist, civic, and enthusiasm
to describe the media activism. She said activists were involved in practically all aspects
of the collective action, from making videos to writing text and organizing events. She
would start a day with updating followers about the day’s events on Facebook, and end
by providing an account of achievements at friendly media studios. “The actions were
very spontaneous and need-based. Every day we were planning what to do tomorrow,
[moving] from one event to another, from one action to another,” she explained. The
activism had a strategic line but individualized and “creative” tactics. “I was running
around like a crazy person to go everywhere I was needed, to get posters and whistles, to
attend Thursdays [meetings of the Coalition for Media Advocacy]… It took much energy
away from me, and it took my time,” said the investigative journalist (N. Z., personal
interview, March 15, 2014).
Others saw the movement as more organized program, with the strategic line but
room for tactical maneuvering. The media developer and democracy specialist saw the
process as organized but flexible and “lively” (H. J., personal interview, March 25,
2014). They said the Coalition for Media Advocacy, and especially the It Concerns You
campaign, had a strategic line, with issues and actions arranged in priority order and
responsibilities assigned to particular actors. Tactical maneuvering was important to
respond to the evolving circumstances in politics and the society (T. B., personal
interview, April, 12, 2014; Z.K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). The democracy
specialist recalled how, after planning and executing street actions, the activists would
receive phone calls from the government and invitations to negotiate, “to trade” (T. B.,
personal interview, April 12, 2014). If negotiations stalled, the activists would go back to
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their street action or engage in some other form of pressure to get the government to talk
again (T. B., personal interview, April 12, 2014). Other factors requiring tactical
maneuvering were internal frictions between the Coalition members (H. J., personal
interview, March 25, 2014). The newspaper editor in chief likened activism to the game
of chess, in which theories and previous games matter, but very important decisions are
often made on the spot. The independent journalist said there was nothing spontaneous
in the activism: “To come up with the slogan, It Concerns You, we met three for about
three to four hours, until the slogan was born. When this many journalists and civil sector
organizations are engaged in extensive brainstorming over one slogan, how is that
spontaneous?!” (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014).
Theme 2: Building stronger, more involved society. While media freedom,
understandably, emerged as the leitmotiv in this study, the society and active publics
became the second overarching theme. The activists, who mobilized over media
problems, began seeing these specific problems in the wider context of societal problems.
They realized problems in the media environment had two sources: unjust decisions in
the government and citizens’ inability to watch the government and lead in public affairs.
The media activists saw the need to consolidate with other issue groups and broaden the
movement. The initial concern over building a healthier media environment developed
into demands for a more vibrant, free, and participatory environment in the country. This
focus on public participation is reflected in activists’ key slogan, it concerns you.
Sub-theme 2.1: Perceiving problems in governance and society. Some activist
journalists went to great lengths in describing problems in Georgian politics, linking
issues in the media and political environments. Asked about her personal motives to
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become an activist, the publisher said she was concerned about her business and the
overall situation in the country. While the failure of her business could have been
tolerated, she could not tolerate the failure of her country (I. M., personal interview, April
18, 2014). The publisher of the Tbilisi-based magazine used the metaphors monopolized
and closed to describe the Georgian politics and the society in the years 2007 and 2009:
There was no movement, and we were somehow reconciled with the idea
that it was all over. The political space -- leverages and resources -- was
fully monopolized [by the government]. We were “offsite”…because
whomever was not with them [the government] was [considered to be]
against them. We were facing this closed system…The opposition was
weak, and the government very strong and vertically integrated. The
government monopolized it all. We were in the standoff with this system,
and what possibly could we do? Our civic spirit was awakening. We
realized we needed to do something, or we would have to live in this
system for many more years (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014)
She recalled her and colleagues’ rage and mobilization experienced over the
government’s mishandling of massive political street protests in November, 2007.
Another tipping point was the war with Russia in August 2008. By that time, the
publisher’s “illusions” about “the young, overzealous government, making mistakes in
the pursuit of fast reforms” were all gone. “The war was the last drop. We realized we
were in trouble. The war rang the alarm,” she said (S. S., personal interview, March 12,
2014). For others, the shocking injustice was the closure of TV Imedi amid accusations of
instigating unrest in November, 2007. The media developer called the closure “an
irreparable, unforgivable mistake” and “crossing of the line” in the eyes of
democratically minded citizens (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014). The media
academic was appalled by the arrest of photographers in 2010 (T. Z., personal interview,
April 2, 2014). All activists placed the blame squarely on the government of Georgia (L.
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T., personal interview, April 4, 2014; N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014; S. S.,
personal interview, March 12, 2014; Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014).
Another source of trouble in Georgian society was an inactive citizenry and its
lack of leadership in public affairs. People were passive and hard to mobilize (I. M.,
personal interview, April 18, 2014; T. Z., personal interview, April 2, 2014; Z. K.,
personal interview, March 13, 2014). Even civil sector organizations and some media
were inactive.
People were helpless. On one occasion, we organized a street protest…My
journalist had been insulted by the police chief, and we stood in protest in
front of the police building. We asked civil sector organizations and the
media to join us…‘if you do not want to be beaten by the police, stand by
us,’ we told them …The building was made of glass, and we saw how they
[the police] were taking our pictures and registering our identities. I
myself took a picture of our crowd. In these pictures, you can see that only
a few people were facing the glass building. Others stood with their backs
to the police, trying to avoid being recognized. These were people from
civil sector organizations and the media! (I. M., personal interview, April
18, 2014)
The editor-in-chief echoed the idea. He said the Georgians did not have much
experience of “positive involvement…in the country’s affairs. They were taking part in
the elections but were not involved in small, local problems” (L. T., personal interview,
April 4, 2014). There were many reasons for the lack of engagement. The activist
journalists saw the link between the government’s media and information policies and the
passivity of citizens. The restrictions of media content distribution amounted to depriving
viewers of choices and of a supply of plural information. People lived in the reality
constructed by government-loyal TV stations. The regional publisher recalled how these
television stations painted a picture of a thriving economy and development around the
country, and how citizens in the regions would compare these pictures with their own
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deteriorating conditions and think their problems were singular. Often, these citizens
blamed local authorities for not keeping up with the pace in the rest of the country (I. M.,
personal interview, April 18, 2014). Not knowing who stood behind these TV stations
made citizens vulnerable to propaganda and manipulation. The producer of proopposition 9th Channel said:
If I need to know what food I am eating --genetically modified, bio,
natural – and the package tells me that, I also need to know what
newspaper I am reading. Is it liberal? Left- or right-oriented? [I need to
know] who is the owner and what interests he has. (T. R., personal
interview, April 10, 2014)
Sub-theme 2.3: Facilitating fair elections. The media democratization movement
mobilized at a decisive moment in Georgia’s history – the watershed elections of 2012,
the first truly competitive and fair elections in which the sitting government peacefully
ceded powers to the opposition. The movement, which energized the society, increased
the level of fairness and public engagement in elections. While most activists agreed the
movement played a role in the elections, not all thought facilitating fair elections was
their goal (RQ2). At one extreme, the investigative journalist said the elections were
entirely unrelated to the protest (N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014). At the other,
the election activist in the It Concerns You campaign said the elections were the end goal
of activism and the reason behind the campaign and its “must carry” initiatives (M. P.,
personal interview, April 7, 2014). Other activists said they tried to leverage the attention
to the election for the media causes, but they had mobilized for neither the fair elections
(S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014) nor the enforcement of the “must carry” rule
in the context of the elections (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014; S. S., personal
interview, March 12, 2014; Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). Offering his take
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on the issue, the editor-in-chief said facilitating fair elections was as much a goal as
enforcing positive media reforms (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014) and that the
“must carry” rule was as important during the elections as it was in other periods. Indeed,
the activists pushed to extend “must carry/must offer” rules beyond the election period,
and mandatory distribution of all broadcast signals is now a standard, year-round
modality in the broadcast sector of Georgia.
The producer of pro-opposition 9th Channel said the media activism was
inseparable from the election activism. These two efforts formed “extraordinary and tense
pre-elections dynamics”. She said the society “was full of expectations” and eager to
follow the elections, but the government was trying to limit information. The media were
caught in the middle, and all its troubles came from government’s action to prevent
voters from getting information. The producer likened the adoption of the “must carry”
rule, which came as a “complete surprise,” to the cracking of an “old, thick layer of ice”
in the Georgian society (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014).
Several activists went so far as to assert that the opposition would not have won
the elections had it not been for the media activism and the “must carry” rule. The
election activist recalled the 2008 presidential elections, which she believed were carried
by the opposition but the victory was not sealed in the results (M. P., personal interview,
April 7, 2014). She was referring to the extraordinarily close presidential elections of
2009, in which President Saakashvili won by a small margin. Because the success of a
contender against an incumbent, suspected of vote rigging, depended on a massive
turnout of voters and their use of ballots, the It Concerns You campaign played a role in
the victory of the opposition by mobilizing voters (M. P., personal interview, April 7,
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2014). “The citizens were very active, attentive and convinced that they were to change
something in their life,” said the election activist (M. P., personal interview, April 7,
2014). Her views were echoed by other interviewees (L. B., personal interview, March
16, 2014; N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014). Offering a view from the outside,
the reporter at independent Resonansi said the “must carry” rule determined the outcome
of the elections. She cited a moral shock and a major swing in voter attitudes prior to the
elections, when the news of prisoner abuse broke on one of the opposition channels. The
reporter said this news would not have reached the majority of Georgians had it not been
for the unlimited signal distribution under the “must carry” rule, adopted into law on
activists’ demands.
Without agreeing on the intent of activists, most activists and news producers and
reporters agreed that the media democratization movement played a role in the outcome
of the 2012 Parliamentary Elections. “Our activism has not directly influenced the
elections. And it has not changed the system. What it did, importantly, was to provide a
good lesson of active involvement in public affairs,” said the media developer (H. J.,
personal interview, March 25, 2014).
Sub-theme 2.2: Movement to join forces with other activists and energize the
public. While the media democratization movement did not have any stated political
goals, many activists saw their goal as strengthening civil society and enhancing the
political involvement of citizens and greater practice of “direct democracy” (L. T.,
personal interview, April 4, 2014) (RQ2). The Coalition was to provide “a good lesson of
activism” to the people (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014), “to strengthen civic
skills and consolidate activists” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014), and, in
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general, set “new rules of the game in Georgia” (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014)
(RQ2).
It was first order task for activists to join forces with other activists. The problems
in the Georgian media were “complex and interconnected” (Z. K., personal interview,
March 13, 2014), and inseparable from other issues in the governance and the society.
Most activists interpreted problems in the media as “flaws in the system” (S. S., personal
interview, March 12, 2014). These problems could not be aided in isolation from other
issues. To attack the system and “snatch away” new rights in the media and other spheres
(S.S., personal interview, March 12, 2014), it was necessary to join forces with other
activists in environmental, urban, and student movements. The magazine publisher said
activists who joined forces over media issues started adopting ownership of a wider range
of problems and joined the wider stream of civic activism. Soon, “the protest events were
happening at multiple locations,” she said. While, initially, no more than 50 people would
show up, the movement was gaining strength like “a wave” (S. S., personal interview,
March 12, 2014). The wave metaphor is very close to the description of a protest cycle
(Tarrow, 1983) as “sequences of escalating collective action that are of greater frequency
and intensity than normal, that spread around various sectors and regions of society”
(Snow & Benford, 1992, p.141). The mobilization and consolidation of protest groups
produced the It Concerns You campaign, a major mobilization of activists and citizens
around the country, launched in February 2012, nine months after the launch of the
Coalition for Media Advocacy.
In assessing the achievements of the Coalition, the publisher said it changed the
political culture. Citizens developed a stronger sense of civic responsibility and became
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more involved with politics, and more vigilant about the abuse of power (S. S., personal
interview, March 12, 2014). The magazine publisher said she started self-identifying as a
member of the civil society, not as the “mass” (S. S., personal interview, March 12,
2014). The Coalition promoted cooperation and internal cohesion in civil society (T. K.,
personal interview, March 26, 2014) and overcame polarization and zero sum attitudes in
Georgian politics (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014). The civil sector also learned
to work closely with the public and to value its trust and support (H. J., personal
interview, March 25, 2014). A stronger, more involved society was the key long-term
outcome of the media activism in 2010 - 2012, said the election activist, whose hopes for
the further betterment of the country were pinned on the civil sector (M. P., personal
interview, April 7, 2014).
The activism of the civil sector organizations strengthened the society. I
can say that the civil sector has never been so united, energetic, active, and
productive. I hope it will stay that way. I genuinely think that our
movement and campaign helped the society mature. It may be a very bold
thing to say, but we increased civic mindedness of people, who were either
indifferent or thought their activism would lead nowhere, or were afraid to
talk out loud. (M. P., personal interview, April 7, 2014)
Rationale behind framing choices (RQ3). Activists the study interviewed
devoted much time to explaining their strategies and tactics but said very little about their
framing choices. When asked what frames they used, most were unable to recall any
framing decisions or rationale behind most slogans, metaphors, or other techniques of
constructing issues in the public discourse, with a few notable exceptions. Some activists,
especially professional journalists, appeared to deliberately shrug off frames as public
relations work. Others may not have been familiar with the concept of “frames” and
misunderstood the question. Activists’ lack of experience and message-level
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coordination, the informality of the Coalition, and professional and ideational diversity
among the Coalition’s member organizations explain the lack of rationalization of
framing work, especially, at the early stages of activism. Most of the analysis below came
from indirect clues about the framing work in activists’ interviews. The only detailed,
focused account of a deliberate framing process was about the elaboration and rationale
behind the key campaign, the It Concerns You. The It Concerns You campaign, which
started when the activism strengthened and matured, demonstrated greater
professionalism in the framing work.
The picture of the framing process that emerged from interviews is in line with
the literature about social movements’ framing work. Social movements are typically
interacting with four constituencies: followers, the media, targets of protest and
references groups of targets of protest (Lipsky, 1968). The Georgian media
democratization movement has addressed the government of Georgia as the target of
protest, active citizens and activists in other movements as followers, the international
community as the government’s reference group, and the media as colleagues and the
party invested in the media reforms.
Theme 1: Frames to target the government. The activists said they were
“working at all levels – with the civil sector, [national] media, regional media,
international organizations, embassies, -- all” (T. K., personal interview, March 26,
2014). Still, the key target of their protest (Lipsky, 1968) was the government of Georgia.
The government, said the media development specialist, was not tolerating opposition,
was not listening to the civil sector concerns, and was avoiding dialogue (H. J., personal
interview, March 25, 2014). The government’s first reaction to activists’ initiatives was
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always “no,” and it felt that “the doors were closed” (H. J., personal interview, March 25,
2014). The government did not much care about the independent press or hold it in high
regard (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014). The president of Georgia repeatedly
said that the Georgian press was “ruthless” and “unprofessional” (Mchedlidze, 2010,
February 18). Even after the government started negotiating with activists, the process
developed slowly. The magazine publisher recalled dealing with a highly placed
parliamentarian, whom the activists “chased everywhere,” waiting for him to log into his
Facebook account well after midnight. The parties distrusted each other.
He was telling us he was on our side, and that [our proposal] would not
work, would not make it through the Parliament. He wanted to be appear
as a good fellow, but he was a typical party executive who would never
make a step against his interests and against his party interests. (S. S.,
personal interview, March 12, 2014)
To reverse the process, the activists apparently started to adopt language their
target would understand (N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014). Their key message
for the government was the country and its interests (RQ3). “We were telling the
government that the issues [in the media] were important, and that it would be bad for the
country if they [the government] took no action,” said the investigative journalist (N. Z.,
personal interview, March 15, 2014). She also highlighted international standards, telling
the government that transparency “was a standard and journalists’ basic right” (N. Z.,
personal interview, March 15, 2014). The head of the media association said: “[we told
the government] ‘if you deal with the problem, it will positively affect your image, while
you will not lose much’” (N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014). Other activists said
they stressed “democracy” and “plurality” because these concepts reflected the
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government’s own declarative goals for the country (L. B., personal interview, March 16,
2014).
This strategy of deploying universally accepted master frames of democracy –
whether rationalized or not -- was effective. The government was clearly sensitive to
Georgia’s image as a rights-based democracy. It wanted to position Georgia as an
aspirant member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European
Union and was aware of the importance the international community attached to media
rights and freedoms.
The activists also targeted the government with the fair elections frame (RQ3). By
using the fair elections frame, the Coalition was again attempting to leverage the
government’s desire to appear democratic in the eyes of the world.
As is clear from the above excerpts, the Coalition for Media Advocacy chose to
actively engage the government, which possessed the ultimate power to enact positive
reforms in the media sector. Typically, social movements rely on extra-institutional
tactics, such as street protests and strikes, to reach their goals (Goodwin, 2013). However,
social movements also effectively employ institutional channels of pressure (Snow &
Benford, 1992; Lofland, 1985), such as court cases (Fuchs, 2013) or lobbyism
(Mauersberger, 2012). Georgian’ activists’ strategy of directly engaging the government,
parallel to street protests and public mobilization, proved effective. This strategy ties
logically with activists’ choice of responsible government, fair elections, free speech, and
access to information frames.
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Theme 2: Frames to target the international community. Lipsky (1968) wrote
that movements, which lack bargaining power, typically try to activate third parties, or
groups, that are referent groups for protesters’ targets and possess sufficient bargaining
power to exert influence over the target. The protesters often engage in actions aimed at
eliciting sympathy and support among these referent groups of targets of protest. The
target of the Georgian media democratization movement – the government of Georgia –
was highly sensitive to Georgia’s standing in the international community and susceptible
to the opinion of the international community. The activists apparently tried to leverage
this sensitivity. By pressing free speech, access to information - transparency and access
to information - plurality frames -- internationally understood concepts of freedom and
democracy -- the activists were trying to engage the international community. By
employing the fair elections frame in the discourse about media reforms, the activists
alerted the international community that “monopolized media would create problems at
the upcoming elections, because the access to information would be lacking” (S. S.,
personal interview, March 12, 2014). They hoped that the international community would
utilize its own channels of pressure on the government, which it did. Ambassadors of
foreign countries, including the United States, made many statements in support of
legislative proposals of activists (Tsiklauri, 2012, May 31). In 2009, the European Union
started the human rights dialogue with the Georgian government, in which participating
civil rights and media organizations produced more than a dozen recommendations to
improve the media environment (EU Human Rights Dialogue, 2009). The EU forwarded
these recommendations to the government of Georgia. Involving the international
community was highly effective strategy, as stressed by many activists and news
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producers (G. L., personal interview, May 5, 2014; S. S., personal interview, March 12,
2014)
Theme 3: Frames to target people – It Concerns You. Members of the public
were the important audience for the activists, as potential recruits, followers, supporters
or, simply, sympathetic bystanders (Lipsky, 1968). Initially, activists’ strategy had been
to mobilize “active people” -- students, media, academic, diplomats, civil sector leaders -instead of attempting mass mobilization (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014; T. Z.,
personal interview, April 2, 2014). Most activists recalled meetings and discussions with
these socially active groups (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014; S. S., personal
interview, March 12, 2014). The media academic said it was a clever strategy, as massive
mobilization was unattainable, while recruiting mobilized publics seemed an easier task.
The strategy of recruiting activists from other or former movements has been one of the
frequently used tools in mobilizers’ toolkit (Goodwin, 2013).
However, as the activism grew and the It Concerns You campaign decided to
build awareness of media problems among mass publics, the activists re-aligned their
frames. This pattern of frame re-alignment to respond to the changing context is well
documented in the literature (Zuo & Benford, 1995). It was necessary to talk about the
media issues “in a very clear language” (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014).
Problems in the media, obvious to professionals, were not fully understood by the public
(H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014)
The lack of access to public information is not only a journalist’s problem.
It is citizens’ common problem. That he [citizen] does not know who
owns televisions, and what interests these people have, and why they
invest money and what money they invest [is bad.]… The citizens should
know. It was our principle when starting the campaign [It Concerns You].
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It is one thing that I, as a journalist, am interested in, but, as a citizen, I
want all other citizens to think [about these problems] too. (Z. K., personal
interview, March 13, 2014)
The election activist, who traveled around the country to meet people, said it was
not as hard to explain the essence of issues in the media to the people as it was to
demonstrate why and how these issues mattered to them.
These issues [proposed amendments to restrict the right of political
gathering, must carry rule] were rather difficult to explain. If we stuck to
the legal language, and dwelled on the details of amendments, nobody
would understand a thing. The government would adopt the law, and
nothing would change. Our purpose, the good work we did, was to get
these key messages to the people: that their electoral choices could be
ignored [in rigged elections], they could have been labeled as political
activists and unjustly prosecuted. [We told them] anyone had the right to
listen to alternative opinions. All of it was simple and tangible and
relevant. Our slogan said just that -- It concerns any one of us…Crafting
slogans, delivering messages, streamlining the campaign gave results.
Every citizen we would meet at various places, from big cities to small
villages, had a reaction. True, they were not standing with us in the streets,
but they were aware, they understood and supported us. (M. P., personal
interview, April 7, 2014)
Making issues relevant and understandable to the recruits in the context of their
daily experiences, that is, increasing their experiential commensurability -- one of the key
tasks in framing (Benford & Snow, 2000) – was clearly achieved by the movement. Still,
the activists needed a potent motivational frame (Snow & Benford, 2000) that would
stress the public’s ownership of problems in the media. It concerns you was designed
with that purpose. The frame shaped the media issues as relevant to most people in
Georgia. The people were told they could not see many Georgian channels available
elsewhere because the government wanted to keep them in the dark and that they ought to
support the “must carry” proposal. The people were learning that they could not even
watch their own, local stations, because the government disliked what these stations said
and pressed local cable providers to block their distribution (N. K., personal interview,
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March 24, 2014). “We were explaining to them [to people] that our common right [to
information] was restricted, that we all needed information, which was withheld from
us,” said the investigative journalist. “We were trying to build discontent, not artificially,
but by making people aware of their problems, and they were getting angry” (N. Z.,
personal interview, March 15, 2014). The magazine publisher said the people did not
need much articulation of the problems. She said they were already unhappy. Instead,
they needed to be told to take charge (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014): “Here,
you need to sign a petition, then, you need to hold a meeting, and later, we need to
change a legislation” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014).
The slogan it concerns you was created as the elections drew nearer. The
independent journalist recalled the focus group work that went into the choice of the
slogan. The activists tested several slogans (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014).
The winner, it concerns you, was authored by a popular Georgian poet (T.B., personal
interview, April 12, 2014). The independent journalist said the slogan became the brand
of activism. He thought it was a very well-chosen, innovative, elastic frame, which
incorporated not only media but also election-related issues and had the potential to cover
other concerns in the future:
We were telling [the people]: instead of blindly following us, we are
telling you, it concerns you! If it does, you need to read this booklet, see
that social ad, listen to our suggestions, and meet us. There were many
discussions in Tbilisi and all over Georgia. We’ve been everywhere and
met everyone. We were telling them, ‘start thinking. If it concerns you,
then express your protest’. (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014)
Theme 4: Frames to target members of the Media. The activists spoke at great
length about the media’s attitudes towards the activism and verbalized their strategies in
dealing with various media groups. Again, they said very little about the choice of frames
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to target members of the media. The media developer said the activists were counting on
the support of the independent media in Tbilisi and the regions and disregarding the
controlled media (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014). She said activists’ media
relations were well-conceived and planned. The assumption of this study that the activists
would try to exploit tensions in the “media-state dynamics” (Mauersberger, 2012, p. 588)
and differences in the media (Weaver & Scacco, 2013) was supported in the interviews.
The comment below illustrates activists’ solid understanding of the balance of forces in
the Georgian media:
In our media campaigns, we were not counting on them [governmentcontrolled media] as our allies. Our campaign relied on online and print
media and social networks. These were little oases [of independent
journalism], invested in our cause. Regional media too…I mean those
media organizations in the regions that had not betrayed journalism and to
whom values, which united us, were real and important, and who were
ready to protect these values. They were our allies. (H. J., personal
interview, March 25, 2014)
9th Channel producer’s comments echo the idea about shared values between
activists and journalism professionals.
We had a good relationship with the third sector. Generally speaking, the
third sector is the media’s ally, both because it has the rights agenda,
which includes media rights, and because it shares the media’s interest in
the transparency of information. No other group has such a vested interest
in transparency. (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014)
The important finding, reflected in this and other statements in this section, is
about the shared ideational base between the media and the civil sector, acknowledged by
both sectors. Activists’ free speech and access to information-transparency frames were
likely to resonate with journalists, for whom these concepts were an important part of the
professional value system and who had experienced problems accessing and distributing
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information. These frames undoubtedly helped activists communicate their concerns in a
language understandable to the members of the media.
Theme 5: Counter frames and marginalization. Some activists spoke about
counter frames deployed by the government in an attempt to marginalize their efforts.
The publisher recalled the government’s “sustained campaign” to politicize the protest by
linking it to the oppositional parties and their leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili. According to
the publisher, this strategy alienated many potential recruits, who were weary of being
associated with partisanship and politics. Politicizing the protest, a tactic described by the
publisher, is a proven marginalization technique (Chan & Lee, 1984). The government
also marginalized people in the middle, who were not taking political sides. The
publisher said these individuals were called a derogatory name of “shuashists” (people in
the middle). The label implied conformism and self-serving positioning in the middle.
The United National Movement was trying everything in its power to
make these labels stick…The system tried to marginalize and neutralize us
and was doing it by various means – by influencing the public opinion on
Facebook, by blowing our mistakes out of proportion. The system was
working against the active people who opposed it. (S. S., personal
interview, March 12, 2014)
The activists thought government-controlled media and the Georgian Public
Broadcaster were complicit in the marginalization. Government-controlled televisions
were siding with the government and not talking to the activists (N. Z., personal
interview, March 15, 2014). “All doors were closed. [Pro-governmental] televisions were
filming us from behind our backs not to show our faces on the screen. News about us
lasted seconds and were aired during the third block [towards the end of the newscast].
Meetings and demonstrations were not covered at all,” said the magazine publisher (S. S.,
personal interview, March 12, 2014). Invitations for pro-governmental stations to attend
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activists’ events “fell on deaf ears” (I. M., personal interview, April 18, 2014). In stories
aired by the public broadcasting, “activists would appear out of nowhere, blow a whistle,
and disappear. Nobody would understand [from the news] why these people blew
whistles in the first place,” said the head of media association (N. K., personal interview,
March 24, 2014). This excerpt evidences the marginalization by framing a protest as a
meaningless show, a spectacle (Dardis, 2006; McLeod & Hertog, 1999).
However, other activists said the pro-governmental media spared the activists and
never really marginalized the Georgian media democratization movement. The
democracy specialist said she had not encountered any resistance or any serious
marginalization from pro-governmental stations (T. B., personal interview, April 12,
2014). “We have been spared terrible lies,” she said. The media developer echoed her
thought:
I would not say the national broadcasters managed to discredit the process.
It did not happen. Perhaps they decided not to [go against us]. My
colleagues may disagree, but based on what we’ve been hearing from
these channels over the years, their rhetoric about our activism was
relatively mild. They did hit Maestro [Tbilisi-based independent station]
hard over its litigation with the government, though. (H. J., personal
interview, March 25, 2014)
The head of a media association summed up the situation, saying that supportive
media supported and followed activists’ news agenda, whereas unfriendly media ignored
activists’ news and themes (N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014). Progovernmental media covered the Coalition and It Concerns You campaign “as any other
news, in a superficial way,” said the election activist (M. P., personal interview, April 7,
2014).
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Views and experiences of activist journalists and news reporters (RQ4). The
study spoke with activist journalists and news producers and reporters about journalists’
involvement in activism, the ethical issues involved in covering activism while being
involved in it, their personal level of involvement in activism, and their coverage of the
media democratization movement and experiences on the beat.
Activist journalists interviewed by the study thought there was no conflict
between practicing journalism and engaging in activism (RQ4). However, they admitted
having given the subject much thought. Most were trying to draw a line between the
expression of activism and bias. They said activism was to be expressed in blogs and
editorials but not in news reporting. Activists were not to cross the line between activism
and politics.
The opinions of news producers and reporters, who were not part of the media
democratization movement and covered it as a beat, diverged along ideological lines.
Producers and reporters at independent and pro-opposition newspapers and TV stations
were supportive of the expression of activism in reporting. They said their own position
on the issue had always emotionally colored their reporting. However, producers and
reporters at pro-governmental media, while expressing support for professional
journalists’ right to activism and to holding strong position on issues, rejected the
expression of activist positions in journalism as unprofessional. They said activist
journalists could better serve their cause by covering issues objectively and substantively,
incorporating both supporters’ and opponents’ issue positions.
Theme 1: Debate about the expression of activism in journalism. Most
journalists who took part in activism said they had not experienced conflict over their two
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roles as activist and journalist. One activist said her “trick” was to be aware of the role
she was playing at a given moment, and stay within its boundaries (N. Z., personal
interview, March 15, 2014). During reporting, an activist journalist would have to abstain
from advocacy, and, while advocating, abstain from reporting, she said. The magazine
publisher said trying to remain neutral was as pointless as masking one’s interest in an
issue with the pretense of neutral reporting. She thought it was acceptable and even
important for activists to express positions (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014).
She said extraordinary circumstances, such as the abuse of rights and freedoms,
warranted a diversion from journalistic standards. “When you are pressured, to try to
stand aside, attempt to be an unbiased arbiter and not to express your opinion [is
nuisance]. Of course you should express your position!” said the magazine publisher. She
said she had been criticized for blending the line between activism and journalism by
journalism purists, whom she despised, calling “sterile types in their comfort zones, on
the Mount Olympus” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014). (The metaphor sterile
in activists’ discourse is contrasted to activist and engaged.) Most activist journalists
stressed the duties of citizenship were of a higher order than professional standards of
journalism.
Asked if he had expressed his activism in writing, the editor-in-chief said he
“naturally” had (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014). He said he wrote editorials and
defended his position on issues. But his newspaper provided both activists’ and
opponents’ view. The editor-in-chief said newspaper’s coverage was balanced, but not as
much to meet the standard as to produce “interesting” journalism. The editor in chief said
it was in the interests as activists to stimulate public discussion of their proposals, and to
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invite opponents’ criticism of potential flaws. Reflecting the range of views in journalism
was also more democratic. “If you advocate democracy, you should stand by its rules
yourself,” said the editor in chief (L.T., personal interview, April 4, 2014). The
independent journalist echoed these views. He too made his activist position clear when
hosting a show or writing an opinion piece, but thought journalists had no right to be
biased against and inattentive to opposite views. Representing all points of view and
facilitating discussion on important issues was a journalist’s role. He also said this was
not always possible. “Georgia is not a sterile country, and the process [of activism in
journalism] is not totally clean” (Z.K., personal interview, March 13, 2014).
People appreciate activism, said the magazine publisher (S. S., personal interview,
March 12, 2014). She thought the trust in her magazine was rising because of her strong
position on issues. People would call from all over Georgia, and ask her reporters to take
up their local issues. She called this practice “civic journalism in action.” She said she
valued close engagement with readers that her activism had led to.
While many activist journalists expressed the support for registering activist
positions in their journalistic work, some said their issues would best be served by
objective, comprehensive reporting and substantive journalism. The head of a media
association, a former journalist, said journalists were not to express activism in their work
(N. K., personal interview, March 24, 2014). The media rights activist, another former
journalist, said journalists were tempted not to tolerate problems and engage in advocacy
reporting, but her advice would be not to express activism in reporting (L. B., personal
interview, March 16, 2014). Only through objective reporting could journalists earn trust
and support from their viewers and readers. “Anyone can say blah-blah-blah. What
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makes difference [in journalism] is [reporting of] facts,” (L. B., personal interview 4,
March 16, 2014).
The study sought views of news producers and reporters regarding the expression
of activism in journalism, and Georgian media’s activist coverage of the media
democratization movement. The views of news professional diverged along ideological
lines, with those in pro-opposition and independent press supporting activism expression
in journalism, and those in pro-government media rejecting the practice. Producers and
reporters at independent and pro-opposition newspapers, and the pro-opposition
television, were under impression that the entire journalistic community supported the
media activism, some more openly than others. The reporter at opposition-aligned Alia
recalled the signing of petition to free photographers accused of espionage, organized by
the Coalition for Media Advocacy. She said every reporter at the event signed the
petition, including reporters in government-controlled televisions. To protect them from
possible repercussions, the activists later deleted their names (T. O., personal interview,
May 3, 2014). Contrary to these views, the reporter at pro-government 24 Saati said he
had not observed any “enthusiasm” for the media activism among his colleagues on the
beat. He said the journalists were just doing their jobs and covering the actualities,
without doing much beyond that. They were not advocating issues or supporting activists.
The producer at pro-opposition 9th Channel said her television and other proopposition independent stations were all involved in the advocacy to support “must
carry/must offer” proposal, and “supported” the Coalition for Media Advocacy’s efforts
“with providing coverage and otherwise” (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014). The
activist journalists said in their interviews that they were frequent guests at opposition-
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owned and pro-opposition stations. “Sometimes they’d “sweep all of us in,” said the
investigative journalist (N. Z., personal interview, March 15, 2014). “We were sitting at
their studios every day. They were like our home. At the end of the day, we’d go to one
of these TV stations, or to some radio station, and discuss what we’d done during the
day,” recalled the magazine publisher (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014). The
reporter at independent Resonansi said her newspaper did not encourage opinionating,
but she made her position felt in the coverage anyway (R. M., personal interview, April
20, 2014). She said the activism to democratize media was “a different kind of issue” for
news reporters, because it was about their own working environment. The reporter said
she mostly wrote reports but also issue-based stories, in which she analyzed the reforms
activists were proposing in legal or economic terms. She said her analysis was balanced,
sometimes even negative, but admitted she could not cover these issues without emotion,
because she had personally experienced governmental pressures and stood to benefit
from improvements in the media environment.
Yes, I was advocating, naturally. How could I not? I have a problem.
This work [activism] will solve my problem. In this circumstances,
one advocates or else there will be no change. (R. M., personal
interview, April 20, 2014)
The reporter who worked for pro-opposition Alia spoke about her involvement in
activism in general terms. She said journalists’ position on issues would always shaped
their stories, and her stories were no exception. A position “comes across in the way
situations are summarized, in the use of words. Even if one tries to be disengaged, one’s
sympathy or antipathy usually comes across in reporting,” she said (T. O., personal
interview, May 3, 2014). The reporter fully supported activists’ agenda. She said the
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media activism of 2010- 2012 was “one of her strongest experiences in the recent years”
(T. O., personal interview, May 3, 2014).
By contrast, the reporter employed at pro-government 24 Saati said he had never
advocated while reporting, nor had he attended any street action. He said he did not see
the point in activist journalists’ involvement in collective action, because all Georgian
journalists were free to express their opinion in the press. He thought journalists could
serve their causes by writing substantively about them, and that was how he saw his role
(D. G., personal interview, April 21, 2014).
Asked to comment on his station’s coverage of the media activism, the producer
at pro-government Rustavi 2 TV, said the coverage was factual but devoid of advocacy.
“We recorded comments of participants of the [It Concerns You] campaign but also
comments from sources on the other side. We were sharing their [activists’] information.
But we were not involved in the campaign.” He said the station “tried to stay away from
activism… because we think it is not our role” (G. L, personal interview, May 5, 2014).
He acknowledged the perception of his station as supportive of the former government,
but thought the television provided professional news, and followed news standards. He
also acknowledged the station had an ideological position, which he called “a political
taste.” “Let’s agree it is a matter of political taste if a station feels greater sympathy
towards one political party than towards another,” he said, adding these sympathies were
acceptable “as long as that station follows professional standards” (G. L., personal
interview, May 5, 2014). He thought some other TV stations, perceived as independent,
were neither independent nor unbiased. Speaking apparently of Tbilisi-based TV stations
Maestro TV and Kavkasia, the producer said these stations were positioning themselves
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as independents but were supporting the opposition and trying to influence voters. He
admitted Rustavi 2 had itself engaged in similar politically-motivated activism in the
past, and thought these stations were doing the same. Rustavi 2 has openly called on its
audiences to engage in the Rose Revolution of 2003, and has greatly contributed to the
rise to power of President Saakashvili’s National Movement party in the 2003
parliamentary elections (Kandelaki, 2006).
Theme 2: News producers and reporters about MDM and its media coverage.
The views of news producers and reporters about the media democratization movement,
activists’ agenda and motives, and the activism in general again diverged along
ideological lines. The reporter at pro-opposition Alia said the activism was “a universal
tool” for people to demand that their long-held concerns be answered. She added she felt,
while covering activists’ street action, that their protest was real, and that protesters were
not forcing supporters to show up, as in some other, “mock protests” (T. O., personal
interview, May 3, 2014). The reporter was happy that the civil society was stronger, and
capable of dealing with society’s problems. “Our civil society is very strong, to the envy
of all other countries. It has proven its worth during the attacks on the press”, she said
(T.O., personal interview, May 3, 2014). The reporter in the independent newspaper
enthused about the media democratization movement and the reforms it achieved, which,
in her view, brought professionalization of the media and greater responsibility on the
part of news media (R. M., personal interview, April 20, 2014). She said her enthusiasm
was shared by the entire professional community:
I personally cannot recall a single journalist who would be against
[proposed reforms.] Anyone knows for fact that if one group is trying to
control [parts of media] today, someday they [other media] too will face
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the same problem. Plus, it was in the interests of media that the public
have access to information. Whether these attitudes were expressed openly
or hidden is a different matter. Still, I do not remember any resistance. On
the contrary, all my colleagues had positive emotions. (R. M., personal
interview, April 20, 2014)
By contrast, the reporter in pro-government 24 Saati, while acknowledging
problems in the media environment and generally positive outcomes of the media
democratization movement’s latest activism, was skeptical about activists’ motives. He
thought one of activists’ key demands -- the “must carry” regulation -- was politically
motivated. His said the demand for mandatory distribution of broadcast signals by cable
operators aimed at providing supporters of the political opposition with access to the
oppositional stations based in Tbilisi. He lamented the public was not interested in an
objective, unbiased journalism, or in supporting the freedom of the press. “The people
just want to see activities of one [political] party, and the criticism of another party. They
are not really concerned about the freedom in the media” (D. G., personal interview,
April 21, 2014). On the brighter side, the reporter noted the “must carry” legislation
“facilitated the reflection of political reality in the media,” and produced a positive
psychological effect of greater freedom in the society.
In his coded, imprecise language, the producer at pro-government Rustavi 2 said
those media that engaged in activism were serving their owners’ and managers’ political
and business interests rather than the cause of media democratization.
Any head of a station can sign petitions and take part in processes [of
activism], but if he abuses the privilege of access to the nation-wide
audience [by steering his station to engage in activism] in favor of his own
interests, it is another matter. (G. L., personal interview, May 5, 2014)
The producer said his news staff, “generally neutral” while reporting on the media
democratization movement, “had questions” in the case of Maestro TV’s satellite
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antennas. He said journalists had asked questions about the origins of these antennas,
which the station intended to distribute free of charge to thousands of viewers. The
question was how the television, which was not profitable, bought this much technology.
The antennas, according to the Georgian government, were bought for the Maestro TV by
the billionaire opposition figure, Bidzina Ivanishvili, to increase Maestro’ reach around
Georgia (Freedom House, 2013). The producer said his TV station served the public
interest when asking these questions, but angered colleagues at the Maestro TV (G. L.,
personal interview, May 5, 2014).
However, the producer said he was fully behind activists’ other demands, such as
the “must carry” rule and the media ownership transparency. He said he could never
understand why the government was restricting broadcast media distribution or making
ownership in the media non-transparent, which led to speculations and distrust of his
station. He said the government should have allowed all TV stations to distribute signals
nationwide and that his station was not afraid of competition. Indeed, the station
maintained its top ratings well after the competing stations reached nationwide audiences
under the “must carry” rule. The market should have been allowed to regulate itself, he
said (G. L., personal interview, May 5, 2014).
In general terms, the producer thought the recent media activism was “a very well
planned and organized campaign and advocacy by very smart people,” but it was not a
social movement. He doubted the real goal of the It Concerns You campaign was to
increase the freedom of speech and the level of information available to people in the
regions “who were well informed already.” Again, resorting to imprecise, convoluted
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language, he expressed his doubts that the activists cared more about the political goals,
such as helping the opposition win the elections, than the freedom of the press.
I do not know what their goal was. For me, the goal, at least in the short
term, without doubt, was…I’ll put it straight, [the goal of improving the
freedom of press, as stated by activists] was a fake one. Could the goal
have been to [serve] the interest of some political force, which wanted to
win the elections? However, if we look at [activists’ goals] in the long
term, continued enforcement of the “must carry” principle after the
elections positively affected the media environment. (G. L., personal
interview, May 5, 2014)
The “must carry/must offer” rule, which discriminated private cable providers by
regulating them to distribute the content that was commercially unattractive, benefited the
media environment, concluded the producer. Greater competition in the broadcast sector
forced his station to improve and innovate. Citizens had greater choice of information as
a result.
Theme 2: Special relationship between the independent media and the civil
sector. Some of the activists in the sample said they had been involved in collective
action since their first steps in independent journalism. The editor-in-chief said his
personal involvement in activism has been long-standing. The first legislative proposal he
had co-authored in 1990 was on the freedom of political gathering. He and other
journalists had promoted the freedom of information legislation, modeled after American
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), since 1995 (L. T., personal interview, April 4,
2014). The independent journalist said he had been advocating for journalists’ rights all
his professional life (Z. K., personal interview, March 13, 2014). These comments
corroborate findings in the literature that there have been historical links between
independent journalism and the civil sector in Georgia (Topuria, 2000).
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Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I have analyzed mobilizing materials produced by the activists
involved in the Georgian media democratization movement in the years 2010 through
2012. I also conducted and analyzed in-depth interviews with twelve activists and five
news producers and reporters. The activists were all leaders in the organizations united in
the Coalition for Media Advocacy, a social movement organization (SMO) for the media
democratization movement. News producers and reporters had written or produced
materials about activism for five Georgian media organizations, sampled by the study.
The study found that activists’ statements relied on master frames related to the
concept of democracy, such as free speech, access to information – transparency, access
to information – plurality, responsible government, and fair elections. The activists’
innovative frame, it concerns you, also related to a particular aspect of democracy,
responsible and participatory self-rule. Often, activists used several frames in one
statement, which reflected both lack of coordination and frame alignment and Coalition
members’ desire to make all important points and reach all key constituents in a single
communication.
In in-depth interviews, the study sought to answer the following research
questions about goals and importance of the media democratization movement, as
interpreted by activists (RQ2), activists’ rationale for framing choices (RQ3), and activist
journalists’ and news professionals experiences covering the media democratization
movement and their views about journalists’ involvement in activism and the media
democratization movement.
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As evident from interviews, the activists were clearly motivated by two goals:
improving the media environment in which their own professional practice was situated
and strengthening the society in which the public would actively participate in policyand decision-making (RQ2). These two goals were interconnected and formed the logic
of democratization. The improvements in the media’s capacity to inform citizens would
lead to citizens’ empowerment and greater participation, while greater participation of
citizens would strengthen the society based on democratic deliberation and informed selfrule. Activists’ goals were reflected in the frames they had used in statements (RQ3).
Activists used frames stressing freedom of speech and media -- free speech, access to
information- transparency, access to information-plurality – and frames stressing
participatory governance -- responsible government, it concerns you, fair elections.
While interviewees may not have articulated why they used these frames, they outlined
their communication strategies and the context of activism in which these frames made
perfect sense. They said they had reminded the government of its responsibility to uphold
internationally accepted standards of free speech and democracy, which is analyzed as
necessitating responsible government, free speech, access to information - transparency
frames. The activists said they targeted the international community in hopes it would
pressure the government into greater acceptance of the activists’ demands. They said they
reminded the international community, and, through them, the government of Georgia,
that the free press providing plural information to the voters was essential to conducting
free and fair elections; hence, the use of fair elections and access to information plurality frames (RQ3).
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The activists provided a good explanation of the key frame, it concerns you, as
reflecting their emphasis on democratizing society and strengthening public participation
(RQ3). While the Georgian public was generally supportive of the freedom of press,
specific problems in the broadcast sector were initially irrelevant to the majority of
people. By using the it concerns you frame, the activists sought to increase people’s
ownership of media issues.
The participants gave rich descriptions of experiences, emotions, attitudes, and
norms in response to the question about the journalistic coverage of the media
democratization and expressions of activism in journalism (RQ4). Their views ranged
from total rejection of advocacy journalism to the acceptance of the decision for the
entire media organizations to engage in activism. News producers and reporters were
split along ideological lines in their attitudes towards activism, the media democratization
movement and the activism in general, and towards the expression of activism in
journalism. The news producers and reporters at independent and pro-opposition
newspapers and pro-opposition television supported the media democratization
movement and themselves engaged in activism. The pro-government media abstained
from activism and advocacy reporting, and thought activists had political motives for
pursuing the media democratization agenda. The pro-government media said the activists
were supporting the political opposition in the elections. However, they acknowledged
that the problems that existed in the media environment, and that, overall, reforms pushed
by activists had improved the media environment.
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Chapter 5
Movement Coverage in the Georgian Media: Quantitative Analysis

The purpose of the quantitative analysis of Georgian media’s coverage of MDM
was: 1) to identify the dominant tone and frames of coverage of MDM across the major
news organizations in the country, and 2) to analyze whether political factors, such as
news organizations ties with the government or the opposition (or lack thereof), and
frames constructed by activists influenced the news coverage. The study theorized that
political factors influence media’s application of mobilizing and demobilizing frames
such that pro-opposition media would cover social movements extensively and
positively, and use mobilizing frames, while pro-government media would either ignore
or negatively cover social movements, and apply demobilizing frames. The study posed a
research question about the independent media’s coverage of MDM. The study also
theorized that movement actors stood a greater chance of pushing their frames into the
pro-opposition media, and the independent media, than pro-government media.
Descriptive
The study analyzed 152 newspaper and 400 TV stories about MDM, produced
from July 1, 2010, to October 1 2012. Pro-government 24 Saati wrote 42 stories;
Independent Resonansi wrote 87 stories; Pro-opposition Alia carried 23 stories; Rustavi 2
television aired 95 stories; 9th Channel aired 176 stories; and Kavkasia aired 129 stories.
News coverage of the media democratization movement was operationalized as the
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stories about the Coalition for Media Advocacy (SMO), the It Concerns You (the
movement’s key campaign), the “must carry/must offer” and media ownership and
financial transparency regulations (the movement’s key legislative proposals), and
movement’s key case to lift government’s ban on the free-of-charge distribution of TV
Maestro’s antennas to the population.
The news organizations produced three types of stories: a) stories focused on
MDM, b) stories that mentioned MDM in the discussion of the media environment,
together with other media issues, and c) stories about various sociopolitical topics that
mentioned MDM in connection with these issues. As shown in Table 5.1, independent
Resonansi was most likely to devote an entire article to MDM (74.7%), followed by progovernment 24 Saati (59.5%) and pro-opposition Alia (52.2%, chi2=14.77, p=.02).
Resonansi and Alia were more likely to cover the movement as part of the general
discussion about the media and its problems -- in 12.6% and 13% of articles, respectively
-- than 24 Saati (2.4%, chi2=14.77, p=.02). Pro-government 24 Saati was most likely to
mention the media democratization movement in passing, as part of the broader
discussion about politics or the society (38.1%), than Alia (34.8%) or Resonansi (12.6%,
chi2=14.77, p=.02). Pro-opposition 9th Channel was most likely to focus the story on
MDM (83.5%), followed by pro-government Rustavi 2 (77.9%) and independent
Kavkasia (69.8%, chi2=18.65, p=.00) (see Table 5.2). Kavkasia was most likely to
mention the media democratization movement as part of the broader discussion about
problems in the media (19.4%), followed by 9th Channel (4.5%) and Rustavi 2 (0.0%,
chi2=18.65, p=.00)). Pro-government Rustavi 2 was more likely to talk about MDM in
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passing, as part of the discussion about other issues, such as politics or international
affairs (22.1%) than Kavkasia (19.4%) or 9th Channel (11.9%, chi2=18.65, p=.00).
Table 5.1. Focus of coverage of MDM by newspapers
Focus of stories

MDM
Media, mentions MDM
Other, mentions MDM
chi2=14.77, p<.05

pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)

pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)

Independent
newspaper
(n=87)

25 (59.5%)
1 (2.4%)
16 (38.1%)

12 (52.2%)
3 (13.0%)
8 (34.8%)

65 (74.7%)
11 (12.6%)
11 (12.6%)

pro-opposition TV
(n=176)
147 (83.5%)
8 (4.5%)
21 (11.9%)

independent
TV (n=129)
90 (69.8%)
14 (10.9%)
25 (19.4%)

Table 5.2. Focus of coverage of MDM by TV stations
Focus of stories
MDM
Media, mentions MDM
Other, mentions MDM
chi2=18.65, p<.001

pro-government TV
(n=95)
74 (77.9%)
0 (0.0%)
21 (22.1%)

The media varied in terms of focus on the media democratization movement’s
organization, key campaign, key legislative proposals and the case. As shown in Table
5.3, the Coalition for Media Advocacy did not get much publicity in the media. Progovernment 24 Saati and pro-opposition Alia named the Coalition in but two stories, or in
4.8% and 8.7% of materials, respectively, and independent Resonansi printed 10 stories
about the Coalition (11.5%). The It Concerns You was covered more extensively, or in
roughly one third of materials by 24 Saati (31%), Alia (26.1%), and Resonansi (26.4%).
The differences across newspapers’ coverage of the Coalition for Media Advocacy and
the It Concerns You campaign were not statistically significant. Issue-wise, progovernment 24 Saati was most likely to cover the “must carry” rule (85.7%), followed by
Resonansi (33.3%) and Alia (17.4%, chi2=39.93, p=.00), and least likely to cover
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ownership and financial transparency in the media (7.1%), compared to Resonansi
(29.9%) and Alia (17.4%, chi2=8.91, p=.01). The coverage of the Maestro TV case was
spread more evenly -- Alia spoke about the Maestro in 31%, 24 Saati in 39.1%, and
Resonansi in 29.9% of materials -- such that the differences were not significant. As
shown in Table 5.4, pro-government Rustavi 2 was least likely to talk about the Coalition
for Media Advocacy (3.2%), with independent Kavkasia providing slightly more (3.9%)
and pro-opposition 9th Channel five times more frequent coverage (19.2%, chi2=7.23,
p=.02). The It Concerns You campaign received the most mention from pro-opposition
9th Channel (20.5%), with slightly less frequent coverage in independent Kavkasia
(18.6%) and six times less frequent coverage in pro-government Rustavi 2 (3.2%,
chi2=15.08, p=.00). Pro-opposition 9th Channel was most likely to cover the Maestro
antennas case (47.2%), followed by independent Kavkasia (34.9%) and pro-government
Rustavi 2 (11.6%, chi2=34.44, p=.00). Rustavi 2 led the coverage of the media ownership
transparency proposal (29.5%), followed by Kavkasia (19.4) and 9th Channel (2.3%,
chi2=41.45, p=.00). Note, pro-opposition 9th Channel provided little coverage of the
transparency issue because the station was launched well after the media ownership
legislation was adopted by the government in 2011. All three channels covered the “must
carry” legislation extensively – Rustavi 2 in 66.3%, 9th Channel in 58.5%, and Kavkasia
in 55% of materials – but the differences were not statistically significant.

Table 5.3. MDM organization, campaign and issues by newspapers
Topics

The Coalition for Media
Advocacy
It Concerns You

pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)

2 (4.8%)
13 (31.0%)

pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)

2 (8.7%)
6 (26.1%)
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Independent
newspaper
(n=87)

10 (11.5%)
23 (26.4%)

chi

P

2

1.54
.32

.46
.85

Must carry rule
Maestro TV antennas case
Media ownership/financial
transparency

36 (85.7%)
13 (31.0%)

4 (17.4%)
9 (39.1%)

29 (33.3%)
26 (29.9%)

39.2
.73

.00
.69

3 (7.1%)

4 (17.4%)

26 (29.9%)

8.91

.05

Table 5.4 MDM organization, campaign and issues by TV stations
Topics

The Coalition for
Media Advocacy
It Concerns You
Must carry rule
Maestro TV case
Media
transparency

pro-government
TV
(n=95)

pro-opposition
TV
(n=176)

independent
TV
(n=129)

chi2

P

3 (3.2%)
3 (3.2%)
63 (66.3%)
11 (11.6%)

18 (10.2%)
36 (20.5%)
103(58.5%)
83 (17.2%)

5 (3.9%)
24(18.6%)
71 (55.0%)
45 (34.9%)

7.23
15.08
2.95
34.44

.05
.01
.29
.00

28 (29.5%)

4 (2.3%)

25 (19.4%)

41.45

.00

Hypotheses and Research Questions
Tone. This study analyzed the tone of coverage of the media democratization
movement across types of news organizations. It proposed (H1a) that pro-government
media would be more likely to use a negative tone about the media democratization
movement than pro-opposition media. H2a suggested that pro-opposition media were
more likely to use a positive tone about the media democratization movement than progovernment media. RQ5a asked about independent media’s tone of coverage of the
media democratization movement compared to other media types.
In general, a positive tone was prevalent in the coverage of the media
democratization movement across all media (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Pro-opposition Alia
used a positive tone in nearly all articles (91.3%), with independent Resonansi (78.2%)
and pro-government 24 Saati (64.3%) also mostly positive. Newspapers produced very
few negative stories: Alia and 24 Saati wrote one negative article (or 4.3% and 2.3%,
respectively), and Resonansi none. Pro-government 24 Saati wrote 33.3% of materials in
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neutral tone, compared to independent Resonansi 21.8% and pro-opposition Alia 4.3%
(chi 2 =10.23, p<.05) (see Table 5.5). As shown in Table 5.6, pro-government Rustavi 2
used a positive tone in the majority of stories (83.2%), as did pro-opposition 9th Channel
(81.3%) and independent Kavkasia (82.3%). TV stations produced very few negative
stories -- 5.3% for independent Rustavi 2, 3.4% for pro-opposition 9th Channel, and 1.6%
for independent Kavkasia – and about the same share of neutral materials -- 11.6% for
Rustavi, 15.3% for 9th Channel and 15.5% for Kavkasia.
To test the hypotheses and answer research questions about the tone of coverage,
the study used Pearson’s chi square test. As per Table 5.5, the test showed significant
differences in newspapers’ tone of coverage of the media democratization movement:
pro-government 24 Saati used negative tone slightly less frequently (2.4%) than proopposition Alia (4.3 %), even though both wrote no more than one negative articles. H1a
was not supported. Alia used a positive tone more frequently (91.3%) than 24 Saati
(64.3%, chi2==10.23, p=0.03). H2a was supported for the newspaper sample. As shown
in Table 5.6, TV stations did not significantly differ by tone of coverage of the media
democratization movement. H1a and H2a were not supported in the TV sample.
Answering RQ5a, independent Resonansi , which used a positive tone in 78.2%
of stories and did not produce a negative article, was more likely than 24 Saati (64.3%)
but less likely than Alia (91.3%) to be positive regarding MDM and less likely than both
newspapers to produce negative stories about MDM (chi2=10.23, p=0.03) (see Table 5.5).
The tone of coverage of MDM by independent Kavkasia --82.3% positive and 1.6%
negative stories –did not differ from the tone used by pro-government and pro-opposition
stations in statistical terms (Table 5.6).
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Table 5.5 Tone by newspapers
pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)
1 (2.4%)

pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)
1 (4.3%)

Independent
newspaper
(n=87)
0 (0.0%)

Neutral

14 (33.3%)

1 (4.3%)

19 (21.8%)

Positive

27 (64.3%)

21 (91.3%)

68 (78.2%)

Tone
Negative

2

chi =10.23, p<.05

Table 5.6. Tone by TV stations
Tone

pro-government TV
(n=95)
5 (5.3%)

pro-opposition TV
(n=176)
6 (3.4%)

independent TV
(n=129)
2 (1.6%)

Neutral

11 (11.6%)

27 (15.3%)

20 (15.5%)

Positive
chi 2 =3.11, p<.6

79 (83.2%)

143 (81.3%)

107 (82.9%)

Negative

Frames. This study analyzed dominant frames across news organizations, key
mobilizing and demobilizing frames, and the usage of movement-advanced frames.
Dominant frames. H1b proposed that pro-government media would be more
likely to use demobilizing frames about the media democratization movement than proopposition media. H2b proposed that pro-opposition media were more likely to use
mobilizing frames about the media democratization movement than pro-government
media. RQ5b asked about independent media’s use of mobilizing and demobilizing
frames as compared to other media.
One of the key findings of this study was the extensive use of mobilizing frames
across dominant types of media in Georgia, which were used much more frequently than
demobilizing frames (see Table 5.7 and Table 5.8). Pro-government 24 Saati used
mobilizing frames in 95.1% and demobilizing frames in 35.7% of materials (chi2=21.33,
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p=00), based on McNemar’s chi square test; Pro-opposition Alia used mobilizing frames
in 95.6% and demobilizing frames in 13% of materials (p=00); Independent Resonansi
used mobilizing frames in 91.1% and demobilizing frames in 34.4% of articles
(chi2=47.17, p=.00); Pro-government Rustavi 2 used mobilizing frames significantly
more frequently (96.8%) than demobilizing frames (13.7%, chi2=77.01, p=00); Proopposition 9th Channel used mobilizing frames in 93.8% and demobilizing frames in
19.9% of materials ( chi2=126.00, p=00); Independent Kavkasia used mobilizing frames
in 99.2% and demobilizing frames in 23.3% of materials (chi2=96.01, p=00). The
analysis was based on McNemar’s chi square test.

Table 5.7. Presence of mobilizing and demobilizing frames in newspapers
Mobilizing
Media
Pro-government newspaper
Pro-opposition newspaper
Independent newspaper

40 (95.1%)
22 (95.6%)
80 (91.1%)

Demobilizi
ng
15 (35.7%)
3 (13%)
29 (34.4%)

chi2

P

21.33
47.17

.00
.00
.00

chi2

P

77.01
126.00
96.01

.00
.00
.00

Table 5.8. Presence of mobilizing and demobilizing frames in TV
Mobilizing
Media
Pro-government TV
Pro-opposition TV
Independent TV

92 (96.8%)
165 (93.8%)
128 (99.2%)

Demobilizi
ng
13 (13.7%)
35 (19.9%)
30 (23.3%)

As per Table 5.9, Pearson’s chi square test showed no significant differences
between pro-government and pro-opposition newspapers’ use of mobilizing frames. H1b
and H2b were not supported in the newspaper sample. As to the TV sample, progovernment Rustavi 2 used more mobilizing frames (96.8%) than pro-opposition 9th
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Channel (93.8%, chi2=6.30, p=.04), but the differences in TV stations’ use of
demobilizing frames were not significant. H1b and H2b were not supported in the TV
sample (see Table 5.10).
Answering RQ5b, there were no significant differences between independent
Resonansi‘s and other newspapers’ use of mobilizing and demobilizing frames.
Independent TV Kavkasia used mobilizing frames (99.2%) more often than progovernment Rustavi 2 (96.8%) and pro-opposition 9th Channel (93.8%) (chi2=6.30,
p=.04) (see Table 5.10).

Table 5.9. Mobilizing and demobilizing frames by newspapers
Frames

Mobilizing
Demobilizing

pro-government pro-opposition
newspaper
newspaper
(n=42)
(n=23)
40 (95.2%)
22 (95.7%)
15 (35.7%)
3 (13%)

Independent
newspaper
(n=87)
80 (92.2%)
29 (33.3%)

chi2

p

.71
4.13

.70
.13

chi2

p

6.30
3.60

.04
.16

Table 5.10. Mobilizing and demobilizing frames by TV stations

Frames
mobilizing
Demobilizing

pro-government
TV
(n=95)
92 (96.8%)
13 (13.7%)

proindependent
opposition TV
TV
(n=176)
(n=129)
165 (93.8%) 128 (99.2%)
39 (22.2%)
30 (23.3%)

Key mobilizing frames. The media gave preference to some mobilizing frames,
and neglected others. All newspapers used free speech, rule of law, access to information
- pluralism, and it concerns you frames more often than others, however, each newspaper
type emphasized one other frame (see Table 5.11). TV stations’ top frames were the free
speech and the rule of law frames.
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Pro-government 24 Saati used free speech frame (71.4%), access to information –
pluralism (61.9%), rule of law (54.8%), it concerns you (31.1%), and fair elections
(59.5%) frames more often than other frames, based on McNemar’s chi square test. Proopposition Alia used free speech frame (56.5%), injustice (39.1%), rule of law (39.1%),
access to information – pluralism (30.4%), and it concerns you (26.1%), frames as its top
frames. Independent Resonansi used the free speech, rule of law (51.7% each) and access
to information – pluralism (44.2%) frames most frequently (see Table 5.11). progovernment Rustavi 2 used rule of law (73.7%), free speech (60%) access to information
– plurality (52.1%) fair elections (51.6%), access to information – transparency (25.3%)
as its top frames (see Table 5.12). Pro-opposition 9th Channel used the free speech frame
most often (80.6%), followed by the access to information – plurality (44.9%), rule of
law (42.6%), fair elections (38.6%), access to information – transparency (25.3%), and
injustice (25%) frames. Independent Kavkasia’s top frames were free speech (73.6%) and
rule of law (64.3%), access to information – plurality frames (52.7%), fair elections
(50.4%), and injustice (27.1%). Other frames were used by newspapers and TV stations
in less than 20% of materials (see Table 5.12).
Table 5.11 shows the results of framing differences across newspapers, based on
Pearson’s chi square test. Pro-government 24 Saati used two frames more frequently than
other newspapers: access to information – plurality (61.9%), which 24 Saati used more
frequently than independent Resonansi (44.2%) and pro-opposition Alia (33.3%,
chi2=6.55, p=.04), and the fair elections frame (59.5%), which 24 Saati again used more
often than Resonansi (30.4%) or Alia (8.7%, chi2=17.57, p=.00). Pro-opposiiton Alia
used injustice frame more frequently (39.1%), than independent Resonansi (18.4%) or
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pro-government 24 Saati (11.9%, chi2=7.1, p=.02). Independent Resonansi used the
access to information – transparency (25.3%) frame more often than pro-opposition Alia
(13%) or pro-government 24 Saati (4.8%, chi2=8.58, p=.01).
Framing differences across TV stations, based on Pearson’s chi square test, are
shown Table 5.12. Pro-government Rustavi 2 used the rule of law frame (73.7%) more
often than independent Kavkasia (64.3%) and pro-opposition 9th Channel (42.6%,
chi2=28.48, p=.00). Rustavi 2 also used the fair elections frame (51.6%) more often than
Kavkasia (50.4%) and 9th Channel (38.6%, chi2=6.00, p=.05), and the access to
information – transparency (25.3%) frame, more frequently than Kavkasia (12.4%) and
9th Channel (1.7%, chi2=36.23, p=.00). Pro-opposition 9th Channel used the free speech
frame (80.6%) more frequently than independent Kavkasia (73.6%) and pro-government
Rustavi 2 (60%, chi2=13.36, p=.00), and movement-advanced it concerns you frame
(20.5%) more frequently than Kavkasia (18.6%) and Rustavi 2 (3.2%, chi2=15.08,
p=.00). Independent Kavkasia used the injustice frame (27.1%) most often, followed by
9th Channel (25%) and Rustavi 2 (2.1%, chi2=25.60, p=.00). Kavkasia also used the
rights frame (14.8%) more often than 9th Channel (8.5%) and Rustavi 2 (1.1%,
chi2=12.98, p=.00), as well as the democratization frame (14%) more often than Rustavi
2 (9.5%) and 9th Channel (4.5%, chi2=8.33, p=.01) (see Table 5.12).

Table 5.11. Mobilizing mater frames by newspapers
Frames

Free speech
Access to info –
plurality

pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)
30 (71.4%)

pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)
13 (56.4%)

Independent
newspaper
(n=87)
45 (51.7%)

chi2

P

4.53

.1

26 (61.9%)

7 (30.4%)

38 (44.2%)

6.55

.04
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Fair elections
Rule of law
It Concerns You
Injustice
Democratization
Access to info –
transparency
Rights

25 (59.5%)
23 (54.8%)
13 (31.1%)
5 (11.9%)
2 (4.8%)

2 (8.7%)
9 (39.1%)
6 (26.1%)
9 (39.1%)
3 (13%)

29 (33.3%)
45 (51.7%)
23 (26.4%)
16 (18.4%)
10 (11.5%)

17.57
1.54
.32
7.19
1.75

.00
.46
.85
.03
.41

2 (4.8%)
0 (0.0%)

3 (13%)
2 (8.7%)

22 (25.3%)
5 (5.7)%

8.58
3.16

.01
.20

Table 5.12 Mobilizing master frames by TV stations

Frames

Rule of law
Free speech
Access to info –
plurality
Fair elections
Access to info –
transparency
Democratization
It Concerns You
Injustice
Rights

chi2

p

independen
t TV
(n=129)
83 (64.3%)
95 (73.6%)

28.48
13.36

.00
.00

79 (44.9%)
68 (38.6%)

68 (52.7%)
65 (50.4%)

2.26
6.00

.32
.05

3 (1.7%)
8 (4.5%)
36 (20.5%)
44 (25.0%)
15 (8.5%)

16 (12.4%)
18 (14.0%)
24 (18.6%)
35 (27.1%)
19 (14.8)%

36.23
8.33
15.08
25.60
12.98

.00
.05
.00
.00
.00

pro-government
TV
(n=95)
70 (73.7%)
57 (60.0%)

proopposition
TV
(n=176)
75 (42.6%)
141 (80.6%)

49 (52.1%)
49 (51.6%)
24 (25.3%)
9 (9.5%)
3 (3.2%)
2 (2.1%)
1 (1.1)%

Key demobilizing frames. Demobilizing frames were used in moderation by the
Georgian newspapers’ and TV stations’ in their coverage of MDM, which was one of the
significant findings of this study (see the section Dominant Frames). From the range of
demobilizing frames and devices applied to social movements (Chan & Lee, 1984;
Dardis, 2008; Di Cicco, 2010; McLeod & Hertog, 1999), the Georgian media used the
hinders free business, politicizing/scamming, hinders country, supports status quo and
ineffective, impotent, counterproductive frames most often, but in moderation. The news
organizations have not used many marginalizing frames described in the literature. In
several stories, the news media used new frames, referring to the lack of compliance
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between activists’ legislative proposals with the international practice (Gamisonia, 2012,
June 15; 9th Channel, 2012, June 13) and with the existing legal framework in the country
(Rustavi 2, 2012, June 22).
Based on McNemar’s chi square test, pro-government 24 Saati used the hinders
free business (19%), politicizing/scamming (9.5%), supports status quo (7.1%), and
hinders country (4.8%) frames most often. Pro-opposition Alia used the hinders free
business, politicizing/scamming, hinders country, and ineffective, impotent,
counterproductive frames evenly, in one article each. Independent Resonansi used the
hinders free business (18.4%) and politicizing/scamming (14.9%) frames more often than
others (see Table 5.13). Pro-government Rustavi 2 used the politicizing/scamming and
hinders free business (7.4% each) frames more often than others, while pro-opposition 9th
Channel used the politicizing /scamming (10.2%) and hinders free business (8.5%)
frames most often. Independent Kavkasia used politicizing/scamming (10.1%) and
hinders free business (8.5%) as its top demobilizing frames (see Table 5.14).
The comparison of demobilizing frames across newspapers and TV stations,
based on Pearson’s chi square test, did not give statistically significant results. The progovernment, pro-opposition, and independent media used demobilizing frames in similar
ways, without significant differences along the lines of political preference.

Table 5.13 Demobilizing frames by newspapers

Demobilizing frames
hinders free business
politicizing / scam
supports status quo

pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)
8 (19%)
4 (9.5%)
3 (7.1%)
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pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)
1 (4.3%)
1 (4.3%)
0 (0.0%)

Independent
newspaper
(n=87)
16 (18.4%)
13 (14.9%)
2 (2.3%)

hinders country
ineffective, impotent,
counterproductive
Other

2 (4.8%)

1 (4.3%)

1 (1.1%)

1 (2.4%)
1 (2.4%)

1 (4.3%)
0 (0.0%)

0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)

pro-government
TV
(n=95)
7 (7.4%)
7 (7.4%)
4 (4.2%)

pro-opposition
TV
(n=176)
18 (10.2%)
15 (8.5%)
2 (1.1%)

independent
TV
(n=129)
13 (10.1%)
11 (8.5%)
3 (2.3%)

2 (2.1%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)

5 (2.8%)
3 (1.7%)
2 (1.1%)
1 (0.6%)

5 (3.9%)
0 (0.0%)
1 (0.8%)
0 (0.0%)

Table 5.14 Demobilizing frames by TV stations

Demobilizing frames
Politicizing / scamming
Hinders free business
Other
Ineffective, impotent,
counterproductive
Hinders country
Supports status quo
Bothersome, disruptive

Movement-advanced frames. H1c proposed that pro-government media would be
less likely to use movement-advanced frames than pro-opposition media. RQ5c inquired
about independent media’s use of movement-advanced frames.
Pearson’s chi square test was used to test the hypotheses and answer the research
question. As shown in Tables 5.11 and 5.12, all newspapers and TV stations used the key
frame advanced by the movement – it concerns you. Newspapers devoted approximately
the same share of materials, one fourth, to the frame such that the differences were not
statistically significant. H1c was not supported for the newspaper sample. As per Table
5.12, pro-government Rustavi 2 used movement-advanced frame-- it concerns you --six
times less frequently (3.2%) than pro-opposition 9th Channel (20.5%, chi2=15.08, p=.00).
H1c was supported for the TV sample (see Table 5.12).
Independent Resonansi‘s use of the it concerns you frame was not different from
pro-government or pro-opposition newspapers use of the same frame. Independent
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Kavkasia used movement-advanced frame less often (18.6%) than pro-opposition 9th
Channel (20.5%), but more often than pro-government Rustavi 2 (3.2%, chi2=15.08,
p=.00) (see Tables 5.11 and 5.12). RQ5c was answered.
Sources. This study identified and analyzed the media’s use of ten categories of
sources: a) the activists of MDM (involved in the Coalition for Media Advocacy and It
Concerns You campaign), b) activist journalists of MDM (involved in the Coalition and
It Concerns You), c) other activists, d) other journalists, e) government officials & MPs
from ruling party, f) opposition MPs, g) non-parliamentary opposition, h) diplomats &
internationals, i) ordinary people, j) others.
The study hypothesized (H1d) that pro-government media would be more likely
to use government officials as sources about the media democratization movement than
pro-opposition media. H2d proposed that pro-opposition media were more likely to use
activists more often as sources than pro-government media. RQ5d asked about
independent media’s use of sources in comparison to other media types.
The media used most categories of sources, but some more often than others (see
Tables 5.15 and 5.16). Based on McNemar’s chi square test, pro-government 24 Saati
used “government officials & ruling party MPs” most frequently (59.5%), followed by
“activists of MDM” (31%, p=.01), “journalists – others” (23.8%, p=.00), “activists –
others” (19%, p=.00), “diplomats & internationals” (19%, chi2=8.82, p=.00), and
“opposition MPs” (16.7%, p=.00), as its sources. Other sources were used in less than
10% of materials, and 24 Saati did not speak to “ordinary people.” Pro-opposition Alia
used “activists – other” (34.8%), “journalists – other” (34.8%), “government officials &
ruling party MPs” (21.7%), and “ordinary people” (13%) most frequently as sources,
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while other categories of sources were used in less than 10% of materials. Alia did not
speak to “activist journalists of MDM”. Independent Resonansi used source categories
“government officials & MPs from ruling party” (35.6%), “journalists – others” (31%)
and “activists – other” (29.9%) most frequently, followed by “activists of MDM” (23%,
chi2=2.70, p=.1), while Alia used other categories of sources in less than 10% of
materials. (see Table 5.15). As shown in Table 5.16, pro-government Rustavi 2 used
“government officials & ruling party MPs” as source most frequently (73.7%), followed
by “opposition MPs” (33.7%, chi2=34.22, p=.00), “diplomats & internationals” (20.2%,
chi2=32.44, p=.00), “journalists – other” (12.8%, chi2=54.15, p=.00), and other categories
in less than 10% of stories. Rustavi 2 has not spoken to “activist journalists of MDM.”
Pro-opposition 9th Channel spoke to “journalists – other” (33.5%) and “activists of
MDM” (25.6%). most often, followed by “government officials & MPs from ruling
party” (29.5%), “activists – other” (17.1%), “diplomats & internationals” (10.3%,
chi2=20.77, p=.00) and other sources. Independent Kavkasia spoke to “government
officials & MPs from ruling party” (45.5%) most often, followed by “journalists – other”
(31.8%, chi2=3.41, p=.06), “activists - other” (29.7%, chi2=4.75, p=.02), “activists –
MDM” (21.7%. chi2=17.52, p=.00), “opposition MPs (16.3%. chi2=47.17, p=.00),
“diplomats & internationals” (14.7%, chi2=21.55, p=.00), and other categories (see Table
5.16).

Table 5.15. Sources by newspapers
Sources

pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)

pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)
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Independent
newspaper
(n=87)

chi2

p

Government officials
& ruling party MPs
Activists - MDM
Journalists – other
Activists – other
internationals
Opposition MPs
Opposition nonparliament
Activist journalists
– MDM
Other sources
Ordinary people

25 (59.5%)
13 (31%)
10 (23.8%)
8 (19%)
8 (19.0%)
7 (16.7%)

5 (21.7%)
3 (13%)
8 (34.8%)
8 (34.8%)
0 (0%)
2 (8.7%)

31 (35.6%)
20 (23%)
27 (31%)
26 (29.9%)
8 (9.2%)
15 (17.2%)

10.54
2.69
1.06
2.36
6.1
1.03

.00
.26
.58
.30
.05
.59

2 (4.8%)

2 (8.7%)

7 (8.0%)

.54

.76

1 (2.4%)

0 (0.0%)

12 (13.8%)

1 (2.4%)
0 (0%)

0 (0.0%)
3 (13%)

0 (0.0%)
1 (1.1%)

7.25
2.63
11.61

.03
.26
.01

Table 5.16. Sources by TV stations
Sources

Government officials
& ruling party MPs
Opposition MPs
Diplomats &
internationals
Journalists – other
Activists – MDM
Opposition nonparliament
Activists - other
Ordinary people
Activist journalists
(MDM)
Other sources

pro-government
TV
(n=95)

independen
t TV
(n=129)

pro-opposition
TV
(n=176)

chi2

p

70 (73.7%)
32 (33.7%)

58 (45.0%)
21 (16.3%)

52 (29.5%)
13 (7.4%)

49.38
30.97

.00
.00

19 (20.2%)
12 (12.8%)
8 (8.4%)

19 (14.7%)
41 (31.8%)
28 (21.7%)

18 (10.3%)
59 (33.5%)
45 (25.6%)

5.14
14.37
11.48

.1
.01
.01

8 (8.4%)
7 (7.4%)
3 (3.2%)

7 (5.4%)
38 (29.7%)
2 (1.6%)

14 (8.0%)
30 (17.1%)
10 (5.7%)

.96
18.35
3.64

.62
.00
.16

0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)

4 (3.1%)
0 (0.0%)

16 (9.1%)
4 (2.3%)

12.18
5.20

.01
.01

The study tested hypotheses and answered the research question based on
Pearson’s chi square test. As shown in Table 5.17, newspapers’ use of two category of
sources, “government officials & ruling party MPs” and a combined category of
“activists (to include “activists of MDM”, “activist journalists of MDM,” and “activistsother”) showed significant differences. Pro-government 24 Saati was nearly three times
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more likely to use government officials as sources (59.5%) than pro-opposition Alia
(21.7%, chi2=10.66, p=.00). There were no differences in newspapers’ use of combined
“activist” category. H1d was supported, and H2d was not supported for the newspaper
sample. In the TV sample, pro-government Rustavi 2 was twice more likely to use
government officials as sources (73.7%) than pro-opposition 9th Channel (29.5%,
chi2=49.38, p=.00), while pro-opposition 9th Channel was three times more likely to
speak to activists than pro-government Rustavi 2 (15.8%, chi2=24.12, p=.00). H1d and
H2d were supported for the TV sample (see Table 5.18).
As an answer to RQ5d, independent Resonansi used government sources more
often (35.6%) than pro-opposition Alia (21.7%), but less frequently than 24 Saati (59.5%,
chi2=10.66, p=.00). The differences between Resonansi’s, Alia’s and 24 Saati‘s use of
activists as sources were statistically not significant (see Table 5.17). Independent
Kavkasia used government sources more often (45%) than pro-opposition 9th Channel
(29.5%) but less frequently than pro-government Rustavi 2 (73.7%, chi2=49.38, p=.00);
Independent Kavkasia spoke to activists more often (46.5%) than either 9th Channel
(40%) or Rustavi 2 (15.8%, chi2=24.12, p=.00) (see Table 5.18).

Table 5.17. Government officials and activists as sources by newspapers
Sources

Government
officials & MPs
from ruling party
Activists

pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)

pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)

independent
newspaper
(n=87)

chi2

p

25 (59.5%)

5 (21.7%)

31 (35.6%)

10.66

.01

20 (47.6%)

11(47.8%)

52 (59.8%)

2.19

.33
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Table 18. Government officials and activists as sources by TV stations
Sources

Government
officials & ruling
party MPs
Activists

pro-government
TV
(n=95)

pro-opposition
TV
(n=176)

independent
TV
(n=129)

chi2

p

70 (73.7%)

52 (29.5%)

58 (45.0%)

49.38

.00

15 (15.8%)

70 (40.0%)

60 (46.5%)

24.12

.00

Frequency, briefness and placement of coverage. The study analyzed
frequency, briefness, and placement of stories about MDM across types of news
organizations.
Frequency. H1e proposed that pro-government media would cover the media
democratization movement less frequently than pro-opposition media. RQ5e posed a
question about the volume of independent media’s coverage of the media
democratization movement.
As shown in Table 5.19, pro-government 24 Saati, and its weekly, Weekend,
produced 42 stories about the media democratization movement during the timeframe of
the study, from July, 2010, to October, 2012. In this period, a total of 814 issues of 24
Saati and Weekend were published. Pro-opposition Alia, and its weekly, Kronika,
produced 23 stories about MDM per 580 issues of Alia and Kronika published during the
timeframe. Independent Resonansi and its weekly, Mteli Kvira, produced 87 stories per
814 issues published during the timeframe of the study. Story per issue ratio was .05 for
24 Saati, .04 stories per issue for Alia, and .11 stories for Resonansi. H1e was not
supported for the newspaper sample. As shown in Table 21, TV stations aired 400 stories
about the media democratization movement during the timeframe of the study, from July,
2010, to October, 2012. Pro-government Rustavi 2 produced 95 stories per 10,793 news
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programs aired during the timeframe of the study (to include 12 daily newscasts, a
business edition, and a weekly analytical program). Pro-opposition 9th Channel aired 176
stories per 1825 programs (12 daily newscasts) aired between its launch on April 30,
2012 and Election Day of October 1, 2012. Independent Kavkasia aired 129 stories per 2,
463 programs during the timeframe of the study (to include three daily newscasts). Story
per newscast ratio was .008 for pro-government Rustavi 2, .09 stories per newscast for 9th
Channel, and .05 stories per newscast for independent Kavkasia. Pro-opposition 9th
Channel covered MDM more frequently (nearly one story per ten newscasts) than progovernment Rustavi 2. H1e was supported for the TV sample (see Table 5.19).
As per RQ5e, independent Resonansi wrote more frequently about the media
democratization movement (1 article per ten issues published) than pro-opposition Alia
(.04 per issue) or pro-government 24 Saati (.05 per issue). Independent Kavkasia covered
MDM more frequently (.05 stories per newscast) than pro-government station (.01 stories
per newscast), but less frequently than pro-opposition 9th Channel (.09 stories per
newscast) (see Table 5.19).

Table 5.19 Frequency of coverage of MDM by newspapers and TV

# of issues/
newscasts
# of stories
about
MDM
story to
issue/
newscast
ratio

progovernment
newspaper
(n=95)

proopposition
newspaper
(n=176)

independent
newspaper
(n=129)

progovernment
TV
(n=95)

proopposition
TV
(n=176)

independent
TV
(n=129)

814

580

814

10792

1825

2463

42

23

87

95

176

129

.05

.04

.11

.008

.09

.05
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Brief versus lengthy coverage. H1f proposed that pro-government media would
be more likely to provide brief coverage of the media democratization movement than
pro-opposition media. H2f proposed that pro-opposition media would be more likely to
provide lengthier coverage of the media democratization movement than pro-government
media. RQ5f inquired about the briefness versus depth of the coverage of the media
democratization movement in the independent media.
`

The briefness (or length) of coverage was operationalized as genre-based

treatment of the subject – MDM. The use of newspaper briefs and TV voice/overs, a
shorter genre, indicated briefness of coverage, whereas the use of newspaper stories,
interviews, opinions and editorials and TV packages, referred to lengthy coverage.
As shown in Table 5.20, newspapers used several genre to treat the subject. Progovernment 24 Saati limited the coverage of the media democratization movement to
news briefs in 35.7% or materials, while pro-opposition Alia wrote only one news brief,
amounting to 4.3% of articles. Independent Resonansi used news briefs in 18.4% of
materials. Pro-opposition Alia wrote more stories (69.8%) opinions (13%) and interviews
(13%) than pro-government 24 Saati, which wrote 64.3% stories, but did not write
opinions or interviews. Independent Resonansi wrote slightly fewer stories (63.2%) than
Alia or 24 Saati, and less opinions (5.7%) and interviews (3.4%) than Alia (chi2=25.14,
p<.01) However, Resonansi editorialized (6.9%) on the subject of media democratization,
while other newspapers have not. In the TV sample, shown in Table 5.21, progovernment Rustavi 2 used voice over (V/O) in 60% or materials, pro-opposition 9th
Channel in 57%, and independent Kavkasia in 55%. Rustavi 2 aired packages in 34.7%
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cases, while 9th Channel used packages in 26.9% and Kavkasia in 38% of cases. 9th
Channel had anchors read stories in 11.4% of cases, while Rustavi 2and Kavkasia did so
in in 2.1% and 7% of cases, respectively. Rustavi 2 aired one interview (2.1%), 9th
Channel five interviews (2.1%), and Kavkasia none (see Table 5.21).

Table 5.20 Genre by newspapers
Genre

News brief
Story
Opinion
Interview
Editorial
Other
chi2=25.14, p<.01

pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)
15 (35.7%)
27 (64.3%)

pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)
1 (4.3%)
16 (69.6%)

independent
newspaper
(n=87)
16 (18.4%)
55 (63.2%)

0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)

3 (13%)
3 (13%)
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)

5 (5.7%)
3 (3.4%)
6 (6.9%)
2 (2.3%)

pro-government
TV
(n=95)
57 (60.0%)
33 (34.7%)

pro-opposition
TV
(n=176)
100 (57.0%)
47 (26.9%)

independent
TV
(n=129)
71 (55.0%)
49 (38.0%)

2 (2.1%)
1 (2.1%)
0 (0.0%)

21 (11.4%)
5 (2.9%)
0 (0.0%)

9 (7.0%)
0 (0.0%)
6 (6.9%)

Table 5.21. Genre by TV
Genre

V/O
Package
Anchor’s text
Interview
Other
chi2=16.06, p<.05

To test hypotheses and answer research questions, the study used Pearson’s chi
square test. The study grouped “stories”, “opinions”, “interviews”, “editorials” and “other
genre” into the category “stories” and compared it to the category “news briefs.” As
shown in Table 5.22, government-leaning 24 Saati produced news briefs more often
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(36.7%) than opposition-leaning Alia (4.3%, chi2=9.66, p=.01). H1f was supported.
Opposition-leaning Alia produced more “stories” (95.6%) than government-leaning 24
Saati (64.3%, chi2=9.66, p=.01). H2f was supported for the newspaper sample. In the TV
sample, regrouping TV packages and interviews into a new category “in-depth stories”,
and comparing its use to the combined use of voiceovers (V/O) and anchors’ texts -“brief news” genre -- did not produce significant differences across TV stations, based on
Pearson’s chi square test. H1f was H2f were not supported for the TV sample (see Table
5.23).
Answering RQ5f, independent Resonansi was less likely to use news briefs
(18.4%) than 24 Saati (36.7%) but more likely than Alia (4.3%, chi2=9.66, p=.01). It was
less likely than Alia (95.6%) and more likely than 24 Saati (64.3%) to produce “stories”
(81.7%, chi2=9.66, p=.01) (see Table 5.22). TV stations’ use of genre were no different in
terms of statistical significance (see Table 5.23).

Table 5.22 Brief news and longer stories by newspapers
Genre

pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)

pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)

independent
newspaper
(n=87)

News brief

15 (35.7%)

1 (4.3%)

16 (18.4%)

Story

27 (64.3%)

22 (95.7%)

71 (81.6%)

chi2=9.66, p<.01

Table 5.23 Brief news and longer stories by TV stations
Genre

pro-government
TV
(n=95)
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pro-opposition
TV
(n=176)

independent
TV
(n=129)

News brief

59 (62.1%)

122 (69.3%)

80 (62.0%)

Stories

36 (37.9%)

54 (30.7%)

49 (38.0%)

chi2=2.29, p<.31

Placement. H1g proposed that pro-government media would place the coverage
of MDM less prominently in terms of assigned newspaper space and airtime than proopposition media. H2g proposed that pro-opposition media would place the coverage of
MDM more prominently in terms of assigned newspaper space and airtime than progovernment media. RQ5g inquired about independent media’s placement of MDM
coverage in terms of prominence of assigned page space or airtime.
As shown in Table 5.24, newspapers differed in terms of newspaper space
assigned to the stories about media democratization movement. Pro-government 24 Saati
placed materials on the front page in 59.5% of cases, while pro-opposition Alia did not
(0.0%, chi2=36.82, p=.00). H1g was not supported. Pro-government 24 Saati was less
likely to put materials about MDM on less prominent pages 6-16 (0.0%) than proopposition Alia (21.7%, chi2=36.82, p=.00). H2g was not supported in the newspaper
sample. In the TV sample, pro-government Rustavi 2 aired 20% of stories during less
prominent morning news segment, while pro-opposition 9th Channel did not air stories
about MDM in the morning (chi2=71.44, p<.00). Pro-opposition 9th Channel aired 60.2%
of stories during the primetime hours, compared to pro-government Rustavi 2 (49.5%,
chi2=71.44, p=.00). H1g and H2g were supported for the TV sample. Independent
Kavkasia did not air stories in the morning, and aired 74.4% of stories during the
primetime segment, that is, more often than pro-government Rustavi 2 (49.5%) and proopposition 9th Channel (60.2%, chi2=71.44, p=.00) (see Table 5.25).
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Table 5.24. Story placement by newspapers
Page

Front page
Pages 2-5
Other pages
chi2=36.82, p<.00

pro-government
newspaper
(n=42)
22 (59.5%)
15 (40.5%)

pro-opposition
newspaper
(n=23)
0 (0.0%)
18 (78.3%)

independent
newspaper
(n=87)
18 (20.9%)
42 (48.8%)

0 (0.0%)

5 (21.7%)

26 (30.2%)

Table 5.25. Story placement by TV stations
News program

Morning
Afternoon
Evening
chi2=71.44, p<.00

pro-government
TV
(n=95)
19 (20.0%)
29 (30.5%)

pro-opposition
TV
(n=176)
0 (0.0%)
70 (39.8%)

independent
TV
(n=129)
0 (0.0%)
33 (25.6%)

47 (49.5%)

106 (60.2%)

96 (74.4%)

Discussion
This study analyzed the coverage of the media democratization movement, an
emergent movement concerned with free speech and democratization in Georgia, across
different types of news organizations to identify dominant tone, frames, sources, and
other elements of the coverage and explain them in the context of news organizations’
political ties (or lack thereof) with the government and the opposition.
A large amount of the literature posits that social movements receive
demobilizing, marginalizing coverage in the media, because the media resist social
change (Chan & Lee, 1984; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980; Olien et al, 1995).
Other literature (Harlow & Johnston, 2011; Weaver & Scacco, 2013) maintains the recent
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trend of media diversification and the diffusion of Internet media lead to more neutral and
fair coverage of social movements in some media.
This study, in very broad terms, was based on theorizing that dynamic changes in
emergent democracies, such as Georgia, led to great disparities among political elites and
the media, and the emergence of a new type of independent media, open to change and
sympathetic to social movements. Social movements in these environments have the
independent media, but also opposition media, as their natural allies against the
government and the system. Based on this theorizing, the study hypothesized more
positive and supportive coverage of social movements in the media aligned with the
opposition and in the independent media, and more negative coverage in governmentaligned media. The hypothesized positive coverage of Georgia’s media democratization
movement was also based on the literature, which predicts more favorable treatment of
emergent movements than of established movements (Gitlin, 1980).
The key finding of the study is largely positive coverage of the media
democratization movement. Newspapers and TV stations across the political spectrum
used mobilizing frames more often than demobilizing frames, and applied a positive tone
in the majority of stories. Demobilizing, marginalizing frames -- powerful weapons
against protest around the world -- were applied rarely, and often side-by-side with
mobilizing frames. The study has explained this finding based on aspects of political and
media environment in Georgia. In 2010-2012, the government was facing strong political
opposition, and the media were split into pro-government, pro-opposition, and centrist,
non-engaged groups. The opposition, and pro-opposition media, supported the media
democratization movement as a strong challenge to the government they hoped to defeat.
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The independent media had their own reasons to support the movement. Both
independent and pro-opposition media experienced government pressures, were in a
disadvantageous position compared to pro-government media, and stood to benefit from
the reform of media environment proposed by activists. As to the positive tone and
mobilizing frames in pro-government media, it appears to be the result of two factors: a)
citizens of Georgia have shown strong respect for the freedom of speech and press -every seventh citizen polled in 2013 said freedom of media was the most important issue
facing the country (Navarro & Woodward, 2013) – making marginalization of activists
demanding greater press freedom unacceptable to readers and viewers, and b) the
government accepted and legitimized the media democratization movement demands for
greater transparency in ownership and financing of media, and for mandatory distribution
of broadcast signals by cable operators. (The government has not responded to the
activists’ demand to lift the ban on distribution of Maestro TV’s antennas.) In April 2011,
the government adopted new ownership transparency legislation, and, in June 2012,
adopted into law the “must carry/must offer” principles of mandatory distribution of
broadcast signals by cable operators. The coverage in pro-governmental media focused
on the government’s response to the activists’ demands, and, in general, on government’s
media democratization reform; hence, the use of positive tone and mobilizing frames.
This explanation is corroborated by more frequent use of government officials as sources
by the pro-government media than by the pro-opposition or the independent media.
Rustavi 2 used government sources in 73.7% of stories, and pro-government 24 Saati in
59.5% of stories, more often than other news organizations.
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Despite overall positive coverage, all news organizations used marginalizing
frames. The government attempted to “change the conversation,” that is, reframe
activists’ demands such that their argument would lose its intended meaning. For
instance, the key demobilizing frame has been hinders free business, which reframed
activists’ demands for transparency in the media ownership and financing, and for the
“must carry” regulation, in terms of the free market. The discussion framed as hinders
free market treated media as businesses, and labeled activists’ demands for disclosure of
proprietary information, such as ownership and financial flows, as intrusive and
unjustifiable burdens on free businesses. The media’s use of politicizing/scamming frame
portrayed activists as politically motivated individuals, and their demands as a political
game.
As theorized by the study, there were differences in the treatment of MDM across
types of media. These differences -- some more obvious than others-- played out in the
choice of specific frames, genre, sources, page space and airtime. In many cases, the
news organizations used frames in line with their political alliances and tastes. In general,
the media carry some and ignore other frames, advanced by social actors, and deploy
their own frames (de Vreese, 2012; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Pro-opposition and
independent media carried activists’ frames, and aligned more or less closely with their
discourse. Pro-governmental media, which refrained from direct attacks and slandering
of the movement, used frames preferred by the government, and reduced the movement’s
importance by shaping stories in the brief genre of news briefs and airing TV stories
during less-popular morning newscasts. Pro-government newspaper 24 Saati shaped
35.7% of its stories as news briefs (two to three short paragraphs), compared to pro-
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opposition Alia (4.3%) or independent Resonansi (18.4%). Pro-government 24 Saati also
wrote fewer stories about MDM (64.3%) than pro-opposition Alia (69.9%). While 24
Saati placed stories about MDM on the front page significantly more often than two other
newspapers, stories shaped as news briefs lacked prominence. 24 Saati was also less
likely to focus on the movement, and instead discussed MDM in connection with other
issues. For instance, 24 Saati discussed the movement’s issues in terms of their
importance for conducting fair elections, which was the government’s preferred
discourse. In the months prior to the 2012 parliamentary elections, the government
adopted the “must carry” regulation, framing it as a major initiative to ensure the fairness
of the election. Pro-government 24 Saati used frames associated with the elections -- fair
elections and access to information – plurality -- two and six times more often than
independent Resonansi and pro-opposition Alia, respectively, and covered the “must
carry” regulation twice more often than other MDM issues (85.7%) and more frequently
than other newspapers. 24 Saati, which used government officials as sources in 59.5% of
articles, essentially covered the government’s role in media democratization in Georgia.
Pro-government TV station Rustavi 2 also gave predominantly positive coverage
of the media democratization movement. However, the coverage was limited to 8 stories
per 1,000 newscasts (.008 stories per newscast), and was almost ten times less frequent
than the coverage of MDM on pro-opposition 9th Channel (.09 stories per newscast, that
is, 9 stories per 100 newscasts). 9th Channel, the station launched by the opposition on
April 30, 2012, that is, five months ahead of the parliamentary elections, produced twice
as many stories as Rustavi 2 during the period sampled in the study. The literature
describes marginalization by not mentioning key players in a movement, aimed at
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reducing their importance and disassociating them from issues (Gamson & Modigliani,
1989). “Sealing off” (Gitlin, 1980) information about the movement, rather than openly
slandering the protesters, appeared to have been Rustavi 2’s strategy. Rustavi 2 spoke to
activists in only 15.8% of cases, compared to government officials featured in 73.7% of
stories, and did not speak to a single activist journalist, a vocal and strong group in
MDM. The station aired MDM stories in less-popular morning newscasts, which other
two stations never did, and was least likely in the TV sample to air MDM stories in
primetime. Rustavi 2 was most likely to mention MDM issues in stories focused on other
issues, such as politics or the elections. Rustavi 2 covered the Coalition for Media
Democracy and the It Concerns You campaign less often than two other stations. It
covered the media ownership issue more frequently than other stations – Rustavi 2 was
itself accused of non-transparent ownership, and responded to these allegations in the
coverage – and was least likely to cover the issue of Maestro TV’s antennas. Rustavi 2’s
preferred frames were rule of law, fair elections, – the frames used by the government in
its own discourse on reforms -- and the access to information - transparency frame,
related to the media ownership transparency coverage. Rustavi 2 was least likely to use
activist-advanced it concerns you frame. Rustavi 2 abstained from demobilizing frames,
airing them in no more than 13.7% of stories.
Pro-opposition media, consistent with theorizing in this study, supported the
social movement. Not only did these media use predominantly positive tone and
mobilizing frames, but they also supported the movement in their decisions about specific
frames, tone, genre, frequency, space and airtime of coverage. Almost entire coverage in
pro-opposition Alia (91.3%) was positive, exceeding the frequency of positive stories in
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pro-government 24 Saati (64.3%) and independent Resonansi (78.2%). Alia wrote most
frequently in the longer genre -- stories, opinions and interviews – among newspapers
sampled. Pro-opposition 9th Channel’s frequency of coverage -- nearly one story per ten
newscasts aired -- was significantly higher than two other two stations’ frequency of
coverage (8 stories per 1,000 newscasts for Rustavi 2 and 5 stories per 100 newscasts for
Kavkasia.). 9th Channel mentioned the Coalition for Media Advocacy (10.2%) and the It
Concerns You (20.5%) much more often than other stations, aired stories in primetime
and gave voice to activists more frequently than pro-government Rustavi 2 (but less
frequently than independent Kavkasia). In its choice of frames, 9th Channel was closer to
activists’ discourse than Rustavi 2. 9th Channel accentuated free speech, the activists’ top
frame, more often than other stations. 9th Channel was also most likely in the TV sample
to use activists’ key frame, it concerns you. The producer at 9th Channel, interviewed by
the study, was a member in one of the organizations of the Coalition for Media
Advocacy, which have undoubtedly positively affected the coverage. 9th Channel used
demobilizing frames from government’s discourse, but in a small share of stories
(10.2%).
Certain features of the coverage in pro-opposition media, especially Alia, hinted
at the political motivation behind the support to the movement. Alia used injustice frame
more often than two other newspapers, and covered MDM in the broader discussion of
media problems. Alia was apparently painting a picture of injustices in Georgia in broad
strokes, reflecting the oppositional political discourse. The strongest oppositional player,
the “Coalition – Georgian Dream,” was trying to entice the protest vote ahead of the 2012
parliamentary elections. Their meetings and demonstrations were taking place throughout
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Georgia, with the “Coalition - Georgian Dream” employing collective action strategies
more often than normal whistle-stop campaigning. According to the international
observers, the campaign was “polarized, tense, and characterized by the use of harsh
rhetoric and a few instances of violence” (Department of State, 2012). According to some
observers, the fate of the elections was decided in favor of the opposition when proopposition 9th Channel aired the story about injustices and tortures in the Georgian
prisons. The injustice frame used by Alia tapped into the oppositional rhetoric. Issuewise, Alia focused on government’s seizure of thousands of Maestro TV’s antennas
slated for free-of-charge distribution – the most flagrant and tangible injustice -- and
wrote about it more often than about other two issues of MDM. Pro-opposition Alia and
9th Channel were least likely to talk to the government sources. Alia wrote about MDM
no more frequently (4 per 100 issues) than pro-government 24 Saati (5 per 100 issues),
and most of its coverage occurred in 2012, that is, during the height of the political
campaign. 9th Channel provided all its coverage in 2012, the year in which the station was
launched. 9th Channel was closed shortly after the opposition won the elections.
Georgia’s independent media have had the closest connection to activists. Over
the years, the civil sector provided assistance, advice and protection to the media, and
voiced its concerns, while the media have dutifully covered the civil agenda. Both the
editor in chief of Resonansi and news director of Kavkasia were members of
organizations which formed the Coalition for Media Advocacy. The study found
supportive and positive, if restrained, coverage of MDM in independent Resonansi and
Kavkasia. While independent Resonansi covered MDM most frequently -- Resonansi
published one story about MDM per ten issues and focused stories on MDM more
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frequently than other two newspapers -- Resonansi’s treatment of the media
democratization was not as enthusiastic and positive as pro-opposition Alia’s. Resonansi
wrote fewer positive stories (78.2%) than Alia (91.3%), (but more than pro-government
24 Saati, which was positive in 64.3% of articles). Resonansi wrote fewer stories of the
longer genre than Alia, (but also fewer news briefs than 24 Saati,) and placed the
coverage of MDM less prominently – the stories were printed on Resonansi’s inside
pages -- than two other newspapers. Independent Resonansi appeared interested in
reflecting discourses around MDM more fully than other newspapers. Resonansi used
government officials as sources many times more often than Alia (but less often than progovernment 24 Saati), and has spoken to at least one category of activists (“activist
journalists of MDM”) more often than other newspapers. Resonansi also covered all three
issues of MDM evenly. The frame it used more often than other newspapers was access
to information – transparency.
Independent Kavkasia, also covered the movement frequently and positively, but
less frequently (5 stories per 100 newscasts) than 9th Channel (9 stories per 100
newscasts). Kavkasia was more likely than other TV stations to report about MDM in
primetime. Two-thirds of Kavkasia’s stories about MDM were aired in its evening
newscasts. Independent Kavkasia focused more often than other TV stations on MDM in
the context of other problems in the media. Like Resonansi, Kavkasia gave voice to both
the government and the activists. The station spoke to the government in about half of its
stories, almost twice more often than pro-opposition 9th Channel (but less often than progovernment Rustavi 2), and spoke to activists more frequently than other TV stations.
Like Resonansi, independent Kavkasia spread its coverage among all three issues of the
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media democratization movement more or less evenly. Being under greater pressure than
independent Resonansi – the pressures on the broadcast media were stronger than on the
print press -- independent Kavkasia used the injustice frame more frequently (27.1%)
than either pro-opposition 9th Channel (25%) or independent Rustavi 2 (2.1%). Kavkasia,
as an outspoken critic of the government, was experiencing a host of problems, and,
unlike rich 9th Channel, was less protected. Kavkasia’s top demobilizing frame, the
ineffective, impotent, counterproductive frame, was associated with perceived lack of
progress in the media democratization movement.
Chapter summary
This chapter outlined the results of the quantitative content analysis of three
Georgian newspapers and three TV stations. The study posed 12 hypotheses and 7
research questions about the tone, frames, frequency, genre and prominence of coverage.
Some theoretical predictions in the study were corroborated by the findings, while other
were not. In general, politically engaged media stood by their respective parties in
selecting tone (24 Saati, Alia), movement-advanced frames (Rustavi 2, 9th Channel),
genre (24 Saati, Alia), sources (24 Saati, Rustavi 2, 9th Channel), and prominence
(Rustavi 2, 9th Channel) of coverage of the media democratization movement. The
independent media were most likely to hold a centrist position, which appeared less
influenced by political actors than editorial positions of pro-government and proopposition media.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions

This study analyzed the construction of reality around the media democratization
movement (MDM) in Georgia. The movement, which has engaged with free speech and
press issues since the early years of Georgia’s independence from the Soviet Union, made
great progress in the areas of journalists’ personal rights and legislative protections of the
freedom and impendence of press (Topuria, 2000, L.T., 2014, April, 4; Z. K., personal
interview, March 13, 2014) but lacked sustainability and coordination. In April 2011, the
MDM formed an organization, the Coalition for Media Advocacy, and launched a
sustained activist program to improve access to information for journalists and regular
citizens. The movement successfully lobbied for the adoption of stricter ownership and
financial disclosure requirements in the broadcast sector. It also launched a formal
campaign, It Concerns You, pushing the government to adopt into law the “must carry”
principle, which requires cable operators to distribute all TV signals and thus breaks the
government’s effective stranglehold over nationwide news. In addition, the movement
publicized the case of TV Maestro’s 140,000 satellite antennas, intended for distribution
to viewers by pro-opposition Maestro TV, but seized by the government months prior to
the 2012 Parliamentary Elections on the grounds that distribution amounted to vote
buying (Freedom House, 2013; IREX, 2013) The study pursued three goals: 1) to
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identify the dominant tone and frames of coverage of the Georgian media
democratization movement, operationalized as the coverage of the Coalition for Media
Advocacy (MDM’s SMO), the It Concerns You (MDM’s campaign), the “must
carry/must offer” and media transparency legislation, and the Maestro satellite antennas
case (MDM’s issues), across types of news organizations; 2) to identify frames
constructed by the media democratization movement; and 3) to analyze whether political
factors, such as news organizations’ ties with the government or the opposition (or lack
thereof), and frames constructed by activists influenced the news coverage. To enhance
the analysis, the study interviewed activists and activist journalists about the goals of
MDM and the rationale behind its framing choices. Finally, the study interviewed news
producers and reporters who had covered MDM about their attitudes towards the
movement and experiences on the beat. In sum, the study analyzed the construction of
reality around the media democratization movements in two realms: the social movement
and the news media.
To identify movement frames and clarify the rationale behind these frame
choices, the study qualitatively analyzed 17 statements issued by MDM from April 13,
2011, to October 1, 2012. It conducted 12 in-depth interviews with activists and activist
journalists, who were leaders in founder organizations in the Coalition for Media
Advocacy. For media frames, the study content analyzed 152 newspaper and 400 TV
stories about MDM produced by pro-government newspaper 24 Saati and progovernment Rustavi 2 television, pro-opposition newspaper Alia and pro-opposition 9th
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Channel, and independent newspaper Resonansi and independent TV Kavkasia14 between
July 1, 2010, and October 1, 2012. The study also interviewed two news producers,
employed by Rustavi 2 and 9th Channel (the producer at Kavkasia TV refused to be
interviewed) and three reporters employed by 24 Saati, Alia and Resonansi.
The literature on social movements and media, written from the social
constructivist and conflict perspectives, posits that the news media’s alliance with
powerful elites leads to demobilizing coverage of social movements as challengers of
these elites and the existing social order. Media propaganda (Herman and Chomsky,
1988), media hegemony (Gitlin, 1980), and media and conflict theories (Olien et al,
1995), developed in the 1970s and onwards, explain media’s negative framing of social
movements by media’s entrenched ties with the elites and their interest in maintaining the
status quo. According to Gitlin (1977, 1980), structural influences, emanating from elite
ownership of the media, interact with aspects of journalists’ professional codes and
invariably lead to negative and marginalizing framing of social movements. The protest
paradigm (Chan & Lee, 1984) builds on Gitlin’s ideas and posits that journalists’
coverage of protests is more diverse and determined by their ideologically-based
“reporting paradigms.” More recent scholarship has found greater diversity in the

14

This categorization is based on newspapers’ and TV stations’ perceived editorial bias,

documented by industry watchdogs (Freedom House, 2009-11) and on the monitoring of
their coverage of the 2012 elections (www.mediamonitoring.ge). None of the newspapers
or TV stations have explicitly endorsed either the government or the opposition in the
2012 campaign or at any other times.
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coverage of protests (Harlow & Johnston, 2011; Weaver & Scacco, 2013) and explained
it by the recent trend of media diversification, the emergence of Internet-based media,
and media’s greater ideological posturing. In non-Western contexts (Mauersberger, 2012;
McCarthy et al, 2008; Yuan, 2013), those outlets in the media landscape oriented towards
social change are more sympathetic towards movement causes.
This literature led to theorizing in this study that political factors, such as news
organizations’ ties with the government or the opposition (or lack thereof) would
influence the news media’s use of mobilizing and demobilizing frames. Pro-government
media would be interested in the maintenance of the status quo and therefore would
ignore or negatively cover social movements, using demobilizing frames. By contrast,
pro-opposition media would be interested in social change, willing to cover social
movements extensively and positively, and use mobilizing frames more often than
demobilizing frames. The study asked whether the independent media, when
experiencing government pressures and unfair competition from pro-government media,
would also cover social movements positively and rely on mobilizing frames. The study
took into consideration the independent media’s long-standing ties with the media
democratization movement. The study hypothesized that movement actors stood a greater
chance of pushing their frames into pro-opposition and independent media than progovernment media.
The key finding of the study was the prevalent use of positive tone and mobilizing
frames in the coverage of the media democratization movement across all types of media.
Newspapers and TV stations across the political spectrum used a predominantly positive
tone and more mobilizing than demobilizing frames. While the study theorized about
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positive coverage of the movement in pro-opposition and independent media, it did not
predict positive coverage in pro-government media. The media democratization
movement has been spared negative and marginalizing coverage, a proven weapon
against social movements and social change around the world. Pro-opposition and
independent media provided consistent, extensive, and enthusiastic coverage of MDM.
Pro-government media focused predominantly on those MDM issues that were eventually
endorsed by the government and covered them positively, relying on government
sources. Pro-government TV simply remained silent most of the time, covering MDM ten
times less frequently than pro-opposition station. This finding of predominantly positive
coverage of the social movement is at odds with much of the early literature on social
movements and media, which predicts consistently negative and marginalizing coverage
of social movements (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Gitlin, 1980, Tichenor et al, 1970;
Olien et al, 1989, 1994, 1995), and complies with more recent literature, which finds
supportive coverage of social movements in some parts of media (Harlow & Johnston,
2011; Mauersberger, 2012; Weaver & Scacco, 2013; Yuan, 2013).
The study explains the patterns of news coverage of MDM in the context of the
news and political environment in Georgia, drawing on the conflict perspective of social
movements. In dynamically changing, emerging democracies, such as Georgia, the elites
and the news media are split. Parts of the news media align themselves with the
government, while other parts side with the political opposition. There is no agreement
between the government and the opposition about the need to maintain the status quo,
and the two are not joining forces against social movements, as in more developed
countries. On the contrary, the opposition works to weaken the government in alliance
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with social movements. News organizations aligned with the government or the
opposition have different editorial policies towards social movements, consistent with
their political ties.
The strongest political opposition of the Georgian government, the Coalition –
Georgian Dream, and the media it owned or worked with, supported the media
democratization movement. The opposition was interested in helping activists expose
violations of press freedoms in Georgia, which negatively affected the government’s
image as a progressive and democratic force among Georgian citizens and the
international community. The news producer at the pro-opposition TV station and the
reporter at the pro-opposition newspaper, sampled by the study, said their news
organizations supported the media democratization movement. The producer said the
pro-opposition station helped MDM by “positive coverage and otherwise” (T. R.,
personal interview, April 10, 2014). The reporter at the pro-opposition newspaper
admitted to having written positive, “emotionally colored” (T. O., personal interview,
May 3, 2014) stories, taking part in protests, and signing petitions on behalf of activists.
She said the media activism “was one of her strongest experiences in years” (T. O.,
personal interview, May 3, 2014). Her newspaper, Alia, was most likely among the
newspapers in the sample to use a positive tone in coverage of MDM. Alia, by some
accounts (Tsiklauri, 2012, June 2), received financial backing from the opposition. Proopposition 9th Channel, a television launched by billionaire opposition leader Bidzina
Ivanishvili, aired ten times as many stories in six months after its launch in April 2012 as
pro-government Rustavi 2 during the timeframe of the study (July, 2010, to October,
2012). 9th Channel exceeded independent Kavkasia in frequency of coverage of MDM.
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The station used the activists’ top master frame, free speech, and the activists’ new frame,
it concerns you, more often than the other stations. The news producer at 9th Channel said
in the interview that her channel, and two other critical TV stations, TV Maestro and
Kavkasia, had engaged in advocacy journalism and supported MDM.
The other type of news media analyzed by the study – the independents – have
had long-standing strong ties with the civil sector (Topuria, 2000) and the media
democratization movement. These media were new forces in the society and developed
and gained strength as a result of the process of transition (Spark, 2008). At the start of
the latest wave of activism, which this study has analyzed, the media democratization
movement established close ties with the independent media. Four influential media
unions -- the Georgian Regional Media Association, the Georgian Association of
Regional Broadcasters, the Regional Broadcasters’ Network, and the Georgian Charter of
Journalism Ethics--became formal founders of the movement’s SMO, the Coalition for
Media Advocacy. These unions, uniting hundreds of members from the independent
media but also from the pro-opposition media, supported the movement and have
undoubtedly positively influenced member journalists’ attitudes towards MDM. The
reporter of independent Resonansi, interviewed by the study, said she could not “recall a
single journalist who was against” MDM proposals (R. M., personal interview, April 20,
2014). She said MDM was “a different kind of issue,” and she “could not” but provide
supportive coverage (R. M., personal interview, April 20, 2014). But she also said her
organization was against advocacy in reporting. The independent media have drawn solid
support to the movement. Independent Kavkasia used mobilizing frames more often than
other TV stations. Independent newspaper Resonansi used a positive tone in covering
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MDM. The editor-in-chief of Resonansi said the coverage in the newspaper was balanced
and that it described both activists’ and opponents’ views (L. T., personal interview,
April 4, 2014). He said it was in the activists’ interests to stimulate public discussion of
their proposals and invite opponents’ criticism of their potential flaws (L.T., personal
interview, April 4, 2014). This and other features of coverage speak of more substantive
discussion about MDM in the independent media, compared to the pro-opposition media.
Resonansi and Kavkasia covered MDM both extensively and consistently during the
period sampled by the study. Resonansi’s coverage had greater focus on MDM and its
issues, than Alia’s, which covered MDM as one element of the generally problematic
media environment in Georgia, or 24 Saati, which covered MDM as part of its elections
and political coverage. Resonansi and Kavkasia spoke to activists more often than other
stations and covered all three issues of MDM evenly, compared to selective coverage in
other newspapers and TV stations. The two independent news organizations also sourced
government officials more often than the pro-opposition media (but much less than the
pro-government media), to reflect both the government’s and the activists’ discourse
about MDM.
The pro-government media abstained from harsh rhetoric and slander in its
coverage of the movement. The marginalization of activists for demands of greater
freedom of media and information could upset readers in Georgian society, which
strongly supported freedom of expression and press. Every seventh citizen polled in 2013
said that the freedom and independence of media was the most important issue facing the
country, ahead of jobs and lost territories (Navarro & Woodward, 2013). After two
centuries of censorship under the Imperial and the Communist regimes, Georgians were
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highly protective of their right to free expression and information. This may explain the
lack of negative coverage in the pro-government media. “We have been spared terrible
lies,” said an activist about the pro-government media (T. B., 2014, April 12, 2014).
However, the pro-government media in the sample tried to belittle the movement actors
and limit information about its activities. The activists complained that pro-government
TV stations did not film their faces nor give them a voice in coverage (S. S., personal
interview, March 12, 2014). The content analysis of the news coverage of the movement
corroborated this story. Pro-government Rustavi 2 television did not interview or
otherwise use as a source a single activist journalist, and such journalists were a vocal
and influential group within the movement. Rustavi 2 also used other activists as sources
less often than other TV stations. It covered the movement during less popular morning
newscasts more often than other TV stations. The producer at Rustavi 2 said the
television covered protesters and their issues but did not provide supportive reporting.
This producer was in general against advocacy journalism and expressed skepticism
about activists’ motives. He thought pro-opposition and independent television stations
were acting in alliance with the political opposition (G. L., personal interview, May 5,
2014).
Rustavi 2 used demobilizing frames less often than other TV stations, but limited
coverage to some nine stories per hundred newscasts. This strategy of no mention, of
“sealing off” news about a movement (Gitlin, 1980), has been described as one of the
marginalization techniques in the literature. Pro-government 24 Saati, which covered
MDM quite extensively (24 Saati’s coverage was more frequent than pro-opposition
Alia’s but less frequent than Resonansi’s), limited one-third of its coverage to news
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briefs, that is, to two to three paragraphs. Both Rustavi 2 and 24 Saati relied heavily on
government sources compared to other types of media. Pro-government media was the
least likely to talk about the Coalition for Media Advocacy, the social movement
organization for MDM. Rustavi 2 was less likely than other TV stations to talk to
activists in general. According to Gamson and Modigliani (1989), the media rarely
covered key players in the movement, in attempts to disassociate them from issues.
From the social constructivist perspective, the media coverage is explained as a
framing contest, in which frames deployed by a social movement compete with counter
frames by the government or other social actors and news media’s own frames. On the
whole, MDM was successful in crafting its messages and pushing them into the media.
The movement pursued two goals, as reported by the activists (H. J., personal interview,
March 25, 2014; I. M., personal interview, April 18, 2014; N. Z., personal interview,
March 15, 2014): a) improving the media environment in which their own professional
practice was situated, and, b) strengthening the civil society in which energized citizens
would participate and play a greater role in society (I. M., personal interview, April 18,
2014; M. P., personal interview, April 7, 2014; S. S., personal interview, March 12,
2014). Two other important insights gained in interviews were that the activism grew out
of the professional protest of journalists, who were unable to practice journalism freely,
and that the activists coordinated closely with other socially active groups to jointly
“snatch away” (S. S., personal interview, March 12, 2014) concessions in the media and
other areas. Activists’ actions, especially towards the end of the period sampled by this
study, were goal-oriented, had clear strategies, and a measure of tactical flexibility and
“creativity” (L. T., personal interview, April 4, 2014). The activists’ strategy was to
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mobilize supporters and third parties, subvert opponents, and attract positive media
coverage, the routine strategy of social movements (Lipsky, 1968).
The media democratization movement’s goals and strategies was reflected in the
frames it deployed in movement statements. The MDM primarily used overarching
master frames linked to the concept of democracy, such as free speech, access to
information – plurality, access to information – transparency, fair elections, rule of law,
and responsible government frames. These frames were highly resonant in Georgian
society, in which the overwhelming majority of the population supported democratic
transformation (Navarro & Woodward, 2013). The activists chose key frames with key
audiences in mind. The activists directly addressed the government in an effort to make it
shoulder responsibility for problems and solutions in the media environment and to reach
the international community as a third party and reference group for the government. All
frames linked with the concept of democracy spoke to the government and the
international community. The government tried to project the image of Georgia as the
fastest developing democracy in the post-Soviet world. It vowed to conduct the best and
most competitive and fair elections in years. The international community, acting on the
theoretical belief (Huntington, 1968) that several consecutive changes of government
through fair elections were necessary to consolidate democracy in Georgia, was keenly
watching the 2012 Parliamentary Elections. By deploying the fair elections frame, the
movement leveraged interest in fair elections among the government and the international
community (S.S., personal interview, March 12, 2014).
Fair elections and rule of law frames were picked up by the pro-government
media. Rule of law was Rustavi 2’s top frame, and the station used rule of law and fair
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elections frames more often than other television stations. 24 Saati also used these
frames, and the related access to information – pluralism frame, as its top frames, and
used them more frequently than other newspapers. The activists’ interviews gave
evidence of their targeting the government and the international community in framing
work. They said they tried “talking the language” of the government (N.Z., personal
interview, March 15, 2014) and deliberately linked media issues with the elections to
build support among the international community (S. S., personal interview, March 12,
2014). This strategy of targeting the government and its preferred discourse has been an
effective framing strategy in previous protests (Zuo & Benford, 1995; Noonah, 2012).
Activists also targeted citizens as potential recruits and followers (Lipsky, 1968).
In this task, the activists primarily relied on a new and innovative frames, it concerns you.
It concerns you accentuated citizens’ responsibility to deal with the problems in the
media environment. According to activists, the problems in the media were easy to
understand, but the population did not relate them to their daily lives (M. P., personal
interview, April 7, 2014), nor did they know what to do about them (S. S., personal
interview, March 12, 2014). It concerns you, an easy-to-understand, resonant, elastic
motivational frame, told the citizens to mobilize and engage. It helped the activists reach
and mobilize everyday citizens and connect them with the activist agenda (M. P.,
personal interview, April 7, 2014). 9th Channel, the pro-opposition television station, used
the frame most frequently, closely followed by the independent Kavkasia, but the
independent and pro-opposition newspapers were no different from the pro-government
newspaper in the use of the it concerns you frame. The activists were proud of the frame
(T. B., personal interview April 12, 2014) and believed it applied to other contexts
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beyond the news media and could spur further mobilization (Z. K., personal interview,
March 13, 2014).
Activists’ frames also resonated with members of the news media across the
political and ideological divide. The free speech, access to information – transparency,
and access to information – plurality frames connected with journalists’ professional
values of free expression and access to information, transparency, and pluralism. All
newspapers and TV stations used these frames. The news producer at the pro-opposition
station said the media and social movements shared values, such as a high regard for
rights and transparency (T. R., personal interview, April 10, 2014). She said “no other
group [but activists had] such a vested interest in transparency.” The activist from the
Open Society (Soros) foundation in the Coalition for Media Advocacy said the
organization targeted the independent media in its media campaigns and counted on their
support (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014).
Other than being elastic and wide in scope, the frames activists chose were timely
and culturally resonant. The activists were willing to adapt frames to changes in the
political and social context (Markowitz, 2009; Noonan, 1995; Zuo & Benford, 1995). The
issues in the Georgian media environment identified and prioritized by activists –
freedom of content production and distribution, access to public information and
transparency of the government, access to plural sources of information in the regions -were initially framed as free speech, access to information – transparency and injustice
issues. As the elections approached, the movement dropped the “injustice” frame and
adopted the fair elections frame, reframing the need for the freedom of media as essential
to conducting fair elections and introduced the access to information – plurality frame,
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accentuating the need to have free and plural sources of information for voters around
Georgia.
The picture that emerged from interviews is that of a dynamic process of growth
in the media democratization movement. The latest phase of activism, which started as
the activity of a few informal groups in 2010, went on to become a formal coalition of
media and civil sector organizations in 2011, and produced a highly organized and highly
effective campaign, the It Concerns You campaign, in 2012. The framing work of the
activists, too, became more elaborate. While at the beginning, framing choices were
spontaneous and basic, as evident from activists’ lack of recall of concrete frames or
communicative devices employed by the Coalition for Media Advocacy, the framing
decisions became formalized as the activism and campaigning grew. The key slogan, it
concerns you, was born at the peak of activism in 2012.
The frames were advanced not only by MDM but also by the government and the
media. These frames swayed the discourse in the media away from MDM’s frames. The
government, through the media it controlled or worked with, was trying to “change the
conversation,” that is, reframe activists’ demands such that they would lose the intended
meaning. The government, for instance, deployed the hinders free business frame, which
treated the media as businesses, and discussed activists’ demands – greater transparency
of ownership and financial information in the broadcast media, mandatory distribution of
all TV signals by cable operators – in market terms. In these terms, the disclosure of
proprietary business information, such as ownership structure and finances, and the
requirement for free cable businesses to distribute all broadcast content, were cast as
intrusive and excessive regulations. The government’s other demobilizing frame,
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politicizing/scamming, described activists as political players and their demands as moves
to gain advantage over the political opponents. These and other demobilizing frames
were carried by all news media, but much less frequently than mobilizing frames.
The key theoretical argument in this study – that pro-opposition, pro-government
and independent news media diverged in their attitudes and coverage of MDM – was
corroborated by the analysis of journalists’ views about MDM, its issues, and the
activism in general. Reporters at pro-opposition and independent newspapers, and a
producer at opposition-controlled 9th Channel, approved of both the activists’ agenda and
even took part in street protests. These journalists had personally experienced
government oppression and had many reasons to desire reforms in the media
democratization sector. The reporter at independent Resonansi said this: “one advocates,
or else, there will be no change” (R. M., personal interview, April 20, 2014). By contrast,
the producers and reporters at the pro-government news media said they backed many of
the activists’ issues but were not taking part in protests, were not advocating while
reporting, and questioned activists’ sincerity and political neutrality.
To sum up, most theoretical predictions in the study were corroborated by the
findings. The key finding of the study was the prevalent use of a positive tone and
mobilizing frames in the coverage of the media democratization movement across all
types of media. The study corroborated the recent findings of supportive coverage of
social movements in those parts of news media that erre open and interested in social
change (Harlow & Johnston, 2011; Mauersberger, 2012; Weaver & Scacco, 2013; Yuan,
2013). It also found that the pro-government media abstained from marginalizing
coverage of the movement. This study explained the predominantly positive tone and
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mobilizing frames in the news media’s coverage of MDM by aspects of the social
conflict in Georgia and activists’ skill in constructing the movement through framing.
However, the nature of the media democratization movement – its focus on the freedom
of speech and press, which clearly overlapped with the interests of the professional
journalistic corps in maintaining professional freedoms– may have been a factor leading
to journalists’ positive and mobilizing coverage of the movement. Yet the positioning of
the movement as a special cause for journalists, and the framing of its goals as shared
goals between activists and journalists, was a calculated and deliberate strategy of the
movement, as is argued in this study.
On the whole, politically engaged media stood by their respective political parties
in selecting nuances of tone, frames, genre, sourcing, frequency, and prominence of
coverage of the media democratization movement. the study concluded that social
movements that manage to exploit tensions in the “media-state dynamics”
(Mauersberger, 2012, p. 588) and differences in the media (Weaver & Scacco, 2013) in
framing decisions have a better chance of gaining good access to audiences and fair
coverage. On the whole, the Georgian media democratization movement was successful
in crafting its messages and pushing them into the news media. The media
democratization movement achieved its key goal, verbalized by activists as the
improvement of the news media environment, and made serious advances towards its
second goal, the improvement of participatory civil society. The media democratization
movement taught “a good lesson of activism” (H. J., personal interview, March 25, 2014)
to Georgian society.
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Appendix A
Codebook

1. Coder: Please, circle your name
1. Coder 1
2. Coder 2
2. Date. Please, write down the date of publication or appearance of a story. (It is usually
indicated the file name for materials downloaded from the Terramedia database). Format
date as this: 27012012 (stands for 27 January, 2012).
3. Source: Please, circle the newspaper or TV you are coding: .1 Alia, .2 Resonansi .3 24
Hours, .4 Rustavi 2, .5 9th Channel, .6 Kavkasia
4. General topic:
.1 Media issues: code here a story about one of the five issues of interest to this study.
These issues are: the Coalition for Media Advocacy, the It Concerns You campaign,
“must carry/must offer” rule about mandatory distribution of broadcast signals by cable
companies and mandatory offer of signal by all TV stations to all cable companies,
Maestro TV satellite Antennas about the problems experienced by TV company Maestro
and associated cable companies when distributing satellite antennas around Georgia, and
the transparency of media ownership and financial flows in the media.
.2 General media: code here materials that discuss broad media issues, general problems
in the media environment, pressures on journalists, low professionalism, instead of being
dedicated to one or few of the special media issues identified for this study (see 4.1 for
the list of issues.) However, this article should mention these specific media issues
briefly.
.3 Other issues: code here any materials that are about politics, elections, economics, a
society but mentions one or all of the specific media issues listed in 4.1.
.4 Unrelated: please, check “yes” if an article or a story is unrelated, i.e. does not mention
any of the issues mentioned in 4.1 Code “unrelated” if any of these issues are mentioned
out of context of activism. e.g.: The minister of Justice appointed Ana Kevkhishvili, a
former coordinator of the Coalition for Media Advocacy, (or former activist of It
Concerns You campaign) as her new deputy. An article is unrelated if it mentions any of
the issues in 4.1 but in the context unrelated to these specific media issues: e.g.: Media
ownership in newspaper x has been revised due to the sale of its stock is unrelated, but
Rustavi 2 ownership was transferred to Karamanashvili brothers from the previous
owner, offshore company xxx, after the law on transparency of ownership was adopted is
to be coded as 4.1, because it is related to the issue of transparency of ownership.
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PLEASE STOP CODING IF AN ARTICLE OR A TV STORY IS UNRELATED.
5. Specific media issues: Code here which of the specific media issues of interest to the
study are present in the material.
.1 It Concerns You: code here any material about the campaign, It Concerns You, or any
materials that briefly mentions the campaign
.2 Coalition for Media Advocacy: code here any material about the Coalition for Media
Advocacy, or the material that mentions this organization.
.3 Must carry/Must offer rule: code here materials that are about or briefly mention “must
carry/must offer” rule, which requires mandatory distribution of all broadcast signals by
cable companies in the same area and the mandatory offer of their content to all cable
companies by TV stations covering the same area. In Georgia in 2012, this rule was
adopted into the Election Law to be activated in the pre-election period.
.4 Satellite antennas issue: Code here materials that are about or briefly mention the
arrest of satellite antennas distributed around Georgia by the cable Company Global, TV
company Maestro and some other organizations so that Maestro’s signal would get
distributed around Georgia. The antennas were arrested as an instance of voter bribery
.5 Transparency of media ownership and financial flows: Code here all materials that are
about or briefly mention the issue of concealed ownership (offshore registration, unclear
ownership structure) in TV companies or any other media or the related activism to
change the Broadcast Law to allow for greater ownership transparency. Both
requirements of ownership transparency and financial flow transparency were
subsequently adopted into law.
6. Newspaper headline, TV story title: please, write a headline in full.
7. Type of newspaper story: please, circle the appropriate genre for a newspaper article
you are coding:
.1 News in brief: typically a brief is one to three paragraph-long news item, printed on the
margins of the front page (but can also appear on other pages) and usually included into a
bordered section with similar, brief items. Most of news briefs do not have an author and
are provided by the agency.
.2 Story: a longer piece, addressing a topic at a greater length than brief news. It usually
contains discussion, context, one or two sources, or two or more quotes from one source,
and, often, has a story line. Code here “lazy” stories, composed of brief introduction by a
journalist, followed by a long, single direct quote from a source or two long direct quote
from two sources. These stories are not formatted as questions and answers. Do not code
these stories as interviews or opinions.
.3 Opinion: refers to opinions of sources rather than an editorial staff. Code here columns
(SVETI) too. Do not code here “lazy” stories, composed of journalists’ introduction and
directly quotes of expressed opinion or interview response by one or few sources.
.4 Interview: refers to a question and answer piece. It may or may not be preceded by an
introduction, and usually has journalists’ questions in bold print, followed by answers.
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Do not code here “lazy” stories, in which journalists’ introduction or a single question is
followed by a single, long direct quote but not formatted as questions and answers.
.5 Editorial: is an unsigned piece by the editorial staff of newspaper, expressing a
position or arguing a point. In some newspapers, the editorial has a byline, that is, the
name of the author, but in some other cases, there is no byline.
.6 Other: please, circle here if none of the above applies, and describe, what it is.
.2 N/A: code non -applicable, if you are coding a TV story.
8. Newspaper story location
.1 Page number: please, write down a page number on which an article appears. If an
article starts on page 2 and continues to page 6, put down “2”, that is, the page on which
an article starts. A page number is usually included in the name of the file. CODE ONLY
THE FIRST PAGE.
.2 N/A: code non -applicable, if you are coding a TV story.
9. Newspaper story length:
.1 Length in paragraphs: please, record the length of the story in paragraphs of a
newspaper article: please, circle the appropriate category based on the length of
newspaper material in paragraphs.
.2 N/A: code non –applicable, if you are coding a TV story.
10. TV program: please, code, whether a TV story appeared in the news program aired
during the morning, afternoon, prime time, or late night airtime segment.
.1 Morning news (07:00 through 11:00)
.2 Afternoon news (12:00, 13:00, 14:00, 15:00, 16:00, 17:00)
.3 Prime time news (18:00, 19:00, 20:00, 21:00)
.4 Late night news (22:00, 23:00, 24:00, 01:00)
.2 N/A: code non –applicable, if it is a newspaper story.
11. TV story type: Please, circle the appropriate genre for a TV story you are coding:
.1 Voiceover: a sequences of images with a text read behind images. It may be that a text
is read by the news anchor.
.2 Package: A TV story, which usually features one or two sources, a journalist, and a
story line. Often, a package has reporter’s “stand-up” shot.
.3 Anchor’s text: code here if the story is simply read by the anchor, with no images,
sounds or interviews.
.4 Interview: code here if an anchor interviewing somebody in the studio or via “live”
distance call. Code here if an anchor is interviewing a journalist, who reported a story.
.5 Other: please, circle here if none of the above applies, and explain what it is.
.2 N/A: code non –applicable, if it is a newspaper article.
12. TV story length:
.1 Length in minutes/seconds: please, write down the length of the story.
.2 N/A: code non –applicable, if you are coding a newspaper story.
13. Produced by:
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.1 Staff reporters: code here if a newspaper story or a TV story has been produced by
staff reporters. Usually, such a newspaper story has a byline.
.2 News agency: code here is a story or TV report has been produced by a news agency.
It is more typical of newspapers to carry agency stories.
.3 International media story: code here if a story has been reprinted from an international
newspaper or if a TV story is a foreign TV story dubbed in Georgian. More typical of
newspapers to carry these types of stories.
.4 Other: code if material is produced by other source than 13.1, 13.2, 13.3. It can be a
social media post or blogpost reprint, or something similarly unordinary. Please, specify
what it is.
14. Sources: Please check if an article or a TV story has a source or sources belonging to
any one of these categories. A source is defined as any subject in a newspaper story or a
TV story other than an author/anchor, who is directly quoted, paraphrased or mentioned
or whose sound bite is provided.
.1 Activists - MDM: leaders of organizations participating in the It Concerns You or
Coalition for Media Advocacy, or any member of these organizations, speaking on behalf
of the coalition except for MDM activists who are professional journalists or heads of
journalistic unions.
.2 Activist journalists - MDM: code here those professional journalists, who were activist
members of It Concerns You or Coalition for Media Advocacy. These included members
of Media Club, also heads of media associations (see attached list for some of the names).
.3 Activists - other: leaders or members of non-governmental organizations, who are not
members of the Coalition or organizations in the Coalition. Code here public figures,
such as writers, academics, artists, etc.
.4 Journalists - other: journalists, editors, publishers, owners of media who are not
identified as members of the Coalition even as they may be members in journalists
unions.
.5 Government officials/ruling party MPs: appointed officials, government servants,
including those serving in quasi-governmental organizations, such as the Georgian
Communications Regulatory Commission or the Ombudsman’s office. Code here
parliamentarians from the ruling, United National Movement party.
.6 Opposition MPs: members of parliament which represent political parties other than
UNM.
.7 Non-parliamentary party representatives: representatives of those political parties,
which were not represented in the Parliament.
.8 International community representatives/diplomats: foreign government officials,
diplomats, representatives of international watchdog organizations, or international
experts. Nationality-wise, these individuals can be foreigners but also Georgians, and
need to be coded here as long as they work for and speak on behalf of an international
organization or a government. Georgian chapters of international organizations are not to
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be included here but under other civil society organizations (or coalition members, if an
organization is the member).
,9 Ordinary citizens: The Georgian citizens who are not identified as associated with
organizations, and are not publicly active individuals, who need to be coded as 14.3.
Usually, these sources are not identified by their names in the media, but are called
“citizens,” “passers-by” or “dwellers of Tbilisi, Kutaisi, etc.”
.10Others: Anyone who does not belong to any of the above categories. Please, describe
the source.
15: Dominant tone towards the organizations and issues of interest to the study, listed in
4.1 (It Concerns You campaign, Coalition for Media Advocacy, Must Carry, Antennas,
Ownership Transparency). If a story or TV report is about any of the above
organizations/issues, determine whether each paragraph is negative, neutral or positive
towards them. Count negative and supportive paragraphs and calculate their ratio. If the
ratio reaches 2:1 in either direction, code an article or a TV story as negative or positive.
If 2:1 ratio is not met, code the material as neutral. Some stories may be entirely neutral
in reporting. If an article or a story is not focused on these issues (which would be the
case if you coded .4.2 or 4.3), but mentions them in passing, only look at the valance of
those paragraphs that mention organizations/issues of interest to this study, and apply 2:1
rule to those specific paragraphs.
.1 negative: code here if at least 2/3 of paragraphs or more is negative.
.2 neutral: code here if all paragraphs are neutral or there is an even number of negative
and positive paragraphs.
.3 positive: code here if 2/3 of paragraphs or more is positive.
16. Mobilizing frames: identify frames that are intended or have a potential to mobilize
the support for the organizations/issues of interest to this study (listed in 4.1). These
frames can be deployed by the It Concerns You and the Coalition, but also by other
parties, or even by reporters or editorial authors themselves. Please, look up the frame
definitions in the table below and check the ones that best fit the reporting in a newspaper
article or a TV story. You can code more than one frame. If a story is not about the
organizations/issues of interest but only mentions those, only identify those frames that
are present in the paragraphs about organizations/issues listed in 4.1.
Mobilizing frames
.1 Rights

.2 Injustice

Definition
Refers to general human rights and freedoms and equal
opportunities for all social groups. The master frame stresses
respect for shared principles of participation in the society
and empowerment of all social groups to incorporate
themselves in the public life and enjoy equal opportunities.
The frame accentuates the rights that constitute the civil
society.
Accentuates the injustice that a movement intends to address.
It articulates a problem such that the conclusion that an
authority system is violating the shared principles of the
participants and provides a reason for noncompliance with
the authority, or that some established practice or mode of
thought is wrong and ought to be replaced. In most generic
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sense, this master frame is about the conception of injustice,
power and domination, be it inherent in people (race or
gender) and identity politics, or in the system, or in conflicts
between groups and denials of rights to some groups within
otherwise just system.
.3 Democratization Refers to the process of transition from totalitarian and
authoritarian systems to the democratic system and attendant
processes, requirements and benchmarks. The aspects of the
democratization frame overlap with the aspects of the rights
frame, but the democratization frame accentuates the
transformation of the society, of which the protection of
rights is but one element. The frame covers all aspects of
democracy as a political system, including the principle of
informed public deliberation and government accountability.
.4 Rule of law
Is used in framing movements’ goals as the improvement of
the legislative system and the practice. For example, MDM’s
legislative proposals can judged in terms of their legal worth,
clarity, fit with the constitution, their implementation in
practice, etc.
.5 Fair elections
Refers to the aspects of fair elections and the need to hold
fair elections.
.6 Free speech
Refers to commonly understood, important and universally
held value of freedom of expression and speech. It is a subset of both the rights and democratization frames, but, for the
purposes of this study, is assigned a separate code to refer to
media’s and communicators’ rights. Any discussion of media
free distribution of broadcast signal, newspaper content,
licensing belong here.
.7 Access to
This frame accentuates an access to information, which,
information –
together with free speech, is an element of the freedom of
plurality
speech and expression framework. This frame discusses the
same issues, as in free speech, but not from media’s, that is,
communicators’ perspective, but from audience members,’
that is, recipients’ perspective.
.8 Access to
This frame underlines the need for greater transparency and
information –
sincerity as opposed to conspiratorial and covert conduct in
transparency
public affairs. The frame has been deployed in earlier studies
of protests in Georgia (Manning, 2007). The discussion of
media ownership and financial transparency belong here.
It concerns you
Refers to citizens’ responsibility, ownership and agency to
deal with problems in their sociopolitical environment.
Other
Code any other frame that is not listed above here, and
specify its meaning.
17: Demobilizing frames: a demobilizing frame is a frame that is intended to or can
potentially demobilize support for the Coalition for Media Advocacy, the It Concerns
You campaign, and the specific issues they have been advocating (as listed in 4.1). These
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frames can be deployed and voiced by the government, but also by other challenger
parties. Please look up the frame definitions in the table and check the ones that best fit
the reporting in an article or a TV story. You can code more than one frame. If a story is
not about the organizations/issues of interest but only mentions those, look at the frames
only in those paragraphs that mentions these issues.
Demobilizing frames Definition
.1 Supports status
Refers to expressions of support for the maintenance of
quo
status quo versus changes proposed by activists; Supports
any repressive measures against activists by a government,
and, in general, government policies.
.2 Hinders free
Refers to claims that protesters’ demands interfere with free
business
market rules. e.g: The demands of legislative changes and
more new regulations upset the free business of media. Any
discussion that accentuates the business aspect of media,
profits, and economic consequences of proposed media
regulations belongs here.
.3 Hinders country
Accentuates the importance of fast economic,
development,
infrastructural, administrative development and state
unpatriotic
building, in general. These concerns are cited as justification
for the authoritarian rule and mistreatment of activists. The
essence of the frame is that developmental concerns are
superior to other concerns, such as human or media rights.
In this frame, a protest is unpatriotic, harmful for a country,
and even treasonous.
.4 Politicizing,
Defines any protest, even one that focus on community
political scam
concerns, in political terms. Protesters are accused of having
manifest or hidden political agendas and seeking political
benefits for themselves more than seeking benefits for the
people. Often, parties and politicians are implicated in
stirring a protest in this frame, or, activism is assigned to
manipulation from other countries and their special services
(KGB). This frame is assumed that all activism is basically
part of the fight between the opposition and the government.
This frame, in general terms, equates activism with the
intrigue or scam.
.5 Immoral, against Defines protest as defying tradition and morality and
tradition
religious values.
.6 Violence,
Refers to general lawlessness, anarchy, violence, vandalism,
confrontation with
crime, clashes with the police, police attacking
police
demonstrations, arrests, cases brought against people, any
other conflict between protesters and the police.
.7 Freak
Appearance and dramaturgy- based coverage, which
show/carnival
emphasizes physical or mental oddities among the
protesters, such as body piercing, long hair, funny clothes,
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bare feet, etc. The frame also emphasized protesters’ odd
behavior, such as staging street action as theatrical
performances, shows, flash mobs, carnivals; Any mentions
of celebrity supporters of protest and their appearance at
protests belongs here.
.8 Romper
Stresses mental, ideological oddities of participants, their
room/idiots at large idealism, naiveté, unprofessional judgment, lack of
understanding of the problem they are dealing with, etc.
.9 Public opinion
Refers to the use of public opinion polls to show public
polls, other
opposition to the protest. Public opinion is invoked to
statistics, bystander marginalize the position of protesters by implying that they
accounts
do not speak for the majority of people or that they represent
only a small, deviant group of population. Also, the frame
refers to unsubstantiated references to the public opinion on
the issue, bystanders’ and witness commentaries that
amplify deviance of the protests compared to publicly held
views or social norms. For example, the protests in Georgia
in 2010 were marginalized through quoting residents in the
protest area, who complained about the dirt and mess in the
streets during the gatherings of protesters.
.10 Counter
Describes counterdemonstrations against a protest event or
demonstrations
against a cause of a social movement.
.11 Bothersome,
Refers to minor disruptions, such as traffic disruptions,
disruptive
garbage and sanitation problems, upset commerce, various
other public costs related to demonstrations and other street
action.
.12 Ineffective,
Code here any references to ineffectiveness of a protest, it
impotent,
being ignored by its targets – the government, the public -counterproductive
as well as comments that the activism will lead nowhere,
and that is not effective.
18. Dominant frames: Calculate the ratio of mobilizing frames, and if one frame
corresponds to more than 70 percent of the materials, code
.1= Single dominant mobilizing frame.
.2=Single dominant demobilizing frame
.3=Mixed mobilizing frame: code mixed mobilizing frame if none of the frames
corresponds to more than 70 percent of material, and all the frames are mobilizing
frames.
.4=Mixed demobilizing frame: code mixed demobilizing frame if none of the
frames corresponds to more than 70 percent of material, and all the frames are
demobilizing frames.
.5=Mixed mobilizing &demobilizing frame: code mixed mobilizing &
demobilizing frame if none of the frames corresponds to more than 70 percent of
material, and there are both mobilizing and demobilizing frames in the material.
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Appendix B
Coding Sheet
1. Coder
1.
2.
.
2. Date: _____________________________
.
3. Media: .1 Alia__ .2 Resonansi__
.3 24 Hours__
.4 Rustavi 2__
.5 9th Channel__
.6Kavkasia TV
4. General topic: .1=media issues in item 5__.2=other media issues (mentions item 5 media issues)__.3 other issues (mentions
item 5 issues ) 4. Unrelated_____PLEASE, STOP CODING IF UNRELATED!
5. Media issues of interest to the study (you can check more than one)
.
.1 It Concerns You_________________
.4 Ban on antenna distribution ______________
.2 Coalition for Media Advocacy_____
.5 Media ownership & financial transparency______
.3 Must Cary /must offer ___________
6. Headline/ story title (please, write in full________________________________________________________
…
7.Type of newspaper story
8. Newspaper story location 9. Newspaper story length
.1 news in brief__
.1page number ____
.1 number of paragraphs____
.
.2 story_________
.2=N/A__
.2=N/A ____
.3 opinion_______
.4 interview_____
.5 editorial______
.6 other_________
.7 N/A
10.TV program type
11.TV story type
12. TV story length
.
.1=morning news___
.1=voiceover___
.1=length in minutes/seconds__
.2=afternoon news___
.2=package___
.2=N/A
.3=primetime news___
.3=anchor’s text___
.4=late night news___
.4=interview____
.5=unclear
.5=other_____
.6 N/A
. 6=N/A___
.13 Produced by: 1. Staff___ .2. Agency ______ .3 Int’l story
.4Other (please, specify)_______
.
14. Sources (you can check more than one.)
.
1= Activists - MDM ____
.6=Opposition MPs ____
.2=Activist journalists – MDM____
.7=non-parliamentary political parties____
.3=other activists (than .1) ___________
.8= international community/diplomats___
.4=other journalists/owners (than .2)_______
.9= ordinary citizens___
.5=government officials, ruling party MPs_______
.10= other (specify)___
15. Dominant tone towards MDM (organization, campaign, or issues listed in item 11)
:
.1=negative___
.2 neutral___
.3=positive___
16. Mobilizing frames (you can check more than one)
:
.1=rights__________________________________.2=inj
.6=free speech_____________________________
ustice________________________________
.7=access to information - plurality____________
.3=democratization__________________________
.8=access to information - transparency_________
.4=rule of law_____________________________
.9=other (please, specify)____________________
.5=fair elections_____________________________
17. Demobilizing frames (you can check more than one)
:
.1=support status quo________________________
.8 =romper room/idiots at large________________
.2=hinders free business________
.9=unfavorable polls, eye-witness______________
.3=hinders country development, unpatriotic______
.10=counter-demonstrations__________________
.4=politicizing, scamming_____________________
.11=bothersome, disruptive__________________
.5=immoral, against tradition__________________
.12=ineffective, impotent, counterproductive_____
.6=violence, police confrontation______________
.13=other (please, specify)___________________
.7=freak show, weird show, carnival____________
18. Dominant frames
.4=Mixed demobilizing frame___________________
.1=Single dominant mobilizing frame (specify)________
.5=Mixed mobilizing & demobilizing frames________
.2=Single dominant demobilizing frame (specify)______
.3=Mixed mobilizing frame_______________________
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Appendix C
Statements by MDM

Table C.1: List of MDM statements
Issued by
Coalition for
Media Advocacy

Title
Memorandum of
partnership

Date
04.13.2011

Coalition for
Media Advocacy

Coalition for Media
Advocacy denounced
violence against journalists
The Coalition for Media
Advocacy Statement on
actions of the tax service at
“Mediapalitra”
The Coalition for Media
Advocacy statement
regarding the arrest of four
photographers
The Coalition for Media
Advocacy requests
termination of Alpha Com
auctioning.
The Coalition for Media
Advocacy responds to
information in web edition
Netgazeti
The Coalition for Media
Advocacy expresses
solidarity to the print
media
The Coalition for Media
Advocacy statement
regarding the adoption of
the election legislation

05.26.2011

Coalition for
Media Advocacy

Coalition for
Media Advocacy

Coalition for
Media Advocacy

Coalition for
Media Advocacy

Coalition for
Media Advocacy

Coalition for
Media Advocacy
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06.10.2011

Topic
Statement of intent upon
launch of the Coalition
for Media Advocacy
Violence against
journalists at May 26
protests
Tax audit of Media
House Mediapalitra

07.10.2011

Arrest of photographers

08.01.2011

Auction sale of TV
tower

11.21.2011

Blackmail campaign
against journalist Tedo
Jorbenadze

11.28.2011

Newspaper stands
removed by the
government

12.24.2011

Fair media coverage and
transparency of the
election process

Coalition for
Media Advocacy

Coalition for
Media Advocacy
Eastern
Partnership

Coalition for
Media Advocacy

It Concerns You

Eastern
Partnership

Media
Association

Coalition for
Media Advocacy
It Concerns You

The Coalition for Media
Advocacy Statement on
legislative amendments to
the Election Code
The Coalition for Media
Advocacy addresses the
Chairman of the Parliament
Special Statement on the
enactment of “Must
carry/must offer”
regulation
The Coalition for Media
Advocacy statement on the
decision of the Tbilisi
Court
It Concerns You protests
seizure of Maestro TV
satellite antennas
Statement on the preelection media
environment

01.12.2012

Fair media coverage and
transparency of the
election process

02.09.2012

Media access at the
Parliament

06.08.201

mandatory broadcast
signal distribution by
cable operators

06.16.2012

Maestro satellite
antenna distribution

07.12.2012

Maestro satellite
antenna distribution

08.30.2012

Petition regarding
continued enforcement of
“Must Carry” principle
after the Elections
Call to Ensure
Transparency on Election
Day
Special statement on
continued enforcement of
“Must carry / must offer”
rules

09.04.2012

Must carry” rules of
mandatory broadcast
signal distribution by
cable operators
Must carry” rules of
mandatory broadcast
signal distribution by
cable operators
Fair media coverage and
transparency of the
election process
mandatory broadcast
signal distribution by
cable operators
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09.24.2012

09.30.2012

Appendix D
Frames in MDM Statements

Table D.1: List of frames in MDM statements
Frames
Free speech
Access to information –
plurality
access to information –
transparency

Law
Democratization

Fair elections
Injustice
Public interest
Rights
Government
responsibility

Keywords
Freedom of speech, freedom of media, free press, free
distribution, unlimited distribution
Access to information, plurality, access to news, access to
TV channels, plural views, alternative views, oppositional
views
Public information, publicly data, information about
government, ownership information, transparency,
transparent governance, ownership transparency, financial
transparency, financial disclosure, public information
requests
rule of law, legislation, law, legal framework, the
Constitution, parliamentary hearings
democratization, democratic development, progress,
democratic transformation, democratic image, democratic
indicators
fair elections, free and participatory elections, competitive
elections, voters’ informed choice
Pressure, violations, violence, arrests, seizure, ban,
intimidation
Public interest in the interests of the public, public needs,
societal needs
Right to information, basic human rights, democratic
rights, civic rights.
Government responsibility, government to act,
government to solve issues, government action, addressing
government
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Appendix E
Reliability Coefficients

Table E.1: Reliability coefficients
Variable

Krippendorff's
Alpha
.98

Topics-MDM

1.00

Topics-General media
Topics – General sociopolitical

1.00

Topics – Unrelated

.97

Issues – It Concerns You

.98

Issues – Coalition

.95

Issues – Must Carry

.98

Issues – Maestro

.93

Issues – Transparency

.98

Story type/Newspaper – news in brief

.98

Story type/newspaper – stories

.95

Story type/newspaper – interview

1.00

Story type/newspaper – opinion

1.00

Story type/newspaper – editorial

1.00

Story types/newspaper – other

1.00

Location/newspaper – page number

1.00

Type TV program – morning

1.00

Type TV program –afternoon

1.00

Type TV program –primetime

.98

Type TV program – late night

.98
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Type TV program – unclear

1.00

Type Story/TV –voiceover

.92

Type story/TV – package

.96

Type story/TV – anchor’s text

.97

Type story/TV – interview

.98
.98

Type story/TV Sources – activists MDM

.90

Sources – activist journalists

.78

Sources – activists other

.89

Sources – journalists other

.98

Sources – Government

.94

Sources – MPs opposition

.92

Sources – non-parliamentary opposition

.95

Sources – international community

1.00

Sources – ordinary people

.97

Sources – other

.97

Tone – negative

1.00

Tone – neutral

.81

Tone – positive

.72

Mobilizing frames – rights

.85

Mobilizing frames – injustice

.84

Mobilizing frames – democratization

.90

Mobilizing frames – rule of law

.93

Mobilizing frames – fair elections

.87

Mobilizing frames – free speech

.74

Mobilizing frames – access to information plurality

.91

Mobilizing frames – access to information – transparency

.89

Mobilizing frames – other

1.00

Demobilizing frame – supports status quo

1.00
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Demobilizing frame –hinders free business

.98

Demobilizing frame – hinders country/unpatriotic

.97

Demobilizing frame –politicize, scamming

.94

Demobilizing frame – immoral

1.00

Demobilizing frame – violence

1.00

Demobilizing frame –freak show

1.00

Demobilizing frame – romper room, idiots

1.00

Demobilizing frame – polls, eyewitness

1.00

Demobilizing frame – counterdemonstration

1.00

Demobilizing frame –bothersome, disruptive

1.00

Demobilizing frame – impotent, ineffective

1.00

Demobilizing frame –other

.95

Dominant frame – single mobilizing

.93

Dominant frame – single demobilizing

1.00

Dominant frame – multi mobilizing

.90

Dominant frame – multi demobilizing

1.00

Dominant frame – mixed

.88
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